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EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 265847, August 06, 2024 ]
MA. ZARAH ROSE DE GUZMAN-ÂLARA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MANUEL N. MAMBA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
LOPEZ, J., J.:
This Court resolves the Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by Ma. Zarah Rose De Guzman-Lara (Lara), assailing the Resolution[2] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc and praying that the Resolution[3] of the COMELEC Second Division be affirmed. Lara avers that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Disqualification she filed against private respondent Manuel N. Mamba (Mamba).
The Antecedents
During the May 2022 National and Local Elections (NLE), Lara and Mamba were candidates for the position of Governor of the Province of Cagayan. Mamba was then the incumbent Governor of the said province, having been elected as such during the May 2019 NLE.[4]
Lara filed a Petition[5] dated May 10, 2022, seeking the disqualification of Mamba as a candidate for the position of Governor of the Province of Cagayan in the May 2022 NLE on the grounds of massive vote-buying activities and unlawful disbursement of public funds, in blatant violations of Section 68[6] of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).[7] In the same Petition, Lara likewise prayed that the COMELEC order and direct the Board of Canvassers to suspend and hold in abeyance the proclamation of Mamba as winner, should the latter receive the highest number of votes in the elections.[8]
Specifically, Lara averred that Mamba used the funds of the provincial government of Cagayan to distribute cash assistance "ayuda" to voters under the following programs: (1) "No Barangay Left Behind;" (2) "No Town Left Behind;" (3) Oplan Tulong sa Barangay;" (4) and "Krusada Kontra Korapsyon." Lara likewise contended that the disbursements were done during the campaign period of March 25 to May 8, 2022.[9]
On May 11, 2022, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mamba as the duly elected Governor for the Province of Cagayan after garnering the highest number of votes legally cast for the said office.[10]
On December 14, 2022, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution[11] granting Lara's Petition for Disqualification and disqualifying Mamba as a candidate for the position of Governor of the Province of Cagayan in the May 2022 NLE:
However, the COMELEC Second Division found that the pieces of evidence submitted by Lara were substantial to prove Mamba's violation of Section 261(v)[14] of the OEC, which prohibits the unauthorized release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds during the 45 day period before the regular election. It noted that Mamba admitted the disbursements of public funds during the prohibited period, i.e., March 25 to May 8, 2022 for the implementation of the "No Barangay Left Behind," "No Town Left Behind," and "Oplan Tulong sa Barangay" programs.[15] Accordingly, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that Lara had overcome the burden of proof with substantial evidence to establish that Mamba violated Section 261 (v) of the OEC.[16]
Aggrieved, Mamba filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division[17] essentially arguing that the evidence on record was insufficient to justify his disqualification.
On March 6, 2023, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition for Disqualification for being filed out of time and for being the wrong remedy, having been filed after Mamba's proclamation. It explained:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (1) in dismissing the Petition for Disqualification for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) in not affirming the December 14, 2022 Resolution finding private respondent Manuel N. Mamba to be disqualified.
In essence, Lara argues that the COMELEC should have applied the liberal construction of its Rules considering the gravity of the issues raised. She puts emphasis on the fact that the Petition for Disqualification was filed by electronic mail on May 10, 2022, at 6:21 p.m., while Mamba was proclaimed as the winning candidate only on May 11, 2022, at 1:39 a.m. Thus, only about seven hours lapsed between the filing of the Petition for Disqualification and the proclamation of Mamba as the winning candidate.[20]
The COMELEC filed its Comment[21] where it primarily argues that: (1) the COMELEC acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Petition for Disqualification on the ground that the proclamation of Mamba effectively divested it of jurisdiction to hear the case; and (2) nothing in the present case justifies the relaxation of the rules.
For his part, Mamba asserts that the COMELEC En Banc correctly dismissed the Petition for Disqualification for lack of jurisdiction as the same was filed after the elections and that a petition for quo warranto is the proper action to question the eligibility of the winning candidate after his proclamation.[22] More, Mamba claims that Lara is not entitled to any liberality, such as the relaxation of the period to file her Petition for Disqualification considering that: (1) the latter paid the filing fees for the Petition for Disqualification after Mamba's proclamation as winning candidate; (2) the purported ground for disqualification cited by Lara was belatedly raised and constituted a prohibited change of theory after the issues have been joined; and (3) Lara failed to explain why she filed the Petition for Disqualification only after the conduct of elections.[23]
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
To begin with, this Court, not being a trier of facts, shall only step in if there is a showing that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As defined, grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law[.]"[24] Thus, if it is sufficiently shown that the COMELEC En Banc exercised its power "capriciously, arbitrarily, whimsically, or without basis under the law or the Constitution[,]" this Court is otherwise duty-bound to "redirect COMELEC's course along constitutional channels."[25]
To recall, petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for having ruled in the assailed Resolution that: (1) the Petition to disqualify respondent was filed out of time and must necessarily be dismissed; and (2) the belated filing thereof was in fact an infirmity which divests the COMELEC from jurisdiction to resolve the issues in the Petition for Disqualification.
After a judicious examination of the case, this Court is persuaded that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
On procedural grounds, the COMELEC should have granted due course to the Petition for Disqualification by exercising liberality in the application of its procedural rules.
In dismissing the Petition for Disqualification as having been filed out of time, the COMELEC relied on Section 5, Rule 2, COMELEC Resolution No. 10673,[26] which provides for guidelines on the electronic filing of pleadings before the COMELEC:
Nevertheless, in stringently applying its procedural rules, the COMELEC clearly lost sight of the peculiar nature of elections cases. After all, "elections cases are, at all times, invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere procedural or technical infirmities."[27]
Time and again, this Court has chosen to uphold the relaxation of election procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice. In the recent case of Uy v. Commission on Elections,[28] the COMELEC denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for being filed a day late, following the rule that any pleading sent through electronic mail beyond 5:00 p.m. would be deemed filed on the following day. Nonetheless, the COMELEC notably resolved the merits of the instant motion, which declared the petitioner as a nuisance candidate. In ruling that the Resolution by the COMELEC denying the motion for reconsideration was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court held:
To reiterate, the instant Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC was based on Section 68 of the OEC, on the grounds of massive vote-buying activities and unlawful disbursement of public funds allegedly committed by respondent during the campaign period of March 25 to May 8, 2022. Section 68 reads:
This interpretation is supported by Article 13 of the Civil Code, which directs that "days" should be understood to mean 24 hours:
On another point, the period to file pleadings through electronic mail as laid down in Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 should have taken stock of particular circumstances surrounding petitions for disqualification, as in this case. To be specific, it must be considered that the proclamation of candidates, which to recall is the reckoning point for the deadline of filing petitions for disqualification, can happen at any time, whether day or night.
This Court must not close its eyes to an imbalance as to the rights of the parties, i.e., right to be proclaimed on one hand, and the right to assail the qualification of the person to be proclaimed on the other. As in this case, while the actual sending of the pleading happened a mere few hours before the proclamation, the Petition was not considered due to some technicality. For future elections, such inconsistencies must be avoided.
On the same score, this Court must hew to practicable realities borne by technological advances. As observed by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo (Chief Justice Gesmundo), unlike in conventional filing, the mode of filing used in this case is through electronic mail. While the pleading will only be received by the agency during office hours, or from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., the same cannot be said with regard to filing by electronic mail. Given that electronic mail may be sent at any time, the same may be received by the recipient in real time. In other words, actual receipt of pleadings by electronic mail is not limited by the physical structures of the agency, which remain open during certain hours of the day. Surely then, in light of the current capabilities brought by modern technology, it can hardly be argued that institutions with vast innovative resources such as the COMELEC will not be able to access a pleading filed beyond office hours when such filing was made via electronic mail. As Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure makes reference to a "day" in the filing of pleadings, which is composed of 24 hours under the Civil Code, the Petition for Disqualification filed by Lara via electronic mail on May 10, 2022 at 6:21 p.m. cannot be considered filed out of time. As a matter of fact, petitioner had until the whole day of May 11, 2022 within which to file the petition against respondent.
Here, respondent was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 11, 2022, at 1:39:59 A.M. Hence, petitioner could file the Petition for Disqualification against respondent at any time before the start of the day of May 11, 2022 and even any time not later than the whole day of May 11, 2022. Contrary to the COMELEC's conclusion, the petitioner's act of filing the subject Petition for Disqualification against respondent on May 10, 2022 at 6:21 p.m. was not in contravention of Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that the petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy.
