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SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 248652, June 19, 2024 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO M. TALAUE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
R E S O L U T I O N
GAERLAN, J.:
For resolution are the Motion for Reconsideration[1] dated March 3, 2021, the Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration[2] dated April 22, 2022, and the corresponding Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (of the January 12, 2021 Decision),[3] likewise dated April 22, 2022, all filed by accused-appellant Antonio M. Talaue (Talaue), assailing the Court's earlier Decision[4] dated January 12, 2021.
In said Decision, the Court denied Talaue's appeal from the Decision[5] dated March 15, 2019 and the Resolution[6] dated July 19, 2019 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0120, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 52(g)[7] in relation to Section 6(b)[8] of Republic Act No. 8291,[9] otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act of 1997.
Antecedents
Talaue, along with Efren C. Guiyab (Guiyab) and Florante A. Galasinao (Galasinao), was indicted by virtue of an Information[10] dated June 9, 2010, the accusatory portion of which reading as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution
Talaue served as Mayor of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Isabela, from 1988 to 1998 and from 2001 to 2010. Guiyab and Galasinao were the Municipal Treasurer and the Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the said municipality.
In a demand letter[15] dated September 19, 2003, the GSIS informed Talaue that the Municipality of Sto. Tomas failed to remit the Social Insurance Contributions of its employees between 1997 and 2003. The unpaid premium collectibles, including interest, totaled PHP 12,071,451.22. Similar notices dated August 2, 2004,[16] February 14, 2005,[17] and March 1, 2006[18] were sent by GSIS to Talaue.
The failure of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas to pay the GSIS constrained the latter to institute a case for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages before Branch 118 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 06-0407-CFM.
On January 7, 2009, the RTC issued a Decision[19] based on a 2008 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the GSIS and the Municipality of Sto. Tomas as represented by Talaue. The said MOA, which was incorporated in the RTC Decision in its entirety, set the liability of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas to PHP 25,444,429.92, payable within 10 years.
Later, in a letter[20] dated October 27, 2016, denominated as Notice on Past Due Compulsory Premiums, the GSIS informed Talaue that the Municipality of Sto. Tomas had not paid the arrearages on its premiums which amounted to PHP 22,436,546.10.
Meanwhile, in a Complaint-Affidavit[21] dated September 4, 2005, Leighton R. Siazon, Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS, charged Talaue, Guiyab, and Galasinao with violation of Republic Act No. 8291 before the Office of the Ombudsman. A similar Affidavit-Complaint[22] dated July 26, 2006 was also filed by Mateo G. Malabug, a Municipal Councilor of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas.
By virtue of the Office of the Ombudsman's Consolidated Resolution[23] dated June 9, 2010, Talaue, Guiyab, and Galasinao were formally charged with violation of Section 52(g) in relation to Section 6(b) of Republic Act No. 8291.
In a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion[24] dated April 10, 2018, the Sandiganbayan was informed of Guiyab's passing on March 22, 2018.[25] Thus, the charge against him was dismissed,[26] while the case proceeded against Talaue and Galasinao.
Evidence for the defense
Professing innocence, Talaue contended in his Judicial Affidavit[27] dated June 27, 2018 that prior to the year 1997, the usual practice was that the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) would withhold funds from the municipality's budget which, in turn, would be applied as payment of the latter's obligations such as the GSIS premium contributions in question. Talaue likewise asserted that the DBM's withholding of the amount of PHP 5,000,000.00 from the municipality's budget for the year 1997 led him to believe that the same would be used to cover remittances to the GSIS. However, the DBM did not do so, resulting in fiscal problems for the municipality.
Talaue instructed Guiyab, the Municipal Treasurer at that time, to reconcile the municipality's accounts. He was unable to ascertain Guiyab's compliance because his term as Municipal Mayor ended in 1998. When he returned to office in 2001, he discovered that Guiyab did not address the issue with the GSIS.
Talaue also contended that the 2008 MOA converted the municipality's obligation into a loan. In particular, Paragraph 5.1 of the said document reads as follows:
On the other hand, in his Judicial Affidavit[30] dated June 18, 2018, Galasinao insisted that as Municipal Accountant, he was not specifically mandated by law to remit the GSIS contributions of the employees of the municipality. His participation is limited to computing the deductions from the employees' monthly salary and preparing the disbursement vouchers, expenditure reports, and other related documents for the GSIS contributions and remittances. His participation stops at the moment of his endorsement of these documents to the Municipal Treasurer.
On March 15, 2019, the Sandiganbayan issued a Decision[31] acquitting Galasinao but convicting Talaue.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that Galasinao cannot be held liable for the crime charged because based on Section 474(b)[32] of the Local Government Code of 1991,[33] as amended, the remittance or payment of the GSIS premium contributions is not among his list of functions and duties as Municipal Accountant. Moreover, the Information did not allege that Galasinao conspired with Talaue, and neither was there any evidence presented for such purpose.
As for the finding of guilt rendered against Talaue, the Sandiganbayan found that he was in the wrong for trying to put all the blame on Guiyab. Moreover, the non-remittance of the GSIS premium contributions is malum prohibitum. Talaue cannot hide behind the 2008 MOA because the conversion of the outstanding premium contributions into a loan did not result in the extinguishment of his criminal liability.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan decreed:
Undaunted, Talaue sought refuge to this Court by interposing an appeal.[38]
Talaue's Appeal
In his Appellant's Brief[39] dated January 22, 2020, Talaue excoriated the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction and argued, inter alia, that notwithstanding the pronouncement that the crime involved in this case is malum prohibitum, the prosecution still failed to discharge its burden of showing that the inability to remit the GSIS premium contributions was intentional; that the exact amount of unremitted contributions was uncertain because no reconciliation was ever conducted to determine the same; that having relied in good faith that his subordinates would facilitate the remittance of the municipality's obligations to the GSIS, the doctrines laid down in Arias v. Sandiganbayan[40] and in Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan[41] dictate that he must be exculpated from liability; and that, at any rate, the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, in the absence of any finding of grave misconduct on his part, is unconstitutional.
In its Appellee's Brief[42] dated June 10, 2020, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) countermanded, among others, that by interposing an ordinary appeal instead of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Talaue availed of the wrong remedy; that, as such, the issuances of the Sandiganbayan had attained finality; that Talaue's guilt has been fully established by the prosecution, especially considering the fact that the crime involved is malum prohibitum; and that the Arias and Magsuci doctrines are inapplicable in this case, it appearing that Talaue did not do anything aside from merely giving instructions to Guiyab.
The Assailed January 12, 2021 Decision
On January 12, 2021, the Court rendered a Decision[43] denying Talaue's appeal. While the Court ruled that Talaue, availed of the correct mode of appeal, the circumstances obtaining in the instant case do not support his plea for acquittal.
In rejecting the contentions put forth by Talaue, the Court ratiocinated that because the crime subject of the instant case is malum prohibitum, it was incumbent upon him to take "drastic measures to rectify the situation and demand accountability"[44] and prove that he was not nonchalant in complying with his legal obligation to remit the GSIS contributions of the municipality's employees on time; that the blanket claim that the municipality did not have enough funds to remit the said GSIS contributions was insufficient and unsubstantiated; that the 2008 MOA only finds relevance with respect to Talaue's civil liability for damages, not his criminal liability; and that Talaue cannot rely on the Arias and Magsuci doctrines because he did not even file charges against Guiyab for the latter's failure to facilitate the remittance of the outstanding contributions to GSIS.
