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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 265481, July 29, 2024 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. XXX265481, PANFILO DELGADO LADE, JR., REYNALDO LOGRONIO DELA TORRE, JR.,* AND YYY265481,** ACCUSED;
PANFILO DELGADO LADE, JR. AND REYNALDO LOGRONIO DELA TORRE, JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
D E C I S I O N
LOPEZ, M., J.:
Eyewitness identification is the bedrock of many pronouncements of guilt.[1] There can be no conviction without proof of identity of the culprit beyond reasonable doubt. The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to establish the identity of the perpetrator.[2] Here, the positive identification and collective criminal liability of the accused for the crimes of murder and slight physical injuries are the subject of review in this appeal assailing the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals.
ANTECEDENTS
On October 20, 2007, Normel Lapinig (Normel) and his cousin Julius Bacolod Caramonte (Julius) were drinking at a videoke bar. By 11:00 p.m., Normel and Julius had consumed four bottles of beer when the group composed of Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. (Panfilo), Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. (Reynaldo), XXX265481, and YYY265481, arrived. XXX265481 sat in front of Julius while Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 stood behind. Normel and Julius left the bar for their boardinghouse at around 12:00 midnight. Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 followed Normel and Julius who were waiting to hail a jeepney at a lit place along the national highway. As Normel boarded the jeepney, YYY265481 and Reynaldo blocked Julius's path. Normel attempted to get off the jeepney and help Julius. However, Reynaldo jabbed Normel's left eye knocking him back inside the jeep. Normel tried to get out again, but YYY265481 punched him on the right ear. Panfilo then restrained the hands of Julius while XXX265481 thrusted a knife on his right chest. Julius tried to run, but he fell by the roadside. At that moment, XXX265481 stabbed Julius on his neck.[4]
Normel asked help from the jeepney driver who drove away instead. Thus, Normel went to the boardinghouse and called for his landlord Jonathan Macavinta (Jonathan). Normel told Jonathan what happened to Julius and expressed that he could still recognize the faces of the assailants. At 10:00 a.m. the next day, Normel and Jonathan proceeded to the police station and reported the incident. Thereat, Normel identified the perpetrators based on a picture from the photo gallery presented to him. Immediately, the authorities conducted a hot pursuit operation and arrested Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481. Later, the police informed Normel that Julius died due to massive hemorrhage from multiple stab wounds.[5] Accordingly, Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 were charged with slight physical injuries and murder committed against Normel and Julius, respectively, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 62, 240-2007 and 62, 241-2007:
On February 6, 2019, the RTC found that Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 conspired to commit slight physical injuries for mauling Normel and murder for killing Julius. The RTC gave credence to Normel's positive identification of Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 as the perpetrators of the crimes,[8] thus:
On March 25, 2021, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment of conviction for slight physical injuries and murder with modification as to the award of damages. The CA ratiocinated that Normel had the opportunity to view Panfilo and Reynaldo as the perpetrators and that he immediately went to the police station to report the crimes. Normel was likewise free of any impermissible suggestion from authorities to single out Panfilo and Reynaldo during the photographic identification, viz.:
RULING
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Criminal investigative techniques include various out-of-court methods of identification to narrow the list of suspects. The law enforcers may utilize a show-up or a one-on-one confrontation where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witnesses for identification. The police officer can also conduct a line-up where witnesses identify the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. The persons other than the accused should be of similar appearance and background. The authorities may likewise employ a street identification where witnesses are brought to a particular neighborhood or place to see if they can recognize the person who committed the crime. The investigative techniques are not limited to corporeal identifications. The operatives can use rogue's gallery or photo board, pictures, and mug shots to identify the perpetrator.[15]
In determining the reliability of out-of-court identifications, the Court must look at the totality of the circumstances and consider the following factors namely: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the length of time between the crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.[16] These rules assure fairness as well as compliance with the constitutional requirements of due process with regard to out-of-court identification and prevent the contamination of the integrity of in-court identification.[17] Specifically, photographic identification must be free from any impermissible suggestions that would single out a person to the attention of the witness making the identification. To prevent any undue suggestiveness in the identification process, it was held that the correct way is to: first, present a series of photographs to the witness and not solely the photograph of the suspect; and second, when showing a group of pictures to the witness, the arrangement and display of photographs should give no suggestion whatsoever which one of the pictures identifies the suspect. The burden to prove that the out-of-court identification was unduly suggestive rests on the accused.[18]
Applying these standards, the Court finds that Normel's out-of-court identification of Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 as perpetrators satisfied the totality of circumstances test. Normel had an unobstructed view of the four accused because of their proximity with each other at the time of the mauling and stabbing incidents. The assault happened while Normel and Julius were waiting to hail a jeepney at a lit place along the national highway. Visibility is a vital factor in determining whether eyewitnesses could have identified the perpetrators of crimes. It is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactors should normally be accepted.[19] Moreover, Normel had become familiar to Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 before the incidents. Normel saw the four accused at the videoke bar and could recall their time of arrival, clothing, and distance when they sat near their table. Normel exhibited a high level of certainty in his statements at the initial investigation and testimony during the trial. Nothing in the records shows that the supposed intoxication of Normel disrupted his attention or prevented him from having a clear view of the assailants. Normel even explained that he could still comprehend what was happening despite consuming beer as he was accustomed to drinking alcohol. More telling is that there is only a time lapse of ten hours between the commission of the crimes and the out-of-court identification. The crime transpired at 12:00 midnight and Normel identified the perpetrators at 10:00 a.m. on the same day in a photo gallery at the police station. Ideally, a prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after the incident. Yet, the Court has considered acceptable an identification made two days after the commission of a crime.[20] In comparison, the present case involved a shorter passage of time. Hence, it can hardly be said that the length of time rendered the positive identification flawed.