Even assuming, that We subscribe to COMELEC's inference that the Petition for Disqualification was filed at 8:00 a.m. of May 11, 2022, the same is still well within the prescribed period. It bears stressing that Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure contains a proviso that the petition shall be filed not later than the date of proclamation. To reiterate, the phrase "not later than the date of proclamation" sets a period of a lapse of the 24-hour period of the day of proclamation, where it can be said that a petition for disqualification is filed out of time.
Harmonizing Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 and Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules on Procedure, it behooves this Court to consider that petitions for disqualification may be filed even beyond office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., so long as it is done within the day of the proclamation. As keenly pointed out by Chief Justice Gesmundo during the deliberations over the instant Petition, to rule otherwise would create a bizarre situation where pleadings filed via electronic mail beyond 5:00 p.m. are considered filed at 8:00 a.m. of the next working day, and yet the proclamation of the candidate can happen at any time of the day or night. While the period of proclamation does not provide a definite time, the period to file a petition based on the period of proclamation was given a timeline.
This Court now holds that a petition for disqualification of a candidate based on Section 68 of the OEC may be filed during the period beginning the whole day after the last day of filing of certificate of candidacy until the end of the day of the date of proclamation, even after the exact time of the proclamation of the winning candidate.
Nonetheless, considering the novel declaration made by this Court in the instant Petition, We deem it necessary to emphasize that these guidelines shall apply prospectively and shall not affect parties who had relied on, and acted upon, the force of former views. This is rooted in fairness and justice, as explained by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in his separate opinion in ANGKLA v. Commission on Elections:[33]
Further, this Court deems it best to remand this case to the COMELEC En Banc for the proper disposition of petitioner's Petition for Disqualification against respondent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The March 6, 2023 Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPA Case No. 22-089 (DC) is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
This case is REMANDED to the Commission on Elections En Banc for the proper disposition of Ma. Zarah Rose De Guzman-Lara's Petition for Disqualification against Manuel N. Mamba.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Singh, JJ., concur.
Gesmundo, C.J., see separate concurring opinion.
Lazaro-Javier,* J., on official business.
M. Lopez, J., see separate opinion.
Kho, Jr.,** J., no part.
* On official business.
** No part.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-41.
[2] Id. at 42-61. The March 6, 2023 Resolution in SPA Case No. 22-089(DC) was signed by Chairman George Erwin M. Garcia and Commissioners Socorro B. Inting, Marlon S. Casquejo, Aimee P. Ferolino, Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr., and Nelson J. Celis of the Commission on Elections En Banc.
[3] Id. at 880-897. The December 14, 2022 Resolution in SPA Case No. 22-089(DC) was signed by Presiding Commissioner Marlon S. Casquejo and Commissioners Rey E. Bulay and Nelson J. Celis of the Commission on Elections, Second Division.
[4] Id. at 5.
[5] Id. at 62-73.
[6] Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
[8] Rollo, p. 72.
[9] Id. at 62-63.
[10] Id. at 1215-1216.
[11] Id. at 880-897.
[12] Id. at 896-897.
[13] Id. at 892-893.
[14] Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
[16] Id. at 896.
[17] Id. at 898-916.
[18] Id. at 50-51.
[19] Id. at 60.
[20] Id. at 20-22.
[21] Id. at 1149-1172.
[22] Id. at 1120-1126.
[23] Id. at 1127-1133.
[24] Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, 610 Phil. 551, 567 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[25] Maturan v. COMELEC, 808 Phil. 86, 91 (2017) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[26] "In Re: Guidelines on Electronic Filing, Conduct of Hearings/Investigations/Inquiries Via Video Conference and Service" (2020).
[27] Pahilan v. Tabalba, 300 Phil. 202, 214 (1994) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
[28] G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952, August 8, 2023 [Per J. M. V. Lopez, En Banc].
[29] Id. at 20-21. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[30] Comelec Rules of Procedure, February 15, 1993.
[31] Treyes v. Larlar, 882 Phil. 505, 555 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[32] Gana-Carait v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 257453, August 9, 2022 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc] at 9. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded in the Supreme Court website.
[33] 884 Phil. 333 (2020) [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc].
[34] Id. at 482.
GESMUNDO, C.J.:
I concur in the ponencia of the esteemed Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez. In particular, it is my position that it was error for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc to rule (a) that it lacked jurisdiction over the Petition for Disqualification, and (b) that the Petition for Disqualification was filed out of time.
To recall, in this case, petitioner Ma. Zarah Rose De Guzman-Lara (Lara) filed a Petition seeking the disqualification of private respondent Manuel N. Mamba (Mamba) as a candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Cagayan in the May 2022 National and Local Elections.[1] The Petition, filed pursuant to Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), was grounded on the alleged commission by Mamba of massive vote-buying activities and unlawful disbursement of public funds.[2] The Petition was sent to the COMELEC by email, at 6:21 p.m. on May 10, 2022.[3] A few hours later, or at 1:39 a.m. on May 11, 2022, Mamba was proclaimed the winner of the elections.[4]
The COMELEC En Banc dismissed the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[5] It cited COMELEC Resolution No. 10673, which provides that pleadings filed by email and received by the COMELEC beyond 5:00 p.m. shall be considered filed at 8:00 a.m. of the next working day.[6] Applying COMELEC Resolution No. 10673, the COMELEC En Banc held that the Petition should be considered filed at 8:00 a.m. on May 11, 2022, or after Mamba's proclamation.[7] Thus, according to COMELEC, the Petition was filed out of time and Mamba's proclamation "divested the Commission of any authority to hear and decide [the disqualification case]."[8]
Contrary to the conclusions of the COMELEC En Banc, I submit that (a) the COMELEC retained jurisdiction over the Petition even after Mamba's proclamation, and (b) the Petition was filed on time.
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections and qualifications of elective provincial officials. Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution states:
It should be emphasized that there is no constitutional provision or law which divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over cases involving the qualifications of elective provincial officials after a candidate has been proclaimed. This is to be distinguished from the COMELEC's jurisdiction over cases involving candidates for the positions of president, vice-president, and members of the Senate and House of Representatives, where a valid proclamation, among others, has the effect of transferring jurisdiction over the case to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Senate Electoral Tribunal, or House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, as the case may be.[9] To stress, in cases involving the disqualification of elective provincial officials, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction even after the proclamation of a winning candidate.
In dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the COMELEC En Banc invoked its own rules of procedure, citing a provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 regarding the time of filing of emails. However, the COMELEC cannot use its own rules of procedure to oust itself of jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law, and rules of procedure yield to substantive law.[10] Jurisdiction cannot be taken away from an otherwise competent tribunal for purely procedural reasons.[11]
Although, based on substantive law, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over contests relating to the elections and qualifications of elective provincial officials even after the proclamation of a winning candidate, it is true that a petition can still be dismissed on other grounds, such as failure to comply with procedural rules. As held by the Court in Agravante v. Commission on Elections,[12] adherence to rules of procedure is necessary to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights.[13] Any party seeking a liberal application of the rules is required to present strong and compelling reasons to warrant their suspension.[14] Consequently, in the absence of compelling reasons to justify a relaxation of the rules, a petition which is filed out of time violates rules of procedure and is dismissible on that ground.
That being said, I agree in the ponencia that the Petition in this case was filed on time, well within the period provided for the filing of petitions for disqualification under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. That is, the Petition passes muster even with a strict application of procedural rules.
The Petition filed before the COMELEC seeking Mamba's disqualification was based on Section 68 of the OEC, which states:
This interpretation finds further support in the Civil Code provision directing that "days" shall be understood to mean 24 hours.[15] Thus, the date or day of the proclamation should be understood to mean the full 24 hours of the day on which the proclamation takes place. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, being procedural law, should yield to the interpretation directed by the Civil Code, a substantive law.
To my mind, moreover, the Court should construe the phrase "date of proclamation" to include the full 24 hours of the day because this is the more reasonable and practical interpretation of Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The Court may take notice of the fact that the proclamation of a winning electoral candidate can take place at any time of the day, even beyond regular office hours and into the late hours of the night. If it was counted from the exact time of the proclamation, then the deadline of the filing of petitions for disqualification, from the point of view of the petitioner, can be extremely difficult to predict. To construe the phrase "date of proclamation" to include the full 24 hours of the day facilitates order and predictability, in accord with the purpose of procedural rules to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights.[16]
Thus, the Petition, which was deemed by the COMELEC to be filed at 8:00 a.m. on the day of Mamba's proclamation, was still filed on time.
Finally, even assuming that the deadline for the filing of petitions for disqualification is the exact hour, minute, or second that the proclamation of the winning candidate takes place, it must be remembered that the Petition in this case was actually filed by email at 6:21 p.m. on May 10, 2022, a day before Mamba's proclamation. It is only because of the application of Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673, which provides that emails received beyond 5:00 p.m. shall be considered filed at 8:00 a.m. of the next working day, that the Petition was deemed filed after Mamba's proclamation took place.