Hence, the present recourse.
Arguments
In favor of Talaue
In the instant Motion for Reconsideration,[45] Talaue asserts, inter alia, that the imposition of the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office is unconstitutional in the absence of any finding that he committed grave misconduct or any such administrative offense; that Section 52(g) of Republic Act No. 8291 is a bill of attainder for penalizing him with perpetual disqualification without any ill motive or malice on his part being proven by the prosecution; that contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, he exerted efforts to settle the municipality's obligations with the GSIS; that the prosecution failed to prove that the nonpayment of the GSIS contributions in question was not without justifiable cause; and that the facts do not support the charge in the Information that he failed to remit said GSIS contributions for the entire period of January 1997 to January 2004, in view of the fact that he was not the Municipal Mayor between July 1, 1998 and June 30, 2001.
Thereafter, in his Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (of the January 12, 2021 Decision),[46] Talaue further contended that the Information against him is defective because it failed to completely allege the essential details of the crime charged. In particular, there was no allegation as to how Talaue was responsible for the remittance of the GSIS premiums pertaining to the term when he was not the municipal mayor. Moreover, the date of the commission of the crime as stated in the Information, written as March 1, 2006, is inconsistent with the period involved, which is from January 1, 1997 until January 31, 2004.
Talaue further asseverated that there was no allegation as to the nature of the GSIS premiums which the municipality failed to remit to the GSIS; that the 2008 MOA converted the legal relationship between the municipality and the GSIS into a contractual relationship, thereby resulting in an express novation as would negate Talaue's criminal liability, if any; that the prosecution failed to identify his precise participation that may be considered an overt criminal act; that the factual findings of the court a quo are not supported by the evidence of record; that the lack of administrative action against Guiyab cannot be taken against him; and that there was no clear intention on his part to harm or commit a grave wrong, thus proving that the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification is unwarranted.
In favor of the People
In its Comment[47] dated January 9, 2023, the People, represented by the OSP, defends its position by elucidating that Talaue was afforded his rights to due process and to be informed of the nature of the cause and accusation against him because the Information sufficiently apprised him of the crime charged against him; that the 2008 MOA did not alter Talaue's criminal liability; that as Municipal Mayor, Talaue was primarily responsible for the prompt and timely remittance of the GSIS premium contributions; and that the Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration[48] dated April 22, 2022 must be denied for failure to allege supervening events as would justify the same.
Issue
In view of the parties' respective postures, the Court is called upon to determine whether the arguments advanced by Talaue warrant a reconsideration of its January 12, 2021 Decision, thereby resulting in his acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
In considering the arguments propounded by Talaue, the Court takes a second hard look on the facts obtaining in this case and the matters which were either not touched upon or were only discussed in passing in its January 12, 2021 Decision. In so doing, the Court gives particular attention to the assertions that Talaue's constitutional right to due process of law was violated by virtue of the defects in the Information charging him of the subject crime; the criminal liability imputed upon him for acts that were performed or not performed by his successor as Municipal Mayor between the years 1999 and 2001; and the attribution of criminal liability based on malum prohibitum, regardless of previous attempts on his part to settle the obligations of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas with the GSIS.
The Court acquits.
The Court grants the Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration[49] and, accordingly, admits the Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (of the January 12, 2021 Decision).[50]
A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading[51] and does not replace that which it supplements.[52] It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand.[53] Thus, it exists side by side with the original.[54]
The admission or non-admission of a supplemental pleading is not a matter of right but, rather, lies in the sound discretion of the court before which its admission is sought.[55] The standards that courts generally follow in the determination of whether or not a supplemental pleading must be accepted have been laid down in Spouses Lambino v. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela City[56] as follows:
II.
Contrary to Talaue's contention, the allegations in the Information dated June 9, 2010 sufficiently prepared him for a proper and adequate defense.
The Constitution ordains that every person charged with the commission of a crime must be afforded the right to due process of law. Section 14 of the Bill of Rights so states:
In order to determine whether an Information complies with the requirements of the Constitution, Sections 6, 8, and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide:
Enrile v. People[64] expounds:
Too, Talaue's contention that the Information inaccurately includes a period when he was not the incumbent mayor of Sto. Tomas, Isabela is a matter of defense that is best addressed during trial.
Indeed, in Jalandoni v. Office of the Ombudsman,[71] the Court had occasion to ordain that:
At any rate, the records show that Talaue never raised the issue of sufficiency of the Information before the court a quo. His Motion to Quash[74] merely claimed that it was the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, which had jurisdiction over the case, and nothing else. It is settled that, as a general rule, failure to assail the Information before an accused pleads is deemed a waiver of any of his or her objections.[75]
II.
Nevertheless, Talaue must be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
While proof beyond reasonable doubt is meant to be that, "all things given, the mind of the judge can rest at ease concerning its verdict,"[76] reasonable doubt is defined as "that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt."[77] Reasonable doubt refers to the "possibility of innocence based on reason and common sense, arising from the evidence or lack of evidence as the case may be."[78] It is:
At the outset, there is no showing that Talaue, as Municipal Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Isabela, had the positive duty to remit the GSIS premium contributions of all employees within his political subdivision. The Local Government Code of 1991 refers to municipal mayors as "chief executives"[80] and not "heads of offices" as contemplated under Section 52(g) of Republic Act No. 8291. More importantly, nowhere in the Local Government Code of 1991 does it include the remittance of GSIS premiums as part of the duties of a mayor.[81] In addition, no reference was made to any internal memorandum or practice within the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Isabela regarding the mayor's participation when it comes to remitting GSIS premium contributions.
On another score, the Court finds as misguided the assertion that Talaue must be convicted on the mere characterization of the crime involved as malum prohibitum. In the recent case of Valenzona v. People,[82] the Court made a distinction between "intent to commit the crime" and "intent to perpetrate the act," such that in crimes classified as mala prohibita, the prosecution must still discharge the burden of proving that the prohibited act was intentionally done by the accused. Thus:
Records show that upon being notified of the municipality's unpaid premium contributions, Talaue readily acknowledged the same and made verbal instructions to Guiyab to update the municipality's accounts with GSIS. Moreover, it was Talaue who entered into the 2008 MOA on the municipality's behalf to ensure that GSIS would be able to collect payment of the municipality's obligations on an installment basis. Worth replicating at this juncture are the following statements in Talaue's Judicial Affidavit[83] dated June 27, 2018:
Verily, Talaue not only made possible the signing of the 2008 MOA, but also attempted to reduce the municipality's obligations to GSIS. He did everything in his power to cause the payment of the unpaid remittances to GSIS. Were it not for the January 7, 2009 RTC Decision which is based on the 2008 MOA, the GSIS would not have been able to file a motion for execution dated October 6, 2010 which, in turn, resulted in the RTC's issuance of a writ of execution through an Order dated March 31, 2011. The Court in its earlier January 12, 2021 Decision acknowledged as much when it declared that it was "through [Talaue's] initiative that the GSIS eventually restructured the obligations of the municipality through the MOA."[88] Unfortunately for Talaue, matters became more complicated when his successor failed to follow through with the 2008 MOA. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the fact that he demonstrated a lack of intent to perpetrate the act or omission penalized by Section 52(g) of Republic Act No. 8291.