There was also no evidence that the law enforcers supplied or suggested to Normel that Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 were the culprits during the photographic identification. In People v. Pineda,[21] the police officers presented photographs of the accused and his companions to the witness who identified two perpetrators. The Court ruled that the identification procedure was unacceptable and tainted with improper suggestion, thus:
Anent Panfilo and Reynaldo's criminal liability, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC's factual and legal findings that they conspired to commit slight physical injuries and murder. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[34] Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts.[35] To be a conspirator, one need not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did they have to know the exact part performed by their co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.[36] Here, the implied conspiracy between Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 is evident from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the crimes demonstrating that all of them have the same purpose and were united in their execution.[37]
Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 were shown to have acted in concert not only in going together at the crime scene but also in purposely following the victims along the national highway. Their presence at the crime scene while one of them is in possession of a deadly weapon is not a mere coincidence or a casual and unintended meeting.[38] Ostensibly, they were there for a common purpose. The simultaneous actions of the four accused likewise evinced that they had one objective in mind—to assault the victims. YYY265481 and Reynaldo blocked Julius as soon as Normel boarded the jeepney. Reynaldo and YYY265481 punched and knocked Normel back into the jeepney when he tried to help Julius. Panfilo restrained the hands of Julius enabling XXX265481 to thrust a knife on his right chest. XXX265481 fatally stabbed Julius on his neck after he fell on the ground. As the CA aptly observed, the four accused acted as one, with XXX265481 and Panfilo attacking Julius while Reynaldo and YYY265481 prevented Normel from coming to his aid. The four accused fled together after achieving their common purpose. They did nothing after the incidents. They did not alert the authorities about the crimes which behavior certainly does not speak of innocence. All these acts point to the conclusion that Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 are co-principals who conspired to commit the crimes. The act of one is the act of all. The four accused are liable for all the crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.[39]
As intimated earlier, Panfilo and Reynaldo were charged with slight physical injuries and murder docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 62, 240-2007 and 62, 241-2007, respectively. Corollarily, the prosecution proved in Criminal Case No. 62, 240-2007 that Normel sustained contusions when YYY265481 and Reynaldo delivered blows to stop him from aiding Julius. YYY265481 and Reynaldo punched Normel twice revealing the malicious intent to inflict such injuries.[40] The contusions neither prevented Normel from engaging in his habitual work nor required medical assistance. As such, the slight physical injuries fall under Article 266, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Given that the crime happened before the enactment of Republic Act No. 10951,[41] the beneficial and original provisions of the RPC shall apply which prescribed the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding PHP 200.00 and censure. Considering the evil intent to inflict harm, the Court deems it proper to modify the punishment from fine to imprisonment. The prescribed penalty of arresto menor ranges from one day to 30 days imprisonment. As the penalty does not exceed one year, the Indeterminate Sentence Law becomes inapplicable. Absent any modifying circumstance, the imposable penalty must be within the medium period of arresto menor or 11 days to 20 days imprisonment. Thus, the Court imposes upon Panfilo and Reynaldo the straight penalty of 20 days imprisonment. As regards the civil liability, the Court awards Normel PHP 5,000.00 moral damages which shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid pursuant to prevailing case law.[42]
In Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007, the prosecution likewise established the crime of murder which requires the presence of the following elements, namely: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.[43] It is clear that XXX265481 stabbed Julius twice causing his death. The post-mortem examination of the body of Julius corroborated this fact. The killing was attended by the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength which demands the purposeful use of excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[44] The prosecution proved the relative disparity in strength or force between Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 as assailants, and Julius as the lone unarmed victim. The collective conduct of the four accused, one of them armed with a deadly weapon, in blocking and restraining the victim before the fatal attack likewise indicate that they deliberately sought abuse of superior strength to ensure the commission of the crime.[45] Lastly, the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the crime of murder is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. Absent any other aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty must be reclusion perpetua. Hence, the CA erred in imposing reclusion perpetua in lieu of death penalty upon Panfilo and Reynaldo. The Court also finds it appropriate to reduce the civil liability of the accused. The awards of PHP 75,000.00 civil indemnity, PHP 75,000.00 moral damages, PHP 75,000.00 exemplary damages, and PHP 50,000.00 temperate damages are proper in accordance with prevailing law and jurisprudence.[46] The award of damages shall all earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated March 25, 2021 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02205 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
In Criminal Case No. 62, 240-2007, accused-appellants Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. and Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. are GUILTY of slight physical injuries a dare sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of 20 days imprisonment. The accused-appellants are solidarily liable to pay the victim Normel Lapinig of PHP 5,000.00 moral damages which shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment.
In Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007, accused-appellants Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. and Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. are GUILTY of murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellants are solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the victim Julius Bacolod Caramonte of PHP 75,000.00 civil indemnity, PHP 75,000.00 moral damages, PHP 75,000.00 exemplary damages, and PHP 50,000.00 temperate damages which shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), I dissent. See separate opinion.
* Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. is also referred to as "Reynaldo Dela Torre" in some parts of the rollo.
** In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9344, Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1] People v. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú, 819 Phil. 406, 416 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[2] People v. Espera, 718 Phil. 680, 694 (2013) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
[3] Rollo, pp. 14-28. The Decision dated March 25, 2021 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02205 was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and concurred in by Associate Justices Loida S. Posadas-Kahulugan and Anisah B. Amanodin-Umpa of the Twenty-Second Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
[4] Id. at 16, 39-40.