While the sensibility of rules adjusting the date of filing by electronic mail is recognized, it is submitted that Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 should not be strictly applied when the deadline is based on the proclamation of an electoral candidate. Again, the proclamation of a winning candidate can take place at any time of the day or night. In this case, for example, Mamba's proclamation took place at 1:39 a.m. on May 11, 2022. A peculiar situation, thus, arises where, applying COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 and presumably to respect office hours, pleadings filed by email beyond 5:00 p.m. are considered filed at 8:00 a.m. of the next working day, and yet the proclamation of the candidate—on which the deadline of the petition for disqualification depends—can happen at any time. Considering thus, it behooves the Court to consider that petitions for disqualification may be filed even beyond office hours. That is, in the specific case where deadlines are based on the proclamation of electoral candidates, there may be compelling reasons to relax the application of Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 regarding the time of electronic filings.
It may also be borne in mind that email filings can, in reality, be done at any time of the day. This is in contrast to personal filings or filings via registered mail, where the pleading in question can only be received by an agency during office hours, after which the agency will be physically closed. On the other hand, emails can be sent and received at any time. Access to the email is not anymore hindered by the physical structure and office hours of the concerned agencies. To stress, as in this case, a pleading can be actually filed by email and considered received by the COMELEC in real time before the proclamation.
Taking the foregoing into consideration, and considering further that the COMELEC Second Division found merit in the charges contained in the Petition for Disqualification,[17] I agree that the Petition for Certiorari filed by Lara before this Court should be granted, and that the case be remanded to the COMELEC En Banc for proper disposition.
ACCORDINGLY, I CONCUR in the ponencia and vote to GRANT the Petition.
[1] Ponencia, p. 2.
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 4.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 4-5.
[6] Id. at 4; COMELEC Resolution No. 10673, sec. 5.
[7] Id. at 4.
[8] Id.
[9] See CONST., art. VI, sec. 17 and art. VII, sec. 4; Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Phil. 326, 339 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc], citing J. Austria-Martinez, Separate Opinion in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 562 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
[10] Non v. Office of the Ombudsman, 882 Phil. 962, 979 (2020) [Per J. Reyes, J. Jr., En Banc].
[11] Gomez v. People, 889 Phil. 915, 980 (2020) [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
[12] G.R. No. 264029, August 8, 2023 [Per C.J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
[13] Id. at 12. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[14] Id. at 8-9. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[15] Republic Act No. 386 (1949), art. 13, The Civil Code of the Philippines.
[16] Gomez v. People, 889 Phil. 915, 978 (2020) [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
[17] Ponencia, p. 3.
LOPEZ, M., J.:
I agree that the dismissal of the Commission of Elections (COMELEC) En Banc of the petition for disqualification is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the case should be remanded for proper disposition. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide that it may suspend the rules in the interest of justice to obtain a speedy disposition of matters before it.[1] Here, several circumstances call for the suspension of the rules. It must be emphasized that the actual filing of the petition for disqualification preceded the actual proclamation and that the COMELEC Second Division gave due course and found the petition meritorious. It would be contrary to the "interest of justice" for COMELEC En Banc to dismiss the case by demanding a strict application of its rules and consequently refusing to review the case's merits after its Second Division found the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, I submit this separate opinion to qualify my concurrence. With respect, I differ from the majority's view that a petition for disqualification may be filed even after the exact moment of the proclamation of a candidate, provided that the date of the proclamation and filing of the petition falls on the same day. The majority's position ignores the distinction between pre-proclamation and post-proclamation remedies anchored under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)[2] and fails to consider related law and constitutional provisions, as discussed below.
Briefly, petitioner Ma. Zarah Rose De Guzman-Lara and private respondent Manuel N. Mamba were gubernatorial candidates of the Province of Cagayan in the 2022 national and local elections. Mamba was the incumbent Governor seeking reelection. On May 10, 2022, at 6:21 p.m., De Guzman-Lara filed a petition for disqualification with the COMELEC via electronic mail against Mamba for violating Section 68 of the OEC. De Guzman-Lara claimed that Mamba committed massive vote-buying activities and disbursed public funds within the prohibitory period of 45 days before the elections. Mamba allegedly authorized the release and disbursement of cash assistance during the prohibitory period. On May 11, 2022, at 1:39 a.m., or a few hours after the petition for disqualification was filed, Mamba was proclaimed the duly elected Governor of Cagayan.
The COMELEC Second Division gave due course to the petition and disqualified Mamba as a candidate for unlawfully disbursing public funds within the prohibitory period. In its Resolution[3] dated December 14, 2022, the COMELEC Second Division disposed the case as follows:
In its Resolution[5] dated March 6, 2023, the COMELEC En Banc reversed its Second Division without looking into the merits of the case. The COMELEC En Banc held that the petition for disqualification was belatedly filed after Mamba's proclamation. Based on the COMELEC rules governing electronic filing, a petition filed via e-mail should be made before 5:00 p.m. Otherwise, the petition would be considered filed the following day at 8:00 a.m. The petition was filed at 6:21 p.m. on May 10, 2022, while the proclamation was made at 1:39 a.m. on May 11, 2022. Following its rules, the petition is considered filed at 8:00 a.m. on May 11, 2022, or after the proclamation of Mamba. Thus, COMELEC may no longer entertain the petition due to lack of jurisdiction. The dispositive portion reads:
Aggrieved, De Guzman-Lara filed this Petition for Certiorari questioning the COMELEC En Banc Resolution for dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and not affirming Mamba's disqualification.
In granting the petition, the Court's majority emphasized two points. First, the COMELEC should have exercised liberality in applying its rules governing the electronic filing of pleadings. Second, Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules provides that a petition for disqualification may be filed "not later than the date of proclamation." The "date of proclamation" should mean "the full 24 hours of the day on which such proclamation takes place."[13] The majority applied Article 13 of the Civil Code, which states that "days" should be understood as 24 hours.[14] Applying this interpretation, the majority found that the petition for disqualification should be considered filed on time even if the COMELEC rules on electronic filing are applied. The petition for disqualification was filed on time because the date of the proclamation and filing of the petition falls on the same day. It is immaterial that the petition was filed after the exact time of proclamation as long as it was filed on the same day.
I.
I agree with the first point. There are sufficient circumstances warranting the liberal application of the COMELEC Rules. First, the actual filing of the petition was made before the actual proclamation. It is undisputed that the electronic filing was made at 6:21 p.m. on May 10, 2022, or a few hours before the actual proclamation on May 11, 2022. Second, the strict application of the rules is not commensurate with the tardiness of the petition, which was only one hour and 21 minutes. Third, the pleading was filed through e-mail, which may be accessed in real time and not limited by the physical structures of the agency.[15] The ponente, echoing the observations of Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, is correct that the Court must hew to the practicable realities borne by technological advances.[16] Fourth, the COMELEC Second Division already gave due course to the petition and found sufficient evidence to disqualify Mamba. Fifth, the case should not be resolved based on technicalities because election cases should be considered imbued with public interest.
Given these reasons, the COMELEC En Banc should have been mindful of its rules, which provide that "[i]n the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission."[17] Verily, it is not in the interest of justice to strictly apply the rules by dismissing a case after its Division found the petition for disqualification meritorious. The COMELEC En Banc should have resolved the case on its merits rather than dismissed it by strictly adhering to its rules. I limit my concurrence up to this point.
II
I beg to differ on the second point that the "date of the proclamation" covers the hours after the proclamation. Indeed, the COMELEC Rules mentioned "but not later than the date of proclamation"[18] as the deadline to file a petition for disqualification. The majority ruled that this phrase should mean the "full 24 hours of the day on which such proclamation takes place" after applying Article 13 of the Civil Code that "days" should be understood as 24 hours.[19] Despite this interpretation, the majority would then quip that the last day to file the petition cannot extend beyond the date of the proclamation:
I submit that a better view should result from harmonizing Sections 68 and 253[22] of the OEC, COMELEC Rules on election contests, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646. The cut-off period should be the exact moment of the proclamation of election results—the same position that the COMELEC En Banc adopted.
Indeed, the majority is correct that Section 68 of the OEC is silent on the period to file a petition for disqualification, to wit:
On the one hand, a petition for disqualification is filed to prohibit a person from continuing as a candidate.[23] It may be filed once a person attains the status of a candidate. In Fermin v. COMELEC,[24] the Court held that a petition for disqualification may be premised under Section 68 of the OEC. Under the COMELEC Rules, it may be filed "not later than the date of proclamation."