In contrast, the prosecution merely asserted that the crime involved in this case is malum prohibitum, and nothing more. Au contraire, dispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita does not discharge the prosecution's burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the prohibited act was done by the accused intentionally.[89]
All told, there was no attempt on the part of the prosecution to show Talaue's intent to perpetrate the crime charged. He did not perform any overt act as would exhibit an intent to violate Republic Act No. 8291. Moreover, Talaue was able to adduce proof of specific acts negating or disproving such perpetrative intent on his part. He did not perform any overt acts as would exhibit an intent to commit the crime in question. His conviction must, perforce, be overturned.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court will no longer belabor itself into discussing the other issues raised by Talaue.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated March 3, 2021, the Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration dated April 22, 2022, and the Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, also dated April 22, 2022, are GRANTED. The Court's Decision dated January 12, 2021 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated March 15, 2019 and the Resolution dated July 19, 2019 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0120 are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure on the part of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant Antonio M. Talaue is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in said case.
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Zalameda, Dimaampao, and Kho, Jr., JJ. concur.
Caguioa (Chairperson), J., see concurring opinion.
[1] Rollo, pp. 128-137.
[2] Id. at 150-153.
[3] Id. at 154-193.
[4] Id. at 106-127. Penned by Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Rosmari D. Carandang (retired), Rodil V. Zalameda, and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
[5] Id. at 3-19. Penned by Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. Musngi and concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar C. Herrera, Jr. and Lorifel L. Pahimna of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
[6] Id. at 20-25.
[7] SECTION 52. Penalty. — . . .
[10] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 1, pp. 1-2.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 114-118.
[13] Id. at 197-204. Penned by Associate Justice Napoleon E. Inoturan and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos and Oscar C. Herrera, Jr. of the Special Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
[14] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 2, pp. 147-165. The Pre-Trial Order dated October 6, 2017 was signed by Associate Justices Oscar C. Herrera, Jr., Michael Frederick L. Musngi, and Efren N. Dela Cruz of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
[15] Id. at 208-209.
[16] Id. at 196-198.
[17] Id. at 199-200.
[18] Id. at 193-195.
[19] Id. at 213-222. Rendered by Judge Pedro B. Corales (now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals).
[20] Id. at 202-204.
[21] Id. at 18-19.
[22] Id. at 16-17.
[23] Id. at 4-15. The Consolidated Resolution was signed by Maria Melinda S. Mananghaya, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I, recommended for approval by Mark E. Jalandoni, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and, ultimately, approved by Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro.
[24] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 2, pp.176-179.
[25] Id. at 180. Certificate of Death.
[26] Id. at 183. Order dated April 19, 2018.
[27] Id. at 258-266.
[28] Id. at 219.
[29] Id. at 220. The said paragraph reads:
In said Decision, the Court denied Talaue's appeal from the Decision[5] dated March 15, 2019 and the Resolution[6] dated July 19, 2019 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0120, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 52(g)[7] in relation to Section 6(b)[8] of Republic Act No. 8291,[9] otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act of 1997.
Talaue, along with Efren C. Guiyab (Guiyab) and Florante A. Galasinao (Galasinao), was indicted by virtue of an Information[10] dated June 9, 2010, the accusatory portion of which reading as follows:
That on or about 01 March 2006, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Sto. Tomas, Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and the Municipal Accountant, respectively, and as such has the legal obligation to timely remit to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) the GSIS premium contributions of the employees of the Municipal Government of Sto. Tomas, Isabela did there and then willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, fail to remit the said GSIS premiums, with an aggregate amount of [PHP] 22,436,546.10, for the period 01 January 1997 to 31 January 2004 within thirty (30) days from the date on which payment thereof has become due and demandable, to the damage and prejudice of the municipal employees.Talaue and Galasinao filed a Motion to Quash[12] dated September 12, 2011, alleging that it was the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, which had jurisdiction over the case, especially considering that he was no longer Municipal Mayor at the time and none of the accused were occupying a government position classified as Salary Grade 27 and above. The said motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[13] dated February 27, 2015. Thus, the court a quo proceeded with the arraignment of Talaue, Guiyab, and Galasinao who, while being assisted by their respective counsels, each entered a plea of not guilty. Then, pre-trial [14] ensued, followed by trial on the merits.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
Evidence for the prosecution
Talaue served as Mayor of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Isabela, from 1988 to 1998 and from 2001 to 2010. Guiyab and Galasinao were the Municipal Treasurer and the Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the said municipality.
In a demand letter[15] dated September 19, 2003, the GSIS informed Talaue that the Municipality of Sto. Tomas failed to remit the Social Insurance Contributions of its employees between 1997 and 2003. The unpaid premium collectibles, including interest, totaled PHP 12,071,451.22. Similar notices dated August 2, 2004,[16] February 14, 2005,[17] and March 1, 2006[18] were sent by GSIS to Talaue.
The failure of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas to pay the GSIS constrained the latter to institute a case for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages before Branch 118 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 06-0407-CFM.
On January 7, 2009, the RTC issued a Decision[19] based on a 2008 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the GSIS and the Municipality of Sto. Tomas as represented by Talaue. The said MOA, which was incorporated in the RTC Decision in its entirety, set the liability of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas to PHP 25,444,429.92, payable within 10 years.
Later, in a letter[20] dated October 27, 2016, denominated as Notice on Past Due Compulsory Premiums, the GSIS informed Talaue that the Municipality of Sto. Tomas had not paid the arrearages on its premiums which amounted to PHP 22,436,546.10.
Meanwhile, in a Complaint-Affidavit[21] dated September 4, 2005, Leighton R. Siazon, Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS, charged Talaue, Guiyab, and Galasinao with violation of Republic Act No. 8291 before the Office of the Ombudsman. A similar Affidavit-Complaint[22] dated July 26, 2006 was also filed by Mateo G. Malabug, a Municipal Councilor of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas.
By virtue of the Office of the Ombudsman's Consolidated Resolution[23] dated June 9, 2010, Talaue, Guiyab, and Galasinao were formally charged with violation of Section 52(g) in relation to Section 6(b) of Republic Act No. 8291.
In a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion[24] dated April 10, 2018, the Sandiganbayan was informed of Guiyab's passing on March 22, 2018.[25] Thus, the charge against him was dismissed,[26] while the case proceeded against Talaue and Galasinao.
Evidence for the defense
Professing innocence, Talaue contended in his Judicial Affidavit[27] dated June 27, 2018 that prior to the year 1997, the usual practice was that the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) would withhold funds from the municipality's budget which, in turn, would be applied as payment of the latter's obligations such as the GSIS premium contributions in question. Talaue likewise asserted that the DBM's withholding of the amount of PHP 5,000,000.00 from the municipality's budget for the year 1997 led him to believe that the same would be used to cover remittances to the GSIS. However, the DBM did not do so, resulting in fiscal problems for the municipality.