[5] Id. at 17, 41-42.
[6] Id. at 14-15.
[7] Id. at 17-18, 42-48.
[8] Id. at 37-57.
[9] Id. at 51-57. The February 6, 2019 Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 62, 240-2007 and 62, 241-2007 was penned by Judge Lope L. Calio of Branch xxxxxxxxxxx, Regional Trial Court, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[10] Id. at 21- 27.
[11] Id. at 30-32.
[12] Id at 4-8.
[13] Id. at 60-61, 69-70.
[14] Id. at 74-108.
[15] See People v. Ansano, 891 Phil. 360 (2020) [Per .J. Caguioa, First Division]. Sea also J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in People v. Pepino, 777 Phil. 29 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[16] People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[17] People v. Gamer, 383 Phil. 557 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Divison].
[18] Mercado v. People, 615 Phil. 434, 445 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[19] People v. AAA, G.R. No. 247007, March 18, 2021 [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[20] People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[21] 473 Phil. 517 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
[22] Id. at 540-541.
[23] 586 Phil. 515 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[24] Id. at 536 -537.
[25] People v. Rivera, 458 Phil. 856 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
[26] Id. at 876-877.
[27] CA rollo, pp. 152-153.
[28] Id. at 157-158.
[29] People v. Matignas, 428 Phil. 834 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[30] People v. Orosco, 757 Phil. 299, 310 (2015) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division], citing People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 721 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[31] People v. Abierra, 833 Phil. 276 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[32] People v. Togahan, 551 Phil. 997, 1014 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
[33] People v. Espina, 383 Phil. 656 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
[34] REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 8, par. 2.
[35] People v. Cabrera, 311 Phil. 33, 40-41 (1995) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
[36] People v. De Jesus, 473 Phil. 405, 429 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[37] People v. Licayan, 415 Phil. 459 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[38] People v. Landicho, 317 Phil. 599 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division].
[39] People v. Medice, 679 Phil. 338, 349 (2012) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
[40] Villareal v. People, 680 Phil. 527 (2014) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].
[41] Republic Act No. 10951 (2017), An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, Otherwise Known as "The Revised Penal Code", as Amended.
[42] Javarez v. People, 881 Phil. 546 (2020) [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].
[43] Ramos v. People, 803 Phil. 775, 783 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
[44] People v. Villanueva and Sayson, 807 Phil. 245, 252 (2017) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
[45] See Valenzuela v. People, 612 Phil. 907, 917 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[46] People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
LEONEN, SAJ.:
Criminal prosecution built solely on eyewitness identification should be handled with great care, given the natural limitations of human memory.[1] An anomalous out-of-court identification taints any subsequent identification made in court. This becomes particularly relevant when prosecution witnesses provide conflicting accounts of the events that transpired during the out-of-court identification.
Here, the impermissibly suggestive procedure of the out-of-court identification violates the due process rights of accused-appellants Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. (Lade) and Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. (Dela Torre). They must, therefore, be acquitted.
This controversy centers on the out-of-court identification by Normel Lapinig (Lapinig) of the four men who had allegedly stabbed his cousin to death, resulting in charges of murder and slight physical Injuries.[2]
Lapinig testified that on the late night of October 20, 2007, he was out with his cousin Julius Bacolod Caramonte (Caramonte), drinking beer at a videoke bar along xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx, Davao City. They left around midnight and were waiting for a ride home when four men approached them. As Lapinig was boarding a passenger jeepney, two of the men blocked Caramonte's way. Lapinig tried to help, but the same men punched him twice. As the jeepney was slowly moving, Lapinig witnessed one of the men stab Caramonte while being restrained by another. Attempting to flee, Caramonte stumbled and fell by the roadside where he was stabbed once more, this time in the neck.[3]
Lapinig alighted the jeepney in xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx in search of police but failed to find one. He then took a motorcycle back to his boarding house. The next day, around 10:00 a.m., accompanied by his lessor, Lapinig went to xxxxxxxxxxx Police Station where he learned that his cousin had died.[4] Upon police inquiry, Lapinig confirmed that he could identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, a police officer showed him a single photograph, from which he identified the four people as the perpetrators.[5] These four men were Lade, Dela Torre, and their co-accused XXX265481 and YYY265481.[6]
Contrary to the testimony of Lapinig, Senior Police Officer IV Ernesto A. Ayop (SPO4 Ayop) testified that Lapinig had been presented with a photo gallery at the police station. According to him, Lapinig skimmed through the photo gallery before isolating the photographs of the four men.[7]
Meanwhile, the defense claimed that on the night of the incident, Lade, Dela Torre, XXX265481, and YYY265481 had been commissioned to post campaign materials for a barangay election, though XXX265481 and YYY265481 did not show up. Later that night, Lade and Dela Torre attended a meeting at the candidate's residence. They went home around 10:00 p.m. and stayed in their respective houses until 6:00 a.m. the next day. The relatives of Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 supported their testimonies.[8]
Cristito Buta (Buta) testified to corroborate the alibi, saying he was the one who hired the three men. He added that around 7:00 a.m. the next day, Lade and Dela Torre arrived at his house and, together, they put up more campaign posters. By 10:00 a.m., two persons arrested Lade and Dela Torre.[9]
On arraignment, XXX265481 admitted to the crime while the other three denied any participation. The trial court convicted him while trial for the rest proceeded. Eventually, the trial court found the three others guilty of both the murder of Caramonte and slight physical injuries inflicted on Lapinig.[10] Pending the Court of Appeals decision, YYY265481 withdrew his appeal, prompting the issuance of a Partial Entry of Judgment as to him. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of Lade and Dela Torre, who in turn appealed to this Court.[11]
The majority, in sustaining the conviction of accused-appellants, ruled Lapinig's out-of-court identification satisfied the totality-of-Âcircumstances test.[12] It further ruled that, in any case, "a defective out-ofÂ-court identification may be cured by subsequent in-court identification[.]"[13]
I dissent.