On the other hand, a petition for quo warranto against elective provincial officials is filed within 10 days after the date of the proclamation. It may be anchored on the grounds of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, to wit:
I submit that the thrust of a petition for quo warranto is to bar a person from holding office from which he or she was elected. After the proclamation, a petition invoking Section 68 of the OEC against the winning candidate is essentially a question of the winning candidate's ineligibility—the right to hold the elective office due to certain acts committed that bar him or her from holding office. The reckoning point separating the proper remedy to be filed concerning elective provincial officers is the proclamation of a candidate, which formally declares a candidate to have garnered the highest number of votes. At that point, he or she ceases to be merely a candidate. He or she has the expectant right to hold public office following the proclamation or results. Before the proclamation of a candidate, filing a petition for quo warranto is premature.[26]
It is worth reiterating the Court's observation in Venezuela v. COMELEC[27] as regards why pre-election cases, such as a petition for disqualification, filed after proclamation should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of the necessary election protest or quo warranto petition. The dismissal would save time and energy for the litigants and the COMELEC:
III
While petitions filed out of time should be dismissed outright, the COMELEC is duty-bound to resolve pending petitions for disqualification filed on time. This duty is required by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646:
[1] COMELEC Rules of Procedure (1993), sec. 4.
[2] Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (1985).
[3] Rollo, pp. 880-897; signed by Presiding Commissioner Marlon S. Casquejo and Commissioners Rey E. Bulay and Nelson J. Celis; Commissioner Nelson J. Celis concurred "on the results."
[4] Id. at 896.
[5] Id. at 44-61; Signed by Chairperson George Erwin M. Garcia and Commissioners Socorro B. Inting, Marlon S. Casquejo, Aimee P. Ferolino, Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr., and Nelson J. Celis while Commissioner Rey E. Bulay took no part.
[6] Id. at 60.
[7] Id. at 49-50.
[8] 378 Phil. 585 (1999) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[9] 478 Phil. 941 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
[10] Rollo, pp. 51-53.
[11] Republic Act No. 6646, sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
[12] Entitled "An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for Other Purposes" (1988).
[13] Draft Decision, p. 9.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 10.
[16] Id. at 10.
[17] COMELEC Rules of Procedure (1993), sec. 4.
[18] COMELEC Rule of Procedure (1993), sec. 3. Period to File Petition.—The Petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.
[19] Draft Decision, p. 9.
[20] Id. at 11.
[21] Id.
[22] OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, sec. 253 Petition for quo warranto.—Any voter contesting the election of any ... provincial ... officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within [10] days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
[23] Fermin v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 449, 469 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
[24] 595 Phil. 449 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
[25] COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Elections, Resolution No. 8804 (2010) Rule 6, sec. 3. The rule provides:
[27] 187 Phil. 503 (1980) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
[28] Id. at 505-506.
[29] 190 Phil. 1 (1981) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
[30] Id. at 1-2. Citations omitted.
[31] 351 Phil. 310 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
[32] Id. at 322-323. Citations omitted.
During the May 2022 National and Local Elections (NLE), Lara and Mamba were candidates for the position of Governor of the Province of Cagayan. Mamba was then the incumbent Governor of the said province, having been elected as such during the May 2019 NLE.[4]
Lara filed a Petition[5] dated May 10, 2022, seeking the disqualification of Mamba as a candidate for the position of Governor of the Province of Cagayan in the May 2022 NLE on the grounds of massive vote-buying activities and unlawful disbursement of public funds, in blatant violations of Section 68[6] of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).[7] In the same Petition, Lara likewise prayed that the COMELEC order and direct the Board of Canvassers to suspend and hold in abeyance the proclamation of Mamba as winner, should the latter receive the highest number of votes in the elections.[8]
Specifically, Lara averred that Mamba used the funds of the provincial government of Cagayan to distribute cash assistance "ayuda" to voters under the following programs: (1) "No Barangay Left Behind;" (2) "No Town Left Behind;" (3) Oplan Tulong sa Barangay;" (4) and "Krusada Kontra Korapsyon." Lara likewise contended that the disbursements were done during the campaign period of March 25 to May 8, 2022.[9]
On May 11, 2022, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mamba as the duly elected Governor for the Province of Cagayan after garnering the highest number of votes legally cast for the said office.[10]
On December 14, 2022, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution[11] granting Lara's Petition for Disqualification and disqualifying Mamba as a candidate for the position of Governor of the Province of Cagayan in the May 2022 NLE:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondent MANUEL N. MAMBA is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of Governor of the Province of Cagayan in the 09 May 2022 National and Local Elections.The COMELEC Second Division ruled that the pieces of evidence submitted by Lara were not substantial to disqualify Mamba on the ground of violation of Section 68 of the OEC. It noted that while the pieces of evidence showed that the conduct of cash distribution occurred, Mamba merely implemented the same in his capacity as Governor. Thus, it was not shown that the acts were done for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters, as required under Section 68 of the OEC.[13]
Let the records of the case be forwarded to the Law Department of this Commission for the conduct of preliminary investigation relative to the election offense aspect of this case.
SO ORDERED.[12]
However, the COMELEC Second Division found that the pieces of evidence submitted by Lara were substantial to prove Mamba's violation of Section 261(v)[14] of the OEC, which prohibits the unauthorized release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds during the 45 day period before the regular election. It noted that Mamba admitted the disbursements of public funds during the prohibited period, i.e., March 25 to May 8, 2022 for the implementation of the "No Barangay Left Behind," "No Town Left Behind," and "Oplan Tulong sa Barangay" programs.[15] Accordingly, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that Lara had overcome the burden of proof with substantial evidence to establish that Mamba violated Section 261 (v) of the OEC.[16]
Aggrieved, Mamba filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division[17] essentially arguing that the evidence on record was insufficient to justify his disqualification.
On March 6, 2023, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition for Disqualification for being filed out of time and for being the wrong remedy, having been filed after Mamba's proclamation. It explained:
While it may appear that the Petition was timely filed following the date stamp of 10 May 2022, an application of the above-quoted text of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 yields no other conclusion but that the Petition was filed belatedly after Respondent's proclamation. The Petition, filed on 10 May 2022, at 18:21:41 GMT+8, is considered as filed at 8:00 A.M. of the next working day, i.e., 11 May 2022, 8:00 A.M., which is after the proclamation of Respondent. The Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation shows that Respondent was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on 11 May 2022 at 1:39:59 A.M. This proclamation effectively divested the Commission of any authority to hear and decide disqualification cases filed after the same. Thus, the Commission has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the subject Petition as it was filed after Respondent's proclamation.Thus, the COMELEC En Banc disposed as follows:
It follows from the foregoing discussion that the subject Petition must be dismissed outright for being filed out of time and for being the wrong remedy for having been filed after Respondent's proclamation.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DISMISS the Petition dated 11 May 2022 for LACK OF JURISDICTION. The criminal aspect of the case is hereby REFERRED to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.On April 5, 2023, Lara filed the instant Petition, where she raised the issues:
SO ORDERED.[19]
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (1) in dismissing the Petition for Disqualification for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) in not affirming the December 14, 2022 Resolution finding private respondent Manuel N. Mamba to be disqualified.
In essence, Lara argues that the COMELEC should have applied the liberal construction of its Rules considering the gravity of the issues raised. She puts emphasis on the fact that the Petition for Disqualification was filed by electronic mail on May 10, 2022, at 6:21 p.m., while Mamba was proclaimed as the winning candidate only on May 11, 2022, at 1:39 a.m. Thus, only about seven hours lapsed between the filing of the Petition for Disqualification and the proclamation of Mamba as the winning candidate.[20]
The COMELEC filed its Comment[21] where it primarily argues that: (1) the COMELEC acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Petition for Disqualification on the ground that the proclamation of Mamba effectively divested it of jurisdiction to hear the case; and (2) nothing in the present case justifies the relaxation of the rules.
For his part, Mamba asserts that the COMELEC En Banc correctly dismissed the Petition for Disqualification for lack of jurisdiction as the same was filed after the elections and that a petition for quo warranto is the proper action to question the eligibility of the winning candidate after his proclamation.[22] More, Mamba claims that Lara is not entitled to any liberality, such as the relaxation of the period to file her Petition for Disqualification considering that: (1) the latter paid the filing fees for the Petition for Disqualification after Mamba's proclamation as winning candidate; (2) the purported ground for disqualification cited by Lara was belatedly raised and constituted a prohibited change of theory after the issues have been joined; and (3) Lara failed to explain why she filed the Petition for Disqualification only after the conduct of elections.[23]
The Petition is meritorious.