Talaue instructed Guiyab, the Municipal Treasurer at that time, to reconcile the municipality's accounts. He was unable to ascertain Guiyab's compliance because his term as Municipal Mayor ended in 1998. When he returned to office in 2001, he discovered that Guiyab did not address the issue with the GSIS.
Talaue also contended that the 2008 MOA converted the municipality's obligation into a loan. In particular, Paragraph 5.1 of the said document reads as follows:
5.1. Remitting Agency. The total or restructured obligation under this Agreement assumed by the MUNICIPALITY OF SANTO TOMAS shall be treated as a loan granted to MUNICIPALITY OF SANTO TOMAS as the remitting agency upon the signing hereof.[28]Hence, he asserted that he could not be charged for violation of Section 52(g) in relation to Section 6(b) of Republic Act No. 8291. Too, prescinding from Paragraph 6.4[29] of the 2008 MOA, an outstanding loan cannot be the basis for any criminal liability.
On the other hand, in his Judicial Affidavit[30] dated June 18, 2018, Galasinao insisted that as Municipal Accountant, he was not specifically mandated by law to remit the GSIS contributions of the employees of the municipality. His participation is limited to computing the deductions from the employees' monthly salary and preparing the disbursement vouchers, expenditure reports, and other related documents for the GSIS contributions and remittances. His participation stops at the moment of his endorsement of these documents to the Municipal Treasurer.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On March 15, 2019, the Sandiganbayan issued a Decision[31] acquitting Galasinao but convicting Talaue.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that Galasinao cannot be held liable for the crime charged because based on Section 474(b)[32] of the Local Government Code of 1991,[33] as amended, the remittance or payment of the GSIS premium contributions is not among his list of functions and duties as Municipal Accountant. Moreover, the Information did not allege that Galasinao conspired with Talaue, and neither was there any evidence presented for such purpose.
As for the finding of guilt rendered against Talaue, the Sandiganbayan found that he was in the wrong for trying to put all the blame on Guiyab. Moreover, the non-remittance of the GSIS premium contributions is malum prohibitum. Talaue cannot hide behind the 2008 MOA because the conversion of the outstanding premium contributions into a loan did not result in the extinguishment of his criminal liability.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Antonio M. Talaue GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 52(g) in relation to Section 6(b) of Republic Act No. 8291. He is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from three (3) years as minimum to five (5) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos [PHP] 20,000.00). He shall further suffer the penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling licensed by the Government.Talaue's Motion for Reconsideration[35] dated March 27, 2019 and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration[36] dated April 22, 2019 were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[37] dated July 19, 2019.
Accused Florante A. Galasinao, on the other hand, is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The property or cash bonds posted by accused Galasinao for his provisional liberty is ordered returned, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. The Hold Departure Order issued against him is ordered LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.[34]
Undaunted, Talaue sought refuge to this Court by interposing an appeal.[38]
In his Appellant's Brief[39] dated January 22, 2020, Talaue excoriated the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction and argued, inter alia, that notwithstanding the pronouncement that the crime involved in this case is malum prohibitum, the prosecution still failed to discharge its burden of showing that the inability to remit the GSIS premium contributions was intentional; that the exact amount of unremitted contributions was uncertain because no reconciliation was ever conducted to determine the same; that having relied in good faith that his subordinates would facilitate the remittance of the municipality's obligations to the GSIS, the doctrines laid down in Arias v. Sandiganbayan[40] and in Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan[41] dictate that he must be exculpated from liability; and that, at any rate, the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, in the absence of any finding of grave misconduct on his part, is unconstitutional.
In its Appellee's Brief[42] dated June 10, 2020, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) countermanded, among others, that by interposing an ordinary appeal instead of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Talaue availed of the wrong remedy; that, as such, the issuances of the Sandiganbayan had attained finality; that Talaue's guilt has been fully established by the prosecution, especially considering the fact that the crime involved is malum prohibitum; and that the Arias and Magsuci doctrines are inapplicable in this case, it appearing that Talaue did not do anything aside from merely giving instructions to Guiyab.
On January 12, 2021, the Court rendered a Decision[43] denying Talaue's appeal. While the Court ruled that Talaue, availed of the correct mode of appeal, the circumstances obtaining in the instant case do not support his plea for acquittal.
In rejecting the contentions put forth by Talaue, the Court ratiocinated that because the crime subject of the instant case is malum prohibitum, it was incumbent upon him to take "drastic measures to rectify the situation and demand accountability"[44] and prove that he was not nonchalant in complying with his legal obligation to remit the GSIS contributions of the municipality's employees on time; that the blanket claim that the municipality did not have enough funds to remit the said GSIS contributions was insufficient and unsubstantiated; that the 2008 MOA only finds relevance with respect to Talaue's civil liability for damages, not his criminal liability; and that Talaue cannot rely on the Arias and Magsuci doctrines because he did not even file charges against Guiyab for the latter's failure to facilitate the remittance of the outstanding contributions to GSIS.
Hence, the present recourse.
In favor of Talaue
In the instant Motion for Reconsideration,[45] Talaue asserts, inter alia, that the imposition of the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office is unconstitutional in the absence of any finding that he committed grave misconduct or any such administrative offense; that Section 52(g) of Republic Act No. 8291 is a bill of attainder for penalizing him with perpetual disqualification without any ill motive or malice on his part being proven by the prosecution; that contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, he exerted efforts to settle the municipality's obligations with the GSIS; that the prosecution failed to prove that the nonpayment of the GSIS contributions in question was not without justifiable cause; and that the facts do not support the charge in the Information that he failed to remit said GSIS contributions for the entire period of January 1997 to January 2004, in view of the fact that he was not the Municipal Mayor between July 1, 1998 and June 30, 2001.
Thereafter, in his Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (of the January 12, 2021 Decision),[46] Talaue further contended that the Information against him is defective because it failed to completely allege the essential details of the crime charged. In particular, there was no allegation as to how Talaue was responsible for the remittance of the GSIS premiums pertaining to the term when he was not the municipal mayor. Moreover, the date of the commission of the crime as stated in the Information, written as March 1, 2006, is inconsistent with the period involved, which is from January 1, 1997 until January 31, 2004.
Talaue further asseverated that there was no allegation as to the nature of the GSIS premiums which the municipality failed to remit to the GSIS; that the 2008 MOA converted the legal relationship between the municipality and the GSIS into a contractual relationship, thereby resulting in an express novation as would negate Talaue's criminal liability, if any; that the prosecution failed to identify his precise participation that may be considered an overt criminal act; that the factual findings of the court a quo are not supported by the evidence of record; that the lack of administrative action against Guiyab cannot be taken against him; and that there was no clear intention on his part to harm or commit a grave wrong, thus proving that the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification is unwarranted.