I
The frailty and malleability of human memory are scientifically proven. Contrary to the common belief that memory is like a video recorder, it may be distorted, contaminated, compromised, and even fabricated.[14]
The "belief that a confident memory is always highly accurate and resistant to distortion or loss"[15] may carry grave consequences. Eyewitness testimonies, heavily influenced by distorted memories, can result in wrongful convictions-allowing innocent individuals to lose their life and liberty, while the real perpetrators evade justice.
Several factors shape the level of a witness's attentiveness when observing an event, including the duration and frequency of exposure, the level of violence during the event, the witness's stress levels and expectations, and their actions during the incident.[16] These factors affect the encoding, storage, and retrieval process of memory construction:
After exposure to new information, the subsequent memory is often compelling to the eyewitness, increasing their confidence in its accuracy despite it being highly compromised. Yet, studies show limited to inverse correlations between one's confidence in the accuracy of a memory and the memory's actual accuracy.[20]
II
Law enforcers use several modes of out-of-court identification to aid their investigations. One mode is a police line-up, where the witness selects a "suspect from a group of persons lined up[.]"[21] Another mode is the showÂ-up, where "the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification."[22] Both are types of corporeal identification, where the suspect is physically present for the witness to identify.[23] Aside from these, law enforcers also use photographs or mugshots to facilitate witness identification of the perpetrator.[24]
Jurisprudence acknowledges that human errors and suggestive influences heavily influence out-of-court identifications. First adopted in People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[25] courts have since used the totality-of-Âcircumstances test to determine the reliability and admissibility of an out-of-Âcourt identification:
On the other hand, this Court has considered prior or contemporaneous actions of law enforcers, prosecutors, the media, or even other witnesses to show the suggestive nature of identification procedures, ultimately resulting in an acquittal.[33]
In People v. Pineda,[34] six perpetrators were involved in a robbery with homicide on a passenger bus. The police admitted that they only showed two photos to the witness—that of Pineda and his co-accused.[35] This Court found the identification procedure unacceptable for being tainted with impermissible suggestion.[36] It provided two rules for out-of-court identifications done through photographs:
People v. Rodrigo[40] similarly involved a case of robbery with homicide. The accused was identified through a lone photograph shown to the witness, and subsequently through a show-up where the witness and the accused had a personal confrontation in the police station.[41] This Court acquitted the accused and explained how a suggestive identification procedure violates the right of the accused to due process:
III
Here, the prosecution banks on the testimony of Lapinig, the sole eyewitness to the crime, to establish the identity of the assailants. In his Affidavit-Complaint taken by the investigating officer a day after the incident, he claimed that the police officers showed him a single picture for him to identify and that he was surprised that the four persons appearing in the picture were the same persons who attacked him and his cousin.[48]
During his cross-examination, Lapinig consistently said that he was only shown one picture. He testified:
However, a closer look at SPO4 Ayop's testimony reveals that he was incompetent to testify as to what transpired during the out-of-court identification. On cross-examination, he said that he was not the person who allegedly showed Lapinig the photo gallery, but one Raul Tonzo:
Oddly enough, SPO4 Ayop also failed to clarify why the police possessed only a single photograph showing all four accused together, which they claimed was part of their photo gallery:
All told, the prosecution did not offer any justifiable explanation for the crucial discrepancies between the testimonies of their witnesses. Therefore, they failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the identities of accused-appellants as the perpetrators.
IV
The out-of-court identification also crumbles under the totality-of-circumstances test.
First, Lapinig himself admitted that he was intoxicated during the incident,[55] which diminished his degree of attention at the time of the incident. His opportunity to view the assailants at the time of the crime was also poorly established. The prosecution claimed that around 11:00 p.m. on October 20, 2007, the four accused were present at the videoke bar;[56] presumably to establish that Lapinig had become familiar with their faces prior to the incident. The majority emphasized:
Only during his cross-examination did Lapinig suddenly mention that he saw the four accused arrive at the videoke bar.[58] Yet, right before saying this, upon the court's inquiry, he claimed that he was not aware of the other people that were inside the videoke bar:
Most important, Lapinig's level of certainty during the out-of-court identification was preceded by a suggestive procedure. Again, the single photograph shown to Lapinig was contrary to the Pineda rules, which require a series of photographs, not merely that of the suspect, to be shown to the witness. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú teaches that not complying with the rules "suggests that any subsequent corporeal identification made by a witness may not actually be the result of a reliable recollection of the criminal incident. Instead, it will simply confirm false confidence induced by the suggestive presentation of photographs to a witness."[61]
Notably, the first, third, and eleventh danger signals discussed in Pineda were present in the out-of-court identification. Lapinig admitted that he could not remember any of the faces of the people present in the videoke bar at the time of the incident.[62] He failed to describe any of the four accused prior to his exposure to the photograph shown by the police. Last, several persons committed the crime, and they were unknown or unfamiliar to Lapinig beforehand.[63]
Given the highly suggestive and problematic out-of-court identification in this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants' identities as the perpetrators of the crime. They must, therefore, be acquitted.
For these reasons, I dissent.