To begin with, this Court, not being a trier of facts, shall only step in if there is a showing that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As defined, grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law[.]"[24] Thus, if it is sufficiently shown that the COMELEC En Banc exercised its power "capriciously, arbitrarily, whimsically, or without basis under the law or the Constitution[,]" this Court is otherwise duty-bound to "redirect COMELEC's course along constitutional channels."[25]
To recall, petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for having ruled in the assailed Resolution that: (1) the Petition to disqualify respondent was filed out of time and must necessarily be dismissed; and (2) the belated filing thereof was in fact an infirmity which divests the COMELEC from jurisdiction to resolve the issues in the Petition for Disqualification.
After a judicious examination of the case, this Court is persuaded that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
On procedural grounds, the COMELEC should have granted due course to the Petition for Disqualification by exercising liberality in the application of its procedural rules.
In dismissing the Petition for Disqualification as having been filed out of time, the COMELEC relied on Section 5, Rule 2, COMELEC Resolution No. 10673,[26] which provides for guidelines on the electronic filing of pleadings before the COMELEC:
SECTION 5. Schedule of Filing through E-mail. – The schedule of filing of verified pleadings, memoranda, comments, briefs, and other submissions through E-mail shall be from Monday to Friday, 8:00 am to 5:00 pm, excluding holidays. E-mails received beyond 5:00 pm shall be considered filed at 8:00 am of the next working day.Indeed, a straightforward application of Section 5 reveals the Petition for Disqualification, filed via electronic mail on May 10, 2022, was filed out of time. The time stamp of the electronic mail, a copy of which is attached to the instant Petition, indicates that it was sent on 6:21 p.m. After a few hours, respondent was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 11, 2022, at 1:39 a.m. Thus, the COMELEC denied the Petition for Disqualification pursuant to Section 5, which instructs that pleadings filed through electronic mail and received beyond 5:00 p.m. are considered filed at 8:00 a.m. of the next working day.
Where a deadline falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, official transaction shall be done on the next working day. (Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, in stringently applying its procedural rules, the COMELEC clearly lost sight of the peculiar nature of elections cases. After all, "elections cases are, at all times, invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere procedural or technical infirmities."[27]
Time and again, this Court has chosen to uphold the relaxation of election procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice. In the recent case of Uy v. Commission on Elections,[28] the COMELEC denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for being filed a day late, following the rule that any pleading sent through electronic mail beyond 5:00 p.m. would be deemed filed on the following day. Nonetheless, the COMELEC notably resolved the merits of the instant motion, which declared the petitioner as a nuisance candidate. In ruling that the Resolution by the COMELEC denying the motion for reconsideration was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court held:
On April 19, 2022, Frederico received via electronic mail the COMELEC Second Division's Resolution declaring him a nuisance candidate. Frederico had five days from notice to move for reconsideration or until April 24, 2022. Considering that the last day fell on a Sunday, the time shall not run until the next working day. Accordingly, Frederico sent the Motion for Reconsideration through electronic mail on April 25, 2022, at 6:23 p.m. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for being filed a day late following the rule that any pleading sent through electronic mail beyond 5:00 p.m. is deemed filed the following day. Nonetheless, the COMELEC affirmed the finding that Frederico is a nuisance candidate.As in Uy, the issue of respondent's qualifications as a candidate for the position of Governor of the Province of Cagayan is crucial to the outcome of his votes and to the result of the elections. Accordingly, the analogous circumstances in Uy in relation to the instant case justifies a relaxation of the COMELEC rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice. Verily, this Court finds no reason why the liberal interpretation of procedural rules accorded in Uy should not be applied in this case.
On this point, we cannot overemphasize that courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just disposition of his cause. The Court has allowed several cases to proceed in the broader interest of justice despite procedural defects and lapses. These rulings are in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Specifically, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that '[i]n the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules and any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.' Here, the COMELEC En Banc is deemed to have relaxed its procedures when it resolved the merits of the motion for reconsideration. In any event, the circumstances of the case merit the liberal application of the rules in the interest of substantial justice. The COMELEC received Frederico's Motion only more than an hour past 5:00 p.m. More importantly, the issue of whether Frederico is a nuisance candidate is determinative not only of the proper treatment of his votes but also as to the outcome of the elections. The grave injustice to Frederico is likewise not commensurate with his failure to comply with the rules.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, the instant Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC was based on Section 68 of the OEC, on the grounds of massive vote-buying activities and unlawful disbursement of public funds allegedly committed by respondent during the campaign period of March 25 to May 8, 2022. Section 68 reads:
SECTION 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.Section 68 is silent as to the period within which petitions for disqualification invoking it may be filed. In lieu of this, this Court makes reference to the applicable period in Rule 25,[30] Sections 1 and 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure:
Plainly, the period within which to file petitions for disqualification based on Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is any day after the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy until the date of proclamation. As worded, a petition for disqualification can be filed even after the exact time of the proclamation of a candidate, so long as it was still filed within the same day. As the Petition for Disqualification against respondent was filed within the prescribed period, it was filed on time.Rule 25 — Disqualification of Candidates.
SECTION 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
....
SECTION 3. Period to File Petition. — The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)
This interpretation is supported by Article 13 of the Civil Code, which directs that "days" should be understood to mean 24 hours:
ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise[.] (Emphasis supplied)Hence, the date or day of proclamation as the deadline of petitions for disqualification should be understood to mean the full 24 hours of the day on which such proclamation takes place. To be sure, this Court emphasizes anew that rules of procedure cannot take precedence over substantive law. "On the contrary, procedural rules are meant to operationalize and effectuate substantive law."[31] Accordingly, this Court finds that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which are merely procedural, should yield to the interpretation directed by the Civil Code, a substantive law.[32]
On another point, the period to file pleadings through electronic mail as laid down in Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 should have taken stock of particular circumstances surrounding petitions for disqualification, as in this case. To be specific, it must be considered that the proclamation of candidates, which to recall is the reckoning point for the deadline of filing petitions for disqualification, can happen at any time, whether day or night.
This Court must not close its eyes to an imbalance as to the rights of the parties, i.e., right to be proclaimed on one hand, and the right to assail the qualification of the person to be proclaimed on the other. As in this case, while the actual sending of the pleading happened a mere few hours before the proclamation, the Petition was not considered due to some technicality. For future elections, such inconsistencies must be avoided.
On the same score, this Court must hew to practicable realities borne by technological advances. As observed by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo (Chief Justice Gesmundo), unlike in conventional filing, the mode of filing used in this case is through electronic mail. While the pleading will only be received by the agency during office hours, or from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., the same cannot be said with regard to filing by electronic mail. Given that electronic mail may be sent at any time, the same may be received by the recipient in real time. In other words, actual receipt of pleadings by electronic mail is not limited by the physical structures of the agency, which remain open during certain hours of the day. Surely then, in light of the current capabilities brought by modern technology, it can hardly be argued that institutions with vast innovative resources such as the COMELEC will not be able to access a pleading filed beyond office hours when such filing was made via electronic mail. As Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure makes reference to a "day" in the filing of pleadings, which is composed of 24 hours under the Civil Code, the Petition for Disqualification filed by Lara via electronic mail on May 10, 2022 at 6:21 p.m. cannot be considered filed out of time. As a matter of fact, petitioner had until the whole day of May 11, 2022 within which to file the petition against respondent.
Here, respondent was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 11, 2022, at 1:39:59 A.M. Hence, petitioner could file the Petition for Disqualification against respondent at any time before the start of the day of May 11, 2022 and even any time not later than the whole day of May 11, 2022. Contrary to the COMELEC's conclusion, the petitioner's act of filing the subject Petition for Disqualification against respondent on May 10, 2022 at 6:21 p.m. was not in contravention of Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that the petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy.
Even assuming, that We subscribe to COMELEC's inference that the Petition for Disqualification was filed at 8:00 a.m. of May 11, 2022, the same is still well within the prescribed period. It bears stressing that Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure contains a proviso that the petition shall be filed not later than the date of proclamation. To reiterate, the phrase "not later than the date of proclamation" sets a period of a lapse of the 24-hour period of the day of proclamation, where it can be said that a petition for disqualification is filed out of time.
Harmonizing Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 and Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules on Procedure, it behooves this Court to consider that petitions for disqualification may be filed even beyond office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., so long as it is done within the day of the proclamation. As keenly pointed out by Chief Justice Gesmundo during the deliberations over the instant Petition, to rule otherwise would create a bizarre situation where pleadings filed via electronic mail beyond 5:00 p.m. are considered filed at 8:00 a.m. of the next working day, and yet the proclamation of the candidate can happen at any time of the day or night. While the period of proclamation does not provide a definite time, the period to file a petition based on the period of proclamation was given a timeline.