In favor of the People
In its Comment[47] dated January 9, 2023, the People, represented by the OSP, defends its position by elucidating that Talaue was afforded his rights to due process and to be informed of the nature of the cause and accusation against him because the Information sufficiently apprised him of the crime charged against him; that the 2008 MOA did not alter Talaue's criminal liability; that as Municipal Mayor, Talaue was primarily responsible for the prompt and timely remittance of the GSIS premium contributions; and that the Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration[48] dated April 22, 2022 must be denied for failure to allege supervening events as would justify the same.
In view of the parties' respective postures, the Court is called upon to determine whether the arguments advanced by Talaue warrant a reconsideration of its January 12, 2021 Decision, thereby resulting in his acquittal.
In considering the arguments propounded by Talaue, the Court takes a second hard look on the facts obtaining in this case and the matters which were either not touched upon or were only discussed in passing in its January 12, 2021 Decision. In so doing, the Court gives particular attention to the assertions that Talaue's constitutional right to due process of law was violated by virtue of the defects in the Information charging him of the subject crime; the criminal liability imputed upon him for acts that were performed or not performed by his successor as Municipal Mayor between the years 1999 and 2001; and the attribution of criminal liability based on malum prohibitum, regardless of previous attempts on his part to settle the obligations of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas with the GSIS.
The Court acquits.
I.
The Court grants the Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration[49] and, accordingly, admits the Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (of the January 12, 2021 Decision).[50]
A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading[51] and does not replace that which it supplements.[52] It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand.[53] Thus, it exists side by side with the original.[54]
The admission or non-admission of a supplemental pleading is not a matter of right but, rather, lies in the sound discretion of the court before which its admission is sought.[55] The standards that courts generally follow in the determination of whether or not a supplemental pleading must be accepted have been laid down in Spouses Lambino v. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela City[56] as follows:
Among the factors that the court will consider are: (1) resulting prejudice to the parties; and (2) whether the movant would be prejudiced if the supplemental pleading were to be denied. What constitutes prejudice to the opposing party depends upon the particular circumstance of each case. An opposing party who has had notice of the general nature of the claim or matter asserted in the supplemental pleading from the beginning of the action will not be prejudiced by the granting of leave to file a supplemental pleading. A motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading may be denied if he is guilty of undue delay or laches which causes substantial prejudice to the opposing party.[57]In the case at bar, Talaue's supplemental pleading is not dilatory. The admission thereof will not prejudice the People because the matters raised therein, having been previously asserted before the court a quo, are already familiar to the OSP. Moreover, since the supplemental pleading in question asserts Talaue's constitutional rights as an accused, he might be prejudiced if the same were denied by the Court. Thus, the higher interest of justice calls for the admission of Talaue's Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (of the January 12, 2021 Decision).
Contrary to Talaue's contention, the allegations in the Information dated June 9, 2010 sufficiently prepared him for a proper and adequate defense.
The Constitution ordains that every person charged with the commission of a crime must be afforded the right to due process of law. Section 14 of the Bill of Rights so states:
SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.[58]A cognate of an accused's right to due process pertains to the filing of an Information, the act of which is sufficient to commence a criminal action.[59] Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court defines an Information as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.
In order to determine whether an Information complies with the requirements of the Constitution, Sections 6, 8, and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide:
SECTION 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
SECTION 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
SECTION 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.Prescinding from the foregoing, the objectives of an accused's right to be informed are as follows:
- To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him [or her] as will enable him [or her] to make the defense;
- To avail himself [or herself] of his [or her] conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
- To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.[60]
Enrile v. People[64] expounds:
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide the accused with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an intelligent plea and prepare a defense. Moreover, the Information must provide some means of ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered evidence. Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the same crime or crimes. In other words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense, ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring omitted)Verily, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or Information.[66] This right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused cannot be waived for reasons of public policy:[67]
[T]he constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information. In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an accused's failure to raise an objection to the insufficiency or defect in the information would not amount to a waiver of any objection based on said ground or irregularity.[68]In the case at bar, the Information states that the period of the unremitted GSIS premiums was "for the period January 1, 1997 to January 31, 2004."[69] This was further qualified by the phrase "within thirty (30) days from the date on which payment thereof has become due and demandable."[70] Accordingly, the material dates within which Talaue allegedly committed the crime charged are clear.
Too, Talaue's contention that the Information inaccurately includes a period when he was not the incumbent mayor of Sto. Tomas, Isabela is a matter of defense that is best addressed during trial.
Indeed, in Jalandoni v. Office of the Ombudsman,[71] the Court had occasion to ordain that:
An information is deemed sufficient if the acts or omissions complained of are alleged in a way that enables "a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged[,]" allows them to prepare their defense, and equips the court to render proper judgment. Thus, an information must clearly and accurately allege the elements of the crime and the circumstances constituting the charge.[72]A perusal of the Information charging Talaue of the crime subject of this case readily shows that its contents and language are enough to let a person of common understanding know what offense is intended to be charged against him. After all, an Information need only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the finer details of why and how the crime was committed.[73]
At any rate, the records show that Talaue never raised the issue of sufficiency of the Information before the court a quo. His Motion to Quash[74] merely claimed that it was the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, which had jurisdiction over the case, and nothing else. It is settled that, as a general rule, failure to assail the Information before an accused pleads is deemed a waiver of any of his or her objections.[75]
Nevertheless, Talaue must be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
While proof beyond reasonable doubt is meant to be that, "all things given, the mind of the judge can rest at ease concerning its verdict,"[76] reasonable doubt is defined as "that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt."[77] Reasonable doubt refers to the "possibility of innocence based on reason and common sense, arising from the evidence or lack of evidence as the case may be."[78] It is:
"[A] term often used, probably pretty well understood, but not easily defined. It is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary, but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.[79] (Emphasis included)Here, there is reasonable doubt when the prosecution failed to prove (1) that Talaue had the duty to remit GSIS premium contributions; and (2) that he intended to commit or perpetrate the act proscribed by Republic Act No. 8291.
At the outset, there is no showing that Talaue, as Municipal Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Isabela, had the positive duty to remit the GSIS premium contributions of all employees within his political subdivision. The Local Government Code of 1991 refers to municipal mayors as "chief executives"[80] and not "heads of offices" as contemplated under Section 52(g) of Republic Act No. 8291. More importantly, nowhere in the Local Government Code of 1991 does it include the remittance of GSIS premiums as part of the duties of a mayor.[81] In addition, no reference was made to any internal memorandum or practice within the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Isabela regarding the mayor's participation when it comes to remitting GSIS premium contributions.
On another score, the Court finds as misguided the assertion that Talaue must be convicted on the mere characterization of the crime involved as malum prohibitum. In the recent case of Valenzona v. People,[82] the Court made a distinction between "intent to commit the crime" and "intent to perpetrate the act," such that in crimes classified as mala prohibita, the prosecution must still discharge the burden of proving that the prohibited act was intentionally done by the accused. Thus:
[D]ispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita does not, in any way, discharge the prosecution of its burden to show that the prohibited act was done intentionally by the accused. On this note, it is important to distinguish between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act—while a person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime regarded as malum prohibitum, he or she may still be held liable if he or she did intend to commit an act that is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. Thus, for acts that are mala prohibita, the intent to perpetrate the prohibited act under the special law must nevertheless be shown.As applied to the instant case, the Court finds that the prosecution miserably failed to demonstrate that Talaue had the volition or conscious intent not to remit or cause the non-remittance of the GSIS premium contributions of the employees of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas. He was led to believe that the GSIS premiums for the year 1997 had already been remitted because the DBM had already withheld PHP 5,000,000.00 from the municipality's budget. This mistaken belief negates any showing that he intentionally caused the non-remittance of GSIS premium contributions.