On the other hand, Lapinig's medical certificate documenting his injury, along with Caramonte's death certificate confirming his demise, effectively establishes the occurrence of the crimes.[64] XXX265481's admission of guilt and YYY265481's withdrawal of appeal render it unnecessary for this Court to pass upon their culpability. Their individual admissions alone are ample evidence to uphold their convictions.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the appeal and ACQUIT accused-appellants Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. and Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. of the crimes charged against each of them.
[1] People v. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú, 819 Phil. 406, 408 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[2] Rollo, p. 31.
[3] Id. at 16.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 16, 23.
[6] Id. at 16.
[7] Id. at 16, 23.
[8] Id. at 17. See also ponencia, p. 3.
[9] Id. at 87-88.
[10] Ponencia, p. 3.
[11] Rollo, p. 20.
[12] Id. at 8.
[13] Id. at 10. (Citation omitted)
[14] Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and Juror Needs to Know about Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1331, 1345 (2015).
[15] Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E. L. Stark, The Neuroscience of Memory: Implications for the Courtroom, 14 NAT REV NEUROSCI, 649 (2013).
[16] See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in People v. Pepino, 777 Phil. 29, 73 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[17] Nancy K. Steblay, Scientific Advances in Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1090, 1104-1105 (2015).
[18] Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After A Century Of Research, 100 THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 825, 842-843 (1973).
[19] Nancy K. Steblay, Scientific Advances in Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1090, 1107 (2015).
[20] Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and Juror Needs to Know about Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1331, 1345 (2015).
[21] People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 180 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[22] Id.
[23] See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in People v. Pepino, 777 Phil. 29, 69 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[24] People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 180 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[25] 319 Phil. 128 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[26] Id. at 180.
[27] 346 Phil. 572 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[28] Id. at 588-589.
[29] 723 Phil. 591 (2013) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
[30] Id. at 614.
[31] Id.
[32] Id. (Citation omitted)
[33] People v. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú, 819 Phil. 406, 429 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[34] 473 Phil. 517 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
[35] Id. at 539.
[36] Id. at 540.
[37] Id.
[38] Id. at 547-548.
[39] Id. at 548.
[40] 586 Phil. 515 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[41] Id. at 529.
[42] Id. at 529-530.
[43] 819 Phil. 406 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[44] Id. at 415.
[45] Id.
[46] Id. at 408.
[47] People v. Rodrigo, 586 Phil. 515, 529 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[48] See Record of Documentary Evidence (Regional Trial Court), p. 4.
[49] TSN Normel Lapinig, March 4, 2008, pp. 43-44. Atty. Leopoldo L. Cagatin is a defense counsel.
[50] TSN, Normel Lapinig, April 17, 2008, pp. 22-23. Atty. Lorenzo B. Ta-asan is a defense counsel.
[51] Rollo, 23.
[52] Id.
[53] TSN, SPO4 Ernesto Ayop, September 26, 2011, p. 22. Atty. Rogelio G. Largo is a defense counsel.
[54] Id. at 23-24, 26-28.
[55] Rollo, p 16.
[56] Id.
[57] Ponencia, p. 8.
[58] TSN, Normel Lapinig, March 4, 2008, p. 12.
[59] Id.
[60] TSN, Normerl Lapinig, April 17, 2008, p. 11.
[61] People v. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú, 819 Phil. 406, 432 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[62] TSN, Normel Lapinig, March 4, 2008, p. 12.
[63] TSN, Normel Lapinig, April 17, 2008, p. 11.
[64] Rollo, pp. 15-16.
On October 20, 2007, Normel Lapinig (Normel) and his cousin Julius Bacolod Caramonte (Julius) were drinking at a videoke bar. By 11:00 p.m., Normel and Julius had consumed four bottles of beer when the group composed of Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. (Panfilo), Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. (Reynaldo), XXX265481, and YYY265481, arrived. XXX265481 sat in front of Julius while Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 stood behind. Normel and Julius left the bar for their boardinghouse at around 12:00 midnight. Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 followed Normel and Julius who were waiting to hail a jeepney at a lit place along the national highway. As Normel boarded the jeepney, YYY265481 and Reynaldo blocked Julius's path. Normel attempted to get off the jeepney and help Julius. However, Reynaldo jabbed Normel's left eye knocking him back inside the jeep. Normel tried to get out again, but YYY265481 punched him on the right ear. Panfilo then restrained the hands of Julius while XXX265481 thrusted a knife on his right chest. Julius tried to run, but he fell by the roadside. At that moment, XXX265481 stabbed Julius on his neck.[4]
Normel asked help from the jeepney driver who drove away instead. Thus, Normel went to the boardinghouse and called for his landlord Jonathan Macavinta (Jonathan). Normel told Jonathan what happened to Julius and expressed that he could still recognize the faces of the assailants. At 10:00 a.m. the next day, Normel and Jonathan proceeded to the police station and reported the incident. Thereat, Normel identified the perpetrators based on a picture from the photo gallery presented to him. Immediately, the authorities conducted a hot pursuit operation and arrested Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481. Later, the police informed Normel that Julius died due to massive hemorrhage from multiple stab wounds.[5] Accordingly, Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 were charged with slight physical injuries and murder committed against Normel and Julius, respectively, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 62, 240-2007 and 62, 241-2007:
At the arraignment, XXX265481 admitted the crimes while Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 pleaded not guilty to the charges. The RTC then issued a judgment of conviction against XXX265481. Trial then ensued. Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 denied any participation in the commission of the crimes. Panfilo and Reynaldo claimed that on October 20, 2007, they were hired to post campaign materials for a barangay elections candidate from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. YYY265481 was unable to join Panfilo and Reynaldo because he had a fever. Thereafter, Panfilo and Reynaldo went to the candidate's house for a meeting. At 10:00 p.m., they went home and stayed in their respective houses until 6:00 a.m. the following day. The relatives of Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 corroborated these accounts.[7]Criminal Case No. 62, 240-2007:
That on or about October 21, 2007, in the City of xxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring and mutually helping each other, attacked, assaulted and punched one Normel Lapinig, thereby inflicting upon the latter slight physical injuries, which required the necessary medical attendance for a period of two (2) days and incapacitated the said offended party from performing [his] customary labor for the same period of time, to his damage and prejudice.Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007:
That on or about October 21, 2007, in the City of xxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed to death with the said weapon one Julius Bacolod Caramonte, hitting and inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which caused his instantaneous death, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the heirs of said Julius Bacolod Caramonte.[6] (Emphasis supplied)
On February 6, 2019, the RTC found that Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 conspired to commit slight physical injuries for mauling Normel and murder for killing Julius. The RTC gave credence to Normel's positive identification of Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 as the perpetrators of the crimes,[8] thus:
Positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. We have likewise consistently assigned less probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by relatives since we have established in jurisprudence that, in order for corroboration to be credible, the same must be offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.Aggrieved, Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 elevated the case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02205. Meantime, YYY265481 withdrew his appeal stating that he is already satisfied with the RTC's decision. On the other hand, Panfilo and Reynaldo maintained their alibis and contended that Normel failed to positively identity them as the culprits. Panfilo and Reynaldo questioned the credibility of Normel given his intoxication at the time of the incident. Panfilo and Reynaldo also invoked case law where the Court acquitted the accused who was pinpointed through a single photograph shown to the sole witness.