This Court now holds that a petition for disqualification of a candidate based on Section 68 of the OEC may be filed during the period beginning the whole day after the last day of filing of certificate of candidacy until the end of the day of the date of proclamation, even after the exact time of the proclamation of the winning candidate.
Nonetheless, considering the novel declaration made by this Court in the instant Petition, We deem it necessary to emphasize that these guidelines shall apply prospectively and shall not affect parties who had relied on, and acted upon, the force of former views. This is rooted in fairness and justice, as explained by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in his separate opinion in ANGKLA v. Commission on Elections:[33]
[W]hen the Court adopts a new view or doctrine in its interpretation of the laws, it has to be applied prospectively so as not to prejudice those who have relied on the abandoned interpretation. In other words, 'when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.' This is the rule because '[t]o hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice, for, then, there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.'[34] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)All told, the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in issuing the March 6, 2023 Resolution dismissing the Petition for Disqualification for having been filed out of time. Consequently, the assailed Resolution must be annulled and set aside.
Further, this Court deems it best to remand this case to the COMELEC En Banc for the proper disposition of petitioner's Petition for Disqualification against respondent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The March 6, 2023 Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPA Case No. 22-089 (DC) is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
This case is REMANDED to the Commission on Elections En Banc for the proper disposition of Ma. Zarah Rose De Guzman-Lara's Petition for Disqualification against Manuel N. Mamba.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Singh, JJ., concur.
Gesmundo, C.J., see separate concurring opinion.
Lazaro-Javier,* J., on official business.
M. Lopez, J., see separate opinion.
Kho, Jr.,** J., no part.
* On official business.
** No part.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-41.
[2] Id. at 42-61. The March 6, 2023 Resolution in SPA Case No. 22-089(DC) was signed by Chairman George Erwin M. Garcia and Commissioners Socorro B. Inting, Marlon S. Casquejo, Aimee P. Ferolino, Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr., and Nelson J. Celis of the Commission on Elections En Banc.
[3] Id. at 880-897. The December 14, 2022 Resolution in SPA Case No. 22-089(DC) was signed by Presiding Commissioner Marlon S. Casquejo and Commissioners Rey E. Bulay and Nelson J. Celis of the Commission on Elections, Second Division.
[4] Id. at 5.
[5] Id. at 62-73.
[6] Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions [...] shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.[7] Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (1985).
[8] Rollo, p. 72.
[9] Id. at 62-63.
[10] Id. at 1215-1216.
[11] Id. at 880-897.
[12] Id. at 896-897.
[13] Id. at 892-893.
[14] Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense:[15] Rollo, pp. 893-896.
....
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. — Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds [.]
[16] Id. at 896.
[17] Id. at 898-916.
[18] Id. at 50-51.
[19] Id. at 60.
[20] Id. at 20-22.
[21] Id. at 1149-1172.
[22] Id. at 1120-1126.
[23] Id. at 1127-1133.
[24] Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, 610 Phil. 551, 567 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[25] Maturan v. COMELEC, 808 Phil. 86, 91 (2017) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[26] "In Re: Guidelines on Electronic Filing, Conduct of Hearings/Investigations/Inquiries Via Video Conference and Service" (2020).
[27] Pahilan v. Tabalba, 300 Phil. 202, 214 (1994) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
[28] G.R. Nos. 260650 & 260952, August 8, 2023 [Per J. M. V. Lopez, En Banc].
[29] Id. at 20-21. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[30] Comelec Rules of Procedure, February 15, 1993.
[31] Treyes v. Larlar, 882 Phil. 505, 555 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[32] Gana-Carait v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 257453, August 9, 2022 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc] at 9. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded in the Supreme Court website.
[33] 884 Phil. 333 (2020) [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc].
[34] Id. at 482.
CONCURRING OPINION
GESMUNDO, C.J.:
I concur in the ponencia of the esteemed Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez. In particular, it is my position that it was error for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc to rule (a) that it lacked jurisdiction over the Petition for Disqualification, and (b) that the Petition for Disqualification was filed out of time.
To recall, in this case, petitioner Ma. Zarah Rose De Guzman-Lara (Lara) filed a Petition seeking the disqualification of private respondent Manuel N. Mamba (Mamba) as a candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Cagayan in the May 2022 National and Local Elections.[1] The Petition, filed pursuant to Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), was grounded on the alleged commission by Mamba of massive vote-buying activities and unlawful disbursement of public funds.[2] The Petition was sent to the COMELEC by email, at 6:21 p.m. on May 10, 2022.[3] A few hours later, or at 1:39 a.m. on May 11, 2022, Mamba was proclaimed the winner of the elections.[4]
The COMELEC En Banc dismissed the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[5] It cited COMELEC Resolution No. 10673, which provides that pleadings filed by email and received by the COMELEC beyond 5:00 p.m. shall be considered filed at 8:00 a.m. of the next working day.[6] Applying COMELEC Resolution No. 10673, the COMELEC En Banc held that the Petition should be considered filed at 8:00 a.m. on May 11, 2022, or after Mamba's proclamation.[7] Thus, according to COMELEC, the Petition was filed out of time and Mamba's proclamation "divested the Commission of any authority to hear and decide [the disqualification case]."[8]
Contrary to the conclusions of the COMELEC En Banc, I submit that (a) the COMELEC retained jurisdiction over the Petition even after Mamba's proclamation, and (b) the Petition was filed on time.
Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for disqualification involving elective provincial officials |
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections and qualifications of elective provincial officials. Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution states:
The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:In this case, the Petition seeks the disqualification of Mamba as a candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Cagayan. Following Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, jurisdiction over the Petition lies with the COMELEC.
. . . .
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
It should be emphasized that there is no constitutional provision or law which divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over cases involving the qualifications of elective provincial officials after a candidate has been proclaimed. This is to be distinguished from the COMELEC's jurisdiction over cases involving candidates for the positions of president, vice-president, and members of the Senate and House of Representatives, where a valid proclamation, among others, has the effect of transferring jurisdiction over the case to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Senate Electoral Tribunal, or House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, as the case may be.[9] To stress, in cases involving the disqualification of elective provincial officials, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction even after the proclamation of a winning candidate.
In dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the COMELEC En Banc invoked its own rules of procedure, citing a provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 regarding the time of filing of emails. However, the COMELEC cannot use its own rules of procedure to oust itself of jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law, and rules of procedure yield to substantive law.[10] Jurisdiction cannot be taken away from an otherwise competent tribunal for purely procedural reasons.[11]
Period for filing of petitions for disqualification |
Although, based on substantive law, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over contests relating to the elections and qualifications of elective provincial officials even after the proclamation of a winning candidate, it is true that a petition can still be dismissed on other grounds, such as failure to comply with procedural rules. As held by the Court in Agravante v. Commission on Elections,[12] adherence to rules of procedure is necessary to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights.[13] Any party seeking a liberal application of the rules is required to present strong and compelling reasons to warrant their suspension.[14] Consequently, in the absence of compelling reasons to justify a relaxation of the rules, a petition which is filed out of time violates rules of procedure and is dismissible on that ground.
That being said, I agree in the ponencia that the Petition in this case was filed on time, well within the period provided for the filing of petitions for disqualification under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. That is, the Petition passes muster even with a strict application of procedural rules.
The Petition filed before the COMELEC seeking Mamba's disqualification was based on Section 68 of the OEC, which states:
Section 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.The OEC does not provide the period within which petitions based on Section 68 may be filed. Instead, the applicable period is found in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as follows:
Otherwise stated, Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure declares that the deadline for filing of petitions for disqualification is the date of proclamation. From a plain reading of the rule, it would appear that a petition for disqualification can be filed even after the exact time a candidate is proclaimed, as long as it is still filed within the same day.RULE 25
Disqualification of Candidates
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
. . . .
Section 3. Period to File Petition. — The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)
This interpretation finds further support in the Civil Code provision directing that "days" shall be understood to mean 24 hours.[15] Thus, the date or day of the proclamation should be understood to mean the full 24 hours of the day on which the proclamation takes place. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, being procedural law, should yield to the interpretation directed by the Civil Code, a substantive law.