In contrast to crimes mala in se, which presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent in doing so, crimes mala prohibita do not require such knowledge or criminal intent; rather, what is crucial is volition or the intent to commit the act. While volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done (as opposed to knowledge of the nature of the act), criminal intent is the state of mind that goes beyond voluntariness, and it is this intent which is punished by crimes mala in se. To hold an offender liable for an offense that is malum prohibitum, it is sufficient that there is a conscious intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, for the essence of mala prohibita is voluntariness in the commission of the act constitutive of the crime.
Succinctly put, for crimes mala in se, there must be proof of criminal intent, while for crimes mala prohibita, it is sufficient that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. As applied here, even if a violation of P.D. 957 is malum prohibitum, it must still be established that the accused had the volition or intent to commit the prohibited act, which is the non-registration of the subject contracts.
. . .
Notably, and as pointed out by Valenzona, even the Information filed against him charges him for "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" failing to register the subject contracts. In this regard, and consistent with the preceding discussions, there must at least be a showing of his volition or intent to not register or cause the non-registration of the subject contracts through his active participation or by conspiring with others to commit the crime. Absent a showing of such participation done willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving Valenzona's guilt. (Citations omitted)
Records show that upon being notified of the municipality's unpaid premium contributions, Talaue readily acknowledged the same and made verbal instructions to Guiyab to update the municipality's accounts with GSIS. Moreover, it was Talaue who entered into the 2008 MOA on the municipality's behalf to ensure that GSIS would be able to collect payment of the municipality's obligations on an installment basis. Worth replicating at this juncture are the following statements in Talaue's Judicial Affidavit[83] dated June 27, 2018:
Q: | What happened after you have your instruction to the municipal treasurer? |
A: | Despite my instructions to the municipal treasurer, no formal arrangements have been arrived at between our municipality and GSIS. The accounts and data likewise remained unreconciled until January 2004. |
Q: | What happened after that? |
A: | In 2006, GSIS then decided to sue our municipality, me and my co-accused for collection of sum of money before the Pasay City Regional Trial Court Branch 118 docketed as Civil Case No. 06-0407-CFM relative to the municipality's obligations to GSIS. |
Q: | What did you do after knowing that a case has been filed against the municipality? |
A: | We faced GSIS in court as the case ensued. In the meantime, I have absolute instructions to the municipal treasurer to start paying our obligations to GSIS despite pendency of the court proceedings. |
Q: | What happened after you gave your instructions to the municipal treasurer? |
A: | Funds were then allocated, and we made payments to GSIS. |
Q: | Do you have proof pertaining to the payments of your municipality made with the GSIS? |
A: | Yes, sir. I have here with me GSIS Official Receipt No. 0002237669[84] dated 28 August 2007 in the amount of One Million Pesos. GSIS also acknowledged our payments covered under OR No. 30366[85] dated 11 October 2007 in the amount of One Million Pesos and OR No. 524548[86] dated 16 November 2009 in the amount of Eight Hundred Fifty thousand pesos as appearing in the prosecution's exhibits |
| . . . . | |
Q: | What happened to the case before the Pasay City Regional Trial Court you were pertaining to a while ago? |
A: | The parties eventually entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), and the court in turn issued a Decision dated 7 January 2009 approving it. |
| . . . . | |
Q: | What happened to this Decision of the Pasay City Regional Trial Court? |
A: | It became the subject of a Motion for Execution dated 6 October 2010 filed by GSIS. Subsequently, it became the subject of a Writ of Execution via an Order issued by the court dated 31 March 2011. The 6 October 2010 Motion for Execution and 31 March 2011 Order were respectively marked as Exhibits "F" and "G" for the prosecution.[87] |
Verily, Talaue not only made possible the signing of the 2008 MOA, but also attempted to reduce the municipality's obligations to GSIS. He did everything in his power to cause the payment of the unpaid remittances to GSIS. Were it not for the January 7, 2009 RTC Decision which is based on the 2008 MOA, the GSIS would not have been able to file a motion for execution dated October 6, 2010 which, in turn, resulted in the RTC's issuance of a writ of execution through an Order dated March 31, 2011. The Court in its earlier January 12, 2021 Decision acknowledged as much when it declared that it was "through [Talaue's] initiative that the GSIS eventually restructured the obligations of the municipality through the MOA."[88] Unfortunately for Talaue, matters became more complicated when his successor failed to follow through with the 2008 MOA. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the fact that he demonstrated a lack of intent to perpetrate the act or omission penalized by Section 52(g) of Republic Act No. 8291.
In contrast, the prosecution merely asserted that the crime involved in this case is malum prohibitum, and nothing more. Au contraire, dispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita does not discharge the prosecution's burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the prohibited act was done by the accused intentionally.[89]
All told, there was no attempt on the part of the prosecution to show Talaue's intent to perpetrate the crime charged. He did not perform any overt act as would exhibit an intent to violate Republic Act No. 8291. Moreover, Talaue was able to adduce proof of specific acts negating or disproving such perpetrative intent on his part. He did not perform any overt acts as would exhibit an intent to commit the crime in question. His conviction must, perforce, be overturned.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court will no longer belabor itself into discussing the other issues raised by Talaue.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated March 3, 2021, the Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration dated April 22, 2022, and the Supplement to Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, also dated April 22, 2022, are GRANTED. The Court's Decision dated January 12, 2021 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated March 15, 2019 and the Resolution dated July 19, 2019 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0120 are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure on the part of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant Antonio M. Talaue is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in said case.
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Zalameda, Dimaampao, and Kho, Jr., JJ. concur.
Caguioa (Chairperson), J., see concurring opinion.
[1] Rollo, pp. 128-137.
[2] Id. at 150-153.
[3] Id. at 154-193.
[4] Id. at 106-127. Penned by Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Rosmari D. Carandang (retired), Rodil V. Zalameda, and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
[5] Id. at 3-19. Penned by Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. Musngi and concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar C. Herrera, Jr. and Lorifel L. Pahimna of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
[6] Id. at 20-25.
[7] SECTION 52. Penalty. — . . .
. . . .[8] SECTION 6. Collection and Remittance of Contributions. — . . .
(g) The heads of the offices of the national government, its political subdivisions, branches, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions, and the personnel of such offices who are involved in the collection of premium contributions, loan amortization and other accounts due the GSIS who shall fail, refuse or delay the payment, turnover, remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time that the same shall have been due and demandable shall, upon conviction by final judgment, suffer the penalties of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years and a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (PHP 10,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (PHP 20,000.00), and in addition shall suffer absolute perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling licensed by the government.