Defense opted to rely on their respective denials and alibis. However, they were shown to be weak and self-serving. The corroborative testimonies of the accused's relatives, likewise, failed to establish that it was physically impossible for each of the accused to be at or near xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx at or about 12:30 A.M. of 21 October 2007. Their alibis are unworthy of credit.
. . . .
Clearly, the coordinated acts of CICL YYY265481, accused Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr., and accused Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr., together with CICL xxxxxxxxxxx, are indicative of their common purpose to maul Normel Lapinig and murder Julius Bacolod Caramonte.
The prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt to the offense of slight physical injuries.
However, the Court cannot agree with the prosecution that the crime be Slight Physical Injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. The alleged injuries sustained by Normel Lapinig did not incapacitate him to continue his studies nor require medical assistance.
CICL XXX265481, CICL YYY265481, accused Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr., and accused Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr., are liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, ...:
. . . .
Likewise, CICL XXX265481, CICL YYY265481, accused Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr., and accused Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr., are liable for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, ...:
. . . .
It is undisputed that on 21 October 2007, CICL XXX265481 (who already pleaded guilty and his case was already earlier decided), CICL YYY26548I, accused Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr., and accused Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. and victims Normel Lapinig and Julius Bacolod Caramonte were at the same area at a certain particular time. The Court is convinced with moral certainty that CICL XXX265481, CICL YYY265481, accused Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr., and accused Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr., did the wrongful acts against Julius Bacolod Caramonte by stabbing him to death and against Normel Lapinig by mauling him.
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused PANFILO DELGADO LADE, JR., REYNALDO LOGRONIO DELA TORRE, JR. and CICL YYY265481 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Physical Injuries under Article 266, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 62, 240-2007 and the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007.
PANFILO DELGADO LADE, JR. AND REYNALDO LOGRONIO DELA TORRE, JR. are hereby sentenced:in Criminal Case No. 62, 240-2007
to jointly and severally (with CICL YYY265481) pay the following: fine of Two Hundred ([PHP] 200.00) Pesos; the amount of Five Thousand ([PHP] 5,000.00) Pesos as moral damages; and the costs of the proceedings.in Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are ordered to jointly and severally (with CICL YYY265481) pay the following: the amount of Seventy-five Thousand ([PHP] 75,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity; the amount of Seventy-five Thousand ([PHP] 75,000.00) Pesos as moral damages; the amount of Seventy-five Thousand ([PHP] 75,000.00) as exemplary damages; and the costs of the proceedings.
With respect to CICL YYY265481, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced:in Criminal Case No. 62, 240-2007
to jointly and severally (with PANFILO DELGADO LADE, JR. and REYNALDO LOGRONIO DELA TORRE, JR.) pay the following: fine of Two Hundred ([PHP] 200.00) Pesos; the amount of Five Thousand ([PHP] 5,000.00) Pesos as moral damages; and the costs of the proceedings.in Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. [He is] ordered to jointly and severally (with PANFILO DELGADO LADE, JR. and REYNALDO LOGRONIO DELA TORRE, JR.) pay the following: the amount of Seventy-five Thousand ([PHP] 75,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity; the amount of Seventy-five Thousand ([PHP] 75,000.00) Pesos as moral damages; the amount of Seventy-five Thousand ([PHP] 75,000.00) as exemplary damages; and the costs of the proceedings.
He is already more than twenty-one (21) years old and is currently detained at xxxxxxxxxxx City Jail as accused in another case, thus his sentence can no longer be suspended.