To my mind, moreover, the Court should construe the phrase "date of proclamation" to include the full 24 hours of the day because this is the more reasonable and practical interpretation of Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The Court may take notice of the fact that the proclamation of a winning electoral candidate can take place at any time of the day, even beyond regular office hours and into the late hours of the night. If it was counted from the exact time of the proclamation, then the deadline of the filing of petitions for disqualification, from the point of view of the petitioner, can be extremely difficult to predict. To construe the phrase "date of proclamation" to include the full 24 hours of the day facilitates order and predictability, in accord with the purpose of procedural rules to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights.[16]
Thus, the Petition, which was deemed by the COMELEC to be filed at 8:00 a.m. on the day of Mamba's proclamation, was still filed on time.
Finally, even assuming that the deadline for the filing of petitions for disqualification is the exact hour, minute, or second that the proclamation of the winning candidate takes place, it must be remembered that the Petition in this case was actually filed by email at 6:21 p.m. on May 10, 2022, a day before Mamba's proclamation. It is only because of the application of Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673, which provides that emails received beyond 5:00 p.m. shall be considered filed at 8:00 a.m. of the next working day, that the Petition was deemed filed after Mamba's proclamation took place.
While the sensibility of rules adjusting the date of filing by electronic mail is recognized, it is submitted that Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 should not be strictly applied when the deadline is based on the proclamation of an electoral candidate. Again, the proclamation of a winning candidate can take place at any time of the day or night. In this case, for example, Mamba's proclamation took place at 1:39 a.m. on May 11, 2022. A peculiar situation, thus, arises where, applying COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 and presumably to respect office hours, pleadings filed by email beyond 5:00 p.m. are considered filed at 8:00 a.m. of the next working day, and yet the proclamation of the candidate—on which the deadline of the petition for disqualification depends—can happen at any time. Considering thus, it behooves the Court to consider that petitions for disqualification may be filed even beyond office hours. That is, in the specific case where deadlines are based on the proclamation of electoral candidates, there may be compelling reasons to relax the application of Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10673 regarding the time of electronic filings.
It may also be borne in mind that email filings can, in reality, be done at any time of the day. This is in contrast to personal filings or filings via registered mail, where the pleading in question can only be received by an agency during office hours, after which the agency will be physically closed. On the other hand, emails can be sent and received at any time. Access to the email is not anymore hindered by the physical structure and office hours of the concerned agencies. To stress, as in this case, a pleading can be actually filed by email and considered received by the COMELEC in real time before the proclamation.
Taking the foregoing into consideration, and considering further that the COMELEC Second Division found merit in the charges contained in the Petition for Disqualification,[17] I agree that the Petition for Certiorari filed by Lara before this Court should be granted, and that the case be remanded to the COMELEC En Banc for proper disposition.
ACCORDINGLY, I CONCUR in the ponencia and vote to GRANT the Petition.
[1] Ponencia, p. 2.
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 4.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 4-5.
[6] Id. at 4; COMELEC Resolution No. 10673, sec. 5.
[7] Id. at 4.
[8] Id.
[9] See CONST., art. VI, sec. 17 and art. VII, sec. 4; Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Phil. 326, 339 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc], citing J. Austria-Martinez, Separate Opinion in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421, 562 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
[10] Non v. Office of the Ombudsman, 882 Phil. 962, 979 (2020) [Per J. Reyes, J. Jr., En Banc].
[11] Gomez v. People, 889 Phil. 915, 980 (2020) [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
[12] G.R. No. 264029, August 8, 2023 [Per C.J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
[13] Id. at 12. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[14] Id. at 8-9. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[15] Republic Act No. 386 (1949), art. 13, The Civil Code of the Philippines.
[16] Gomez v. People, 889 Phil. 915, 978 (2020) [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
[17] Ponencia, p. 3.
SEPARATE OPINION
LOPEZ, M., J.:
I agree that the dismissal of the Commission of Elections (COMELEC) En Banc of the petition for disqualification is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the case should be remanded for proper disposition. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide that it may suspend the rules in the interest of justice to obtain a speedy disposition of matters before it.[1] Here, several circumstances call for the suspension of the rules. It must be emphasized that the actual filing of the petition for disqualification preceded the actual proclamation and that the COMELEC Second Division gave due course and found the petition meritorious. It would be contrary to the "interest of justice" for COMELEC En Banc to dismiss the case by demanding a strict application of its rules and consequently refusing to review the case's merits after its Second Division found the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, I submit this separate opinion to qualify my concurrence. With respect, I differ from the majority's view that a petition for disqualification may be filed even after the exact moment of the proclamation of a candidate, provided that the date of the proclamation and filing of the petition falls on the same day. The majority's position ignores the distinction between pre-proclamation and post-proclamation remedies anchored under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)[2] and fails to consider related law and constitutional provisions, as discussed below.
Briefly, petitioner Ma. Zarah Rose De Guzman-Lara and private respondent Manuel N. Mamba were gubernatorial candidates of the Province of Cagayan in the 2022 national and local elections. Mamba was the incumbent Governor seeking reelection. On May 10, 2022, at 6:21 p.m., De Guzman-Lara filed a petition for disqualification with the COMELEC via electronic mail against Mamba for violating Section 68 of the OEC. De Guzman-Lara claimed that Mamba committed massive vote-buying activities and disbursed public funds within the prohibitory period of 45 days before the elections. Mamba allegedly authorized the release and disbursement of cash assistance during the prohibitory period. On May 11, 2022, at 1:39 a.m., or a few hours after the petition for disqualification was filed, Mamba was proclaimed the duly elected Governor of Cagayan.
The COMELEC Second Division gave due course to the petition and disqualified Mamba as a candidate for unlawfully disbursing public funds within the prohibitory period. In its Resolution[3] dated December 14, 2022, the COMELEC Second Division disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondent MANUEL N. MAMBA is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of Governor of the Province of Cagayan in the 09 May 2022 National and Local Elections.In his partial motion for reconsideration, Mamba focused on questioning the sufficiency of evidence against him. Curiously, he did not question why the Second Division gave due course to the petition.
Let the records of the case be forwarded to the Law Department of this Commission for the conduct of preliminary investigation relative to the election offense aspect of this case.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In its Resolution[5] dated March 6, 2023, the COMELEC En Banc reversed its Second Division without looking into the merits of the case. The COMELEC En Banc held that the petition for disqualification was belatedly filed after Mamba's proclamation. Based on the COMELEC rules governing electronic filing, a petition filed via e-mail should be made before 5:00 p.m. Otherwise, the petition would be considered filed the following day at 8:00 a.m. The petition was filed at 6:21 p.m. on May 10, 2022, while the proclamation was made at 1:39 a.m. on May 11, 2022. Following its rules, the petition is considered filed at 8:00 a.m. on May 11, 2022, or after the proclamation of Mamba. Thus, COMELEC may no longer entertain the petition due to lack of jurisdiction. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DISMISS the Petition dated 11 May 2022 for LACK OF JURISDICTION. The criminal aspect of the case is hereby REFERRED to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.The COMELEC En Banc emphasized the evident philosophy underlying the dichotomy of remedies before and after the proclamation of a winning candidate—the prevention of confusion and conflict of authority.[7] It then cited the cases of Bagatsing v. COMELEC[8] and Albaña v. COMELEC,[9] which upheld the dismissal of a petition for disqualification filed after the elections.[10] Nonetheless, the COMELEC En Banc recognized that a petition for disqualification filed on time (before the proclamation of a winning candidate) may survive following Section 6[11] of Republic Act No. 6646.[12]
SO ORDERED.[6]
Aggrieved, De Guzman-Lara filed this Petition for Certiorari questioning the COMELEC En Banc Resolution for dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and not affirming Mamba's disqualification.
In granting the petition, the Court's majority emphasized two points. First, the COMELEC should have exercised liberality in applying its rules governing the electronic filing of pleadings. Second, Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules provides that a petition for disqualification may be filed "not later than the date of proclamation." The "date of proclamation" should mean "the full 24 hours of the day on which such proclamation takes place."[13] The majority applied Article 13 of the Civil Code, which states that "days" should be understood as 24 hours.[14] Applying this interpretation, the majority found that the petition for disqualification should be considered filed on time even if the COMELEC rules on electronic filing are applied. The petition for disqualification was filed on time because the date of the proclamation and filing of the petition falls on the same day. It is immaterial that the petition was filed after the exact time of proclamation as long as it was filed on the same day.
The COMELEC should have liberally applied its rules |
I agree with the first point. There are sufficient circumstances warranting the liberal application of the COMELEC Rules. First, the actual filing of the petition was made before the actual proclamation. It is undisputed that the electronic filing was made at 6:21 p.m. on May 10, 2022, or a few hours before the actual proclamation on May 11, 2022. Second, the strict application of the rules is not commensurate with the tardiness of the petition, which was only one hour and 21 minutes. Third, the pleading was filed through e-mail, which may be accessed in real time and not limited by the physical structures of the agency.[15] The ponente, echoing the observations of Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, is correct that the Court must hew to the practicable realities borne by technological advances.[16] Fourth, the COMELEC Second Division already gave due course to the petition and found sufficient evidence to disqualify Mamba. Fifth, the case should not be resolved based on technicalities because election cases should be considered imbued with public interest.