(b) Each employer shall remit directly to the GSIS the employees' and employers' contributions within the first ten (10) days of the calendar month following the month to which the contributions apply. The remittance by the employer of the contributions to the GSIS shall take priority over and above the payment of any and all obligations, except salaries and wages of its employees.[9] Signed into law by former President Fidel V. Ramos on May 30, 1997.
[10] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 1, pp. 1-2.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 114-118.
[13] Id. at 197-204. Penned by Associate Justice Napoleon E. Inoturan and concurred in by Associate Justices Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos and Oscar C. Herrera, Jr. of the Special Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
[14] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 2, pp. 147-165. The Pre-Trial Order dated October 6, 2017 was signed by Associate Justices Oscar C. Herrera, Jr., Michael Frederick L. Musngi, and Efren N. Dela Cruz of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
[15] Id. at 208-209.
[16] Id. at 196-198.
[17] Id. at 199-200.
[18] Id. at 193-195.
[19] Id. at 213-222. Rendered by Judge Pedro B. Corales (now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals).
[20] Id. at 202-204.
[21] Id. at 18-19.
[22] Id. at 16-17.
[23] Id. at 4-15. The Consolidated Resolution was signed by Maria Melinda S. Mananghaya, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I, recommended for approval by Mark E. Jalandoni, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and, ultimately, approved by Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro.
[24] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 2, pp.176-179.
[25] Id. at 180. Certificate of Death.
[26] Id. at 183. Order dated April 19, 2018.
[27] Id. at 258-266.
[28] Id. at 219.
[29] Id. at 220. The said paragraph reads:
6.4. Completeness of the Agreement. This Agreement replaces and supersedes any understanding, communication and representation whether verbal or written, between the parties.[30] Id. at 251-256.
[31] Rollo, pp. 3-19.
[32] Incorrectly cited as Section 473 in the Sandiganbayan Decision. Section 474(b) reads:
SECTION 474. Qualifications, Powers and Duties.— . . .
. . . .
(b) The accountant shall take charge of both the accounting and internal audit services of the local government unit concerned and shall:
[33] Signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino on October 10, 1991.
[34] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[35] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 2, pp. 357-366.
[36] Id. at 381-384.
[37] Rollo, pp. 20-25.
[38] Id. at 26-28, Notice of Appeal dated July 30, 2019.
[39] Id. at 43-61.
[40] 259 Phil. 794 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
[41] 310 Phil. 14 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
[42] Rollo, pp. 68-99.
[43] Id. at 106-127.
[44] Id. at 123.
[45] Id. at 128-137.
[46] Id. at 154-193.
[47] Id. at 212-225.
[48] Id. at 150-153.
[49] Id.
[50] Id. at 154-193.
[51] Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 530, 541 (2000) [Per J. Purisima, Third Division].
[52] Chan v. Chan, 590 Phil. 116, 131 (2000) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
[53] Loy, Jr. v. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PGTWO, 620 Phil. 220, 232 (2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
[54] Spouses Caoili v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 122, 140 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
[55] British Traders' Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 121 Phil. 696, 705 (1965) [Per J. J.P. Bengzon, En Banc].
[56] 541 Phil. 504 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Third Division].
[57] Id. at 518.
[58] CONST., art. III, sec. 14.
[59] People v. Zurbano, 147 Phil. 520, 523 (1971) [Per J. Villamor, En Banc].
[60] People v. Bayya, 384 Phil. 519, 526 (2000) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc] citing Pecho v. People, 331 Phil. 1 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc], quoting from U.S. v. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223, 226 (1904) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
[61] Quimvel v. People, 808 Phil. 889, 912 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
[62] People v. Dimaano, 506 Phil. 630, 649 (2005) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[63] Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251, 279 (1999) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
[64] 766 Phil. 75 (2015) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[65] Id. at 104.
[66] People v. Flores, Jr., 442 Phil. 561, 570 (2002) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
[67] People v. Pangilinan, 676 Phil. 16, 28 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; People v. Flores, Jr., id.; People v. Dawisan, 417 Phil. 443, 456 (2001) [Per J. Buena, Second Division]; People v. Antido, 343 Phil. 949, 979 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Third Division]; Carpio, J., dissenting in De Lima v. Guerrero, 819 Phil. 616, 1004-1005 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]."[T]he fact that all the elements of the crime were duly proven in trial cannot cure the defect of a Complaint or Information to serve its constitutional purpose." People v. Vañas, 850 Phil. 201, 212 (2019) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division], citing Guelos v. People, infra.
[68] Guelos v. People, 811 Phil. 37, 62-63 (2017) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
[69] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 1, pp. 1-2.
[70] Id.
[71] G.R. No. 211751, May 10, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[72] Id.
[73] People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 769 Phil. 378, 382 (2015) [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division].
[74] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 1, pp. 114-118.
[75] Spouses Tayamen v. People, G.R. No. 246986, April 28, 2021 [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[76] People v. Bermas, 854 Phil. 556, 565 (2019) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
[77] Balina v. People, G.R. No. 205950, January 12, 2021 [Per J. Gaerlan, First Division].
[78] ARNOLD H. LOEWY, TAKING REASONABLE DOUBT SERIOUSLY, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 70 (2010).
[79] Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 59 Mass. 295 (1850) [Massachusetts, United States of America].
[80] Local Government Code of 1991, sec. 444.
[81] Id.
[82] G.R. No. 248584, August 30, 2023 [Per J. Caguioa, Third Division].
[83] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 2, pp. 258-266.
[84] Marked as Exhibit "1" and admitted by the Sandiganbayan.
[85] Marked as Exhibit "3" and admitted by the Sandiganbayan.
[86] Marked as Exhibit "2" and admitted by the Sandiganbayan.
[87] Sandiganbayan rollo, vol. 2, pp. 262-264.
[88] Rollo, p. 123.
[89] Id.
CAGUIOA, J.:
I agree with the ponencia that accused-appellant should be acquitted from the charge of violation of Section 52(g) in relation to Section 6(b) of Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as the GSIS Act of 1997 (GSIS Law).[1] Verily, the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant, as mayor of the municipality of Sto. Tomas, Isabela, had the positive duty to remit the GSIS premiums of the employees within his political subdivision. More importantly, the prosecution failed to prove any overt act or nonfeasance on the part of accused-appellant as regards the failure to remit the GSIS premiums.
Preliminarily, I agree that the Information sufficiently makes a case for the non-remittance of GSIS premiums.