The period of their preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their penalty pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis supplied)
On March 25, 2021, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment of conviction for slight physical injuries and murder with modification as to the award of damages. The CA ratiocinated that Normel had the opportunity to view Panfilo and Reynaldo as the perpetrators and that he immediately went to the police station to report the crimes. Normel was likewise free of any impermissible suggestion from authorities to single out Panfilo and Reynaldo during the photographic identification, viz.:
On the night of the incident, the four Accused-Appellants followed Normel and Julius as they left the bar and to the area where they were waiting to hail a ride home. The four [of] them acted as one, with XXX265481 and Panfilo attacking Julius while Reynaldo and YYY265481 prevented Normel from coming to his aid. The unity of their actions indicates conspiracy and they are thus liable for all the crimes ultimately committed.Panfilo and Reynaldo sought reconsideration but were denied.[11] Hence, this recourse.[12] In their manifestations, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and Reynaldo dispensed with the filing of supplemental briefs, and adopted their pleadings filed before the CA.[13] Meanwhile, Panfilo submitted the required brief and impugned the credibility of Normel and the validity of the photographic identification. In any event, Panfilo averred that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[14]
In their attempt to prevent Normel from helping Julius, Reynaldo and YYY265481 delivered blows that knocked him back into the vehicle. This caused contusions on the part of Normel, thereby constituting slight physical injuries, specifically under Par. 2 of Article 266, as it was not shown that the injuries prevented the victim from engaging in his habitual work nor did he require medical assistance.
Meanwhile, XXX265481 stabbed Julius in the right chest while he was being held by Panfilo. Julius then tried to run away from his assailants but was eventually caught and stabbed in the neck. As established in his Certificate of Death, Julius died from his wounds. In addition to the fact that Accused-Appellants actually pursued Julius, the fact of his death creates the presumption that they acted with the intent to kill.
The killing was also qualified with abuse of superior strength, which is established when there is "inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime." During the stabbing, XXX265481 had a clear advantage over Julius as the latter was being restrained by Panfilo. Not only that, YYY265481 and Reynaldo made sure that Normel would not be able to come to his cousin's aid. By their actions, the Accused-Appellants clearly made sure that they had the advantage when attacking Julius. The killing is therefore qualified to Murder.
. . . .
Meanwhile, SPO4 Ayop testified that Normel was presented with a photo gallery or three bundles of photographs at the police station, with the witness himself skimming through them before isolating the photograph of the Accused-Appellants.
. . . .
On the night of the incident, Normel already had the opportunity to see the Accused-Appellants when they first entered the videoke bar. He was even able to recall, the time they entered the bar, their clothing and how far they were seated from where he and Julius were. When he and Julius left the bar, Normel also remembered the faces of the people who followed them, who of the four punched him in the face, and who stabbed Julius. Normel's experience, which transpired in less than a day, left him with enough certainty to accurately describe the perpetrators of the crime. This was precisely why Normel was able to tell both his landlord back at his boarding house as well as the police officer at the station that he could still recognize their faces.
In Rodrigo, the lone witness in question was made to identify the suspect after being invited by the police and shown a single photo, as part of an investigation that lasted for a month. In this case, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the photographic identification involved failed the test as it was not free from impermissible suggestion:
. . . .
The procedure on photographic identification, therefore, is meant to rule out impermissible suggestion which, based on the facts of the case before Us, do not apply to Normel's identification of the Accused-Appellants. Unlike Rosita in Rodrigo, Normel was the one who immediately went to the police station to report the incident knowing well what the perpetrators looked like. He was in no way prone to suggestion on the part of the police.
. . . .
In Rodrigo, the Supreme Court noted that the identification of the perpetrator flagged several of the danger signs mentioned above. None of these exist in the case of Normel who, as explained above, had every opportunity to see and recognize Accused-Appellants and showed no discrepancies in describing them in court. . . In addition, We also see no ill-motive on the part of Normel to simply impute his cousin's death on a random group of strangers, other than the simple fact that he knew that they were indeed the ones who committed the offense.
. . . .
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 11th judicial Region, Branch xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx finding Accused-Appellants Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. and Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Slight Physical Injuries under Par. 2, Article 266 in Criminal Case No. 62, 240-2007 of the RPC and Murder under Article 248 of the RPC in Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:
For Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007, the award of damages should be as follows: [PHP] 100,000.00 as Civil Indemnity, [PHP] 100,000.00 as Moral Damages, [PHP] 100,000.00 as Exemplary Damages, and PHP] 50,000.00 as Temperate Damages, plus costs of the suit.
For Criminal Case Nos. 62, 240-2007 and 62, 241-2007: damages are subject to interest at a rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Criminal investigative techniques include various out-of-court methods of identification to narrow the list of suspects. The law enforcers may utilize a show-up or a one-on-one confrontation where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witnesses for identification. The police officer can also conduct a line-up where witnesses identify the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. The persons other than the accused should be of similar appearance and background. The authorities may likewise employ a street identification where witnesses are brought to a particular neighborhood or place to see if they can recognize the person who committed the crime. The investigative techniques are not limited to corporeal identifications. The operatives can use rogue's gallery or photo board, pictures, and mug shots to identify the perpetrator.[15]
In determining the reliability of out-of-court identifications, the Court must look at the totality of the circumstances and consider the following factors namely: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the length of time between the crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.[16] These rules assure fairness as well as compliance with the constitutional requirements of due process with regard to out-of-court identification and prevent the contamination of the integrity of in-court identification.[17] Specifically, photographic identification must be free from any impermissible suggestions that would single out a person to the attention of the witness making the identification. To prevent any undue suggestiveness in the identification process, it was held that the correct way is to: first, present a series of photographs to the witness and not solely the photograph of the suspect; and second, when showing a group of pictures to the witness, the arrangement and display of photographs should give no suggestion whatsoever which one of the pictures identifies the suspect. The burden to prove that the out-of-court identification was unduly suggestive rests on the accused.[18]
Applying these standards, the Court finds that Normel's out-of-court identification of Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 as perpetrators satisfied the totality of circumstances test. Normel had an unobstructed view of the four accused because of their proximity with each other at the time of the mauling and stabbing incidents. The assault happened while Normel and Julius were waiting to hail a jeepney at a lit place along the national highway. Visibility is a vital factor in determining whether eyewitnesses could have identified the perpetrators of crimes. It is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactors should normally be accepted.[19] Moreover, Normel had become familiar to Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 before the incidents. Normel saw the four accused at the videoke bar and could recall their time of arrival, clothing, and distance when they sat near their table. Normel exhibited a high level of certainty in his statements at the initial investigation and testimony during the trial. Nothing in the records shows that the supposed intoxication of Normel disrupted his attention or prevented him from having a clear view of the assailants. Normel even explained that he could still comprehend what was happening despite consuming beer as he was accustomed to drinking alcohol. More telling is that there is only a time lapse of ten hours between the commission of the crimes and the out-of-court identification. The crime transpired at 12:00 midnight and Normel identified the perpetrators at 10:00 a.m. on the same day in a photo gallery at the police station. Ideally, a prosecution witness must identify the suspect immediately after the incident. Yet, the Court has considered acceptable an identification made two days after the commission of a crime.[20] In comparison, the present case involved a shorter passage of time. Hence, it can hardly be said that the length of time rendered the positive identification flawed.
There was also no evidence that the law enforcers supplied or suggested to Normel that Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 were the culprits during the photographic identification. In People v. Pineda,[21] the police officers presented photographs of the accused and his companions to the witness who identified two perpetrators. The Court ruled that the identification procedure was unacceptable and tainted with improper suggestion, thus:
Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established methods of identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is unacceptable. . .Similarly in People v. Rodrigo,[23] the operatives presented a singular photograph for the eyewitness to identify the person responsible for the crime. The witness then identified the person in the picture as among the perpetrators after the lapse of five and a half months from the commission of the crime. The Court held that suggestive identification violates the right of the accused to due process and the time element attendant to the identification made it unreliable, to wit:
. . . .
In the present case, there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only of appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two accused. The police obviously suggested the identity of the accused by showing only appellant and Sison's photographs to Ferrer and Ramos.[22] (Emphasis supplied)
The time element involved in the process of identification is shown by the sequence of events following the robbery-homicide on October 27, 2000. The earliest document on record subsequent to the crime is Rosita's Sinumpaang Salaysay of November 24, 2000 where Rosita significantly mentioned that she did not know the robbers and that one Chito Alicante gave her their names. The Information against Rodrigo was filed with the court on February 28, 2001 and the warrant of arrest was issued only on April 18, 2001. The records do not show when Rosita saw Rodrigo at the San Jose del Monte Police Station 48 . . . but this presumably happened only after his arrest on April 18, 2001 or 5 1/2 months after the crime. Thereafter, Rosita identified Rodrigo in court on April 10, 2002, or more than 15 months after the crime. Thus, Rosita only saw Rodrigo twice before they met in court; first, at the crime scene as she alleged; and, second, at the San Jose del Monte Police Station under circumstances that do not appear in the records.Contrary to the defense's theory, the authorities presented three bundles of photographs to Normel who skimmed through the gallery before separating the picture of the four accused. Verily, it is highly improbable that impermissible suggestions crept the process given the number of photographs from which Normel may pick out and identify the suspects. The time element between the crimes and the eyewitness's identification also discount any impropriety in the procedure. Notably, the identification came just 10 hours after the incidents. The hard facts show that Normel immediately went to the police station to report the incident knowing well what the perpetrators looked like. Normel was in no way prone to suggestion on the part of the law enforcers. At any rate, a defective out-of-court identification may be cured by subsequent in-court identification,[25] viz.:
. . . .
By her own account, Rosita only learned the names of the robbers from information given by one Chito Alicante who never appeared as a witness in the case. The photographic identification was made at the police station by showing her the lone photograph of Rodrigo who was expressly noted in the Sinumpaang Salaysay as a "suspect." Thus, Rosita, who did not know the robbers, initially fixed them in her mined through their names that Chito Alicante supplied, and subsequently, linked the name Lee Rodrigo to the faces she saw in this photograph the police presented as the suspect. Note that by providing only a lone photograph, complete with a name identified as the suspect, the police did not even give Rosita the option to identify Rodrigo from among several photographed suspects; the police simply confronted her with the photograph of Rodrigo as the suspect.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that the appellant Alfonso Rivera's out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. Without hesitation, the two prosecution witnesses, Renato Losaria and Juanito Baylon identified the appellant as one of the assailants. In People v. Timon, the accused were identified through a show-up. The accused assailed the process of identification because no other suspect was presented in a police line-up. We ruled that a police line-up is not essential in identification and upheld the identification of the accused through a show-up. We also held that even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was defective, the defect was cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the "inadmissibility of a police line-up identification . . . should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification."[26] (Emphasis supplied)In this case, Normel was unequivocal when he was asked during trial to identify the assailants. Experience suggests that it is precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes that witnesses can remember the identities of criminals with a high degree of reliability at any given time. Normel was subjected to rigorous cross-examination but he did not falter in his positive identification of the assailants. Normel vividly recalled the crimes and was unyielding in his identification of the perpetrators and their respective participants, thus:
COURT:Taken together, there is no ground to discredit Normel's out-of-court and in-court identification. The Court fails to see any ground that would invalidate the positive identification of Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481. On this point, we stress that the CA and the RTC's assessment on the credibility of Normel as a witness and the veracity of his testimony are given the highest degree of respect,[29] especially if there is no fact or circumstances of weight or substance that was overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, which could affect the result of the case.[30] To be sure, Normel harbored no ill motive to falsely testify against the four accused.[31] The earnest desire to seek justice is