Given these reasons, the COMELEC En Banc should have been mindful of its rules, which provide that "[i]n the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission."[17] Verily, it is not in the interest of justice to strictly apply the rules by dismissing a case after its Division found the petition for disqualification meritorious. The COMELEC En Banc should have resolved the case on its merits rather than dismissed it by strictly adhering to its rules. I limit my concurrence up to this point.
The "date of proclamation" should be understood as the exact moment of the proclamation of the election results |
I beg to differ on the second point that the "date of the proclamation" covers the hours after the proclamation. Indeed, the COMELEC Rules mentioned "but not later than the date of proclamation"[18] as the deadline to file a petition for disqualification. The majority ruled that this phrase should mean the "full 24 hours of the day on which such proclamation takes place" after applying Article 13 of the Civil Code that "days" should be understood as 24 hours.[19] Despite this interpretation, the majority would then quip that the last day to file the petition cannot extend beyond the date of the proclamation:
The Court now holds that a petition for disqualification of a candidate based on Section 68 of the OEC may be filed during the period beginning the whole day after the last day of filing of certificate of candidacy until the end of the day of the date of proclamation, even after the exact time of the proclamation of the winning candidate.[20] (Emphasis supplied)What would be the reckoning point for counting the 24 hours? If the reckoning point is the exact moment of proclamation, then an interpretation applying Article 13 of the Civil Code may not justify the majority's position that the last day to file a petition for disqualification should be "until the end of day of the date of proclamation."[21] An example of a scenario that may happen during the elections would best demonstrate the absurdity of the majority's position. Suppose a candidate was proclaimed at 11:49 p.m. on May 10, 2022. How does the 24-hour period come into play? Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the 24-hour period should extend beyond May 10, 2022. Also, what is the rationale for allowing the filing of a petition for disqualification after proclamation?
I submit that a better view should result from harmonizing Sections 68 and 253[22] of the OEC, COMELEC Rules on election contests, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646. The cut-off period should be the exact moment of the proclamation of election results—the same position that the COMELEC En Banc adopted.
Indeed, the majority is correct that Section 68 of the OEC is silent on the period to file a petition for disqualification, to wit:
Section 68. Disqualifications.—Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters ... or (e) violated any of Sections ... 261, paragraphs ... v ... shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office[.] (Emphasis supplied)The silence of Section 68 should not be understood as an unbridled discretion on the part of the COMELEC to set the deadline to file a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC must harmonize this section with other provisions of law. As worded, the grounds under this section may be used to bar a candidate (1) from continuing as a candidate or (2) from holding the office if elected. The difference in purpose reflects the dichotomy of the available remedies—a petition for disqualification or a petition for quo warranto.
On the one hand, a petition for disqualification is filed to prohibit a person from continuing as a candidate.[23] It may be filed once a person attains the status of a candidate. In Fermin v. COMELEC,[24] the Court held that a petition for disqualification may be premised under Section 68 of the OEC. Under the COMELEC Rules, it may be filed "not later than the date of proclamation."
On the other hand, a petition for quo warranto against elective provincial officials is filed within 10 days after the date of the proclamation. It may be anchored on the grounds of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, to wit:
Section 253. Petition for quo warranto.—Any voter contesting the election of any ... provincial ... officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis supplied)The COMELEC Rules[25] reiterate the period to file a petition for quo warranto.
I submit that the thrust of a petition for quo warranto is to bar a person from holding office from which he or she was elected. After the proclamation, a petition invoking Section 68 of the OEC against the winning candidate is essentially a question of the winning candidate's ineligibility—the right to hold the elective office due to certain acts committed that bar him or her from holding office. The reckoning point separating the proper remedy to be filed concerning elective provincial officers is the proclamation of a candidate, which formally declares a candidate to have garnered the highest number of votes. At that point, he or she ceases to be merely a candidate. He or she has the expectant right to hold public office following the proclamation or results. Before the proclamation of a candidate, filing a petition for quo warranto is premature.[26]
It is worth reiterating the Court's observation in Venezuela v. COMELEC[27] as regards why pre-election cases, such as a petition for disqualification, filed after proclamation should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of the necessary election protest or quo warranto petition. The dismissal would save time and energy for the litigants and the COMELEC:
It was not until February 6, 1980, as admitted in the very petition itself, that the issue of disqualification was raised. The view, therefore, that the present proceeding cannot with precision be described as a pre-proclamation controversy, considering that on the very same day, private respondent Saldivar had already been proclaimed, has much to commend it. Moreover, it would save the time and energy of the litigants as well as respondent Commission, and eventually this Court in view of its appellate jurisdiction, if the matter were passed upon in an election protest or quo warranto petition in the lower court, the office involved being that of municipal mayor.[28] (Emphasis supplied)In Aguinaldo v. COMELEC,[29] the Court reiterated Venezuela and explained that a petition for disqualification timely filed should be resolved on the merits:
Since Venezuela v. Commission on Elections, this Court has invariably adhered to the principle that after the holding of the January 30, 1980 election, and a proclamation thereafter made, a petition to disqualify a candidate based on a change of political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election, filed with this Court after January 10, 1980, arising from a pre-proclamation controversy, should be dismissed without prejudice to such ground being passed upon in a proper election protest or quo warranto proceeding. Where, however, such constitutional provision had been seasonably invoked prior to that date with the Commission on Elections having acted on it and the matter then elevated to this Court before such election, the issue thus presented should be resolved.[30] (Emphasis supplied)By examining the related provisions and rules discussed above and the difference in objectives in filing a petition for disqualification or quo warranto, it becomes clear that the proclamation of the winning candidate delineates the available remedies.
COMELEC is duty-bound to resolve pending petitions for disqualification that were timely filed |
While petitions filed out of time should be dismissed outright, the COMELEC is duty-bound to resolve pending petitions for disqualification filed on time. This duty is required by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis supplied)In Sunga v. COMELEC,[31] the Court held that the COMELEC may not deviate from its duty to resolve the petitions for disqualification timely filed because it would be contrary to the legislative intent of Republic Act No. 6646. Dismissing the petition for disqualification outright would also unduly reward erring candidates:
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect.With these, subject to the qualification on the interpretation of the deadline to file a petition for disqualification, I concur with the results and vote to remand the case to COMELEC En Banc for proper disposition.
....
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
[1] COMELEC Rules of Procedure (1993), sec. 4.
[2] Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (1985).
[3] Rollo, pp. 880-897; signed by Presiding Commissioner Marlon S. Casquejo and Commissioners Rey E. Bulay and Nelson J. Celis; Commissioner Nelson J. Celis concurred "on the results."
[4] Id. at 896.
[5] Id. at 44-61; Signed by Chairperson George Erwin M. Garcia and Commissioners Socorro B. Inting, Marlon S. Casquejo, Aimee P. Ferolino, Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr., and Nelson J. Celis while Commissioner Rey E. Bulay took no part.
[6] Id. at 60.
[7] Id. at 49-50.
[8] 378 Phil. 585 (1999) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
[9] 478 Phil. 941 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
[10] Rollo, pp. 51-53.
[11] Republic Act No. 6646, sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
[12] Entitled "An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for Other Purposes" (1988).
[13] Draft Decision, p. 9.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 10.
[16] Id. at 10.
[17] COMELEC Rules of Procedure (1993), sec. 4.
[18] COMELEC Rule of Procedure (1993), sec. 3. Period to File Petition.—The Petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.
[19] Draft Decision, p. 9.
[20] Id. at 11.
[21] Id.
[22] OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, sec. 253 Petition for quo warranto.—Any voter contesting the election of any ... provincial ... officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within [10] days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
[23] Fermin v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 449, 469 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
[24] 595 Phil. 449 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, En Banc].
[25] COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Elections, Resolution No. 8804 (2010) Rule 6, sec. 3. The rule provides:
Section 3. How initiated.—An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed ... within a non-extendible period of ten days following the date of proclamation[.][26] Loong v. COMELEC, 290-A Phil. 559, 574 (1992) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
[27] 187 Phil. 503 (1980) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
[28] Id. at 505-506.
[29] 190 Phil. 1 (1981) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
[30] Id. at 1-2. Citations omitted.
[31] 351 Phil. 310 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
[32] Id. at 322-323. Citations omitted.