The accusatory portion of the Information dated June 9, 2010 provides:
That on or about 01 March 2006, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Sto. Tomas, Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and the Municipal Accountant, respectively, and as such has the legal obligation to timely remit to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) the GSIS premium contributions of the employees of the Municipal Government of Sto. Tomas, Isabela did there and then willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, fail to remit the said GSIS premiums, with an aggregate amount of PHP 22,436,546.10, for the period 01 January 1997 to 31 January 2004 within thirty (30) days from the date on which payment thereof has become due and demandable, to the damage and prejudice of the municipal employees.The Information clearly provides for the period of the unremitted GSIS premiums when it stated, "for the period 01 January 1997 to 31 January 2004."[3] This period was even further qualified by the phrase "within thirty (30) days from the date on which payment thereof has become due and demandable."[4] This qualifying period is in accord with the GSIS board's power to collect unpaid premiums. The GSIS Law provides, viz.:
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] (Emphasis in the original)
[T]o ensure the collection or recovery of all indebtedness, liabilities and/or accountabilities, including unpaid premiums or contributions in favor of the GSIS arising from any cause or source whatsoever, due from all obligors, whether public or private. The Board shall demand payment or settlement of the obligations referred to herein within thirty (30) days from the date the obligation becomes due, and in the event of failure or refusal of the obligor or debtor to comply with the demand, to initiate or institute the necessary or proper actions or suits, criminal, civil or administrative or otherwise, before the courts, tribunals, commissions, boards, or bodies of proper jurisdiction within thirty (30) days reckoned from the expiry date of the period fixed in the demand within which to pay or settle the account.[5]The same is also consistent with the penal provision in the GSIS Law which provides that the heads of offices who "fail, refuse or delay the payment, turnover, remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time that the same shall have been due and demandable shall, upon conviction by final judgment, suffer the penalties."[6]
Simply put, the Information gives a clear picture of the material dates concerning the purported offense. Accordingly, there is no question that accused-appellant was properly informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
That the Information inaccurately includes a period when accusedÂ-appellant was not the incumbent mayor is a non-issue. This is a matter of defense which should be addressed by him during trial as correctly ruled in the ponencia.[7] In other words, this inaccuracy does not affect how accused-appellant would be able to understand the nature of the charge against him.
Next, while it is true that the GSIS Law specifies two kinds of contributions, the same law, however, clearly provides that it is still the employer's obligation to directly remit both types of contributions to the GSIS.[8] In other words, that the Information failed to specify the kind of contribution involved does not affect accused-appellant's defense when the law mandates that the employer should remit both types of contributions to GSIS.
With the foregoing, the ponencia correctly discredited accused-appellant's claim of a violation of his right to be informed of the accusation filed against him. Nevertheless, as correctly ruled in the ponencia, accusedÂ-appellant's acquittal is still warranted.
While the relevant penal provision under the GSIS Law is "considered mala prohibita and, thus, the defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are rendered immaterial,"[9] I agree with the ponencia's postulation that the characterization of crimes as mala prohibita should not be utilized as a blanket argument to rule that a violation automatically translates to culpability. It is important to note that "dispensing with proof of criminal intent for crimes mala prohibita does not discharge the prosecution's burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the prohibited act was done by the accused intentionally."[10]
I highlight here the case of Valenzona v. People[11] (Valenzona), which is also cited in the ponencia. In Valenzona, the Court ruled that notwithstanding the fact that the president of the corporation was made liable under Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 957 for the corporation's violations, this does not excuse the prosecution from proving the president's actual participation in the non-registration of the subject contracts, thus:
Verily, the fact that the president is specifically made liable under P.D. 957 for violations made by a corporation does not excuse the prosecution from proving Valenzona's active participation in the crime charged. Having the burden of proving the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to provide evidence showing that Valenzona's duties and responsibilities as President entailed his active participation in ALSGRO's non-registration of the subject contracts. However, what has been established is that the specific obligation to comply with Section 17 was given to another department, not to the president. The evidence on record is bereft of any showing that Valenzona's acts or omissions had caused ALSGRO to violate Section 17 of P.D. 957. Likewise, the prosecution failed to prove that it was within Valenzona's power as President of ALSGRO to prevent such violation. In the absence of proof that Valenzona had any direct and active participation in the nonÂ-registration of the subject contracts, he cannot be made criminally liable for violation of Section 17 of P.D. 957.[12] (Emphasis supplied)Parallel to the foregoing, it may well be crucial to recall the difference between intent to commit the crime (or criminal intent) and intent to perpetrate the act, as comprehensively discussed in the case of Sama v. People[13] (Sama), to wit:
Considering that the instant case involves a malum prohibitum offense, there is no need for the prosecution to establish accused-appellant's criminal intent. In the same vein, accused-appellant's defense of good faith will likewise have no effect to support his acquittal. Instead, an inquiry should be made as to whether the prosecution established accused-appellant's intent to perpetrate the act or omission. As ruled by the Court in Sama, this intent refers to accused-appellant's volition, or the knowledge of the act being done.[15] His prior and contemporaneous acts which support this criminal design will prove this type of intent. In the absence of any, then, he must be acquitted.Hence, "[i]ntent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself[.]" When an act is prohibited by a special law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the performance of the prohibited act is the crime itself.Volition, or intent to commit the act, is different from criminal intent. Volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done [in contrast to knowledge of the nature of his act]. On the other hand, criminal intent — which is different from motive, or the moving power for the commission of the crime — refers to the state of mind beyond voluntariness. It is this intent that is being punished by crimes mala in se.Matalam recognized that the character or effect of the commission of the prohibited act, which is not required in proving a malum prohibitum case, is different from the intent and volition to commit the act which itself is prohibited if done without lawful cause. Justice Zalameda elucidates:The malum prohibitum nature of an offense, however, does not automatically result in a conviction. The prosecution must still establish that the accused had intent to perpetrate the act.
Intent to perpetrate has been associated with the actor's volition, or intent to commit the act. Volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done. In previous cases, this Court has determined the accused's volition on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.[14]
Here, the records are bereft of any showing that accused-appellant, as municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Isabela, had the positive duty to himself remit the GSIS premium contributions of all employees within his political subdivision. To be sure, the Local Government Code does not, in fact, include the remittance of GSIS premiums as part of the duties of a mayor.[16]
Ultimately, nowhere is it shown that accused-appellant instructed his subordinates not to remit the said premiums. In fact, the ponencia recognized that accused-appellant was led to believe that the GSIS premiums for 1997 were already covered since the Department of Budget and Management already withheld PHP 5,000,000.00 from their municipality's budget.[17] Hence, there was no way for accused-appellant to have acquiesced to the nonÂ-remittance considering that he was under the belief that the premium contributions were being remitted to the GSIS. This, coupled by the fact that no overt act was performed by accused-appellant, clearly supports his acquittal.
In fine, the Court should not allow mere proof of a violation of the law coupled with proof of the accused's position — as being enumerated in the law — to support a conviction. It is still necessary for the prosecution to prove, during trial, how the accused as president, mayor, officer, etc., actively participated in transgressing the law, on behalf of the juridical entity, for him or her to be convicted. Without such burden being hurdled by the prosecution, the inescapable conclusion should be to acquit.
[1] Republic Act No. 8291 (1997), sec. 52(g) in relation to sec. 6(b), otherwise known as the GSIS Act of 1997.
[2] Ponencia, p. 2.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Republic Act No. 8291 (1997), sec. 41 (w).
[6] Republic Act No. 8291 (1997), sec. 52(g). (Emphasis supplied)
[7] Ponencia, p. 9.
[8] Republic Act No. 8291 (1997), sec. 6(b).
[9] Navarra v. People, G.R. No. 224943, March 20, 2017 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
[10] Valenzona v. People, G.R. No. 248584, August 30, 2023 [Per J. Caguioa, Third Division], available at
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] G.R. No. 224469, January 5, 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc], available at
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] LOCAL GOV'T. CODE, sec. 444.
[17] Ponencia, p. 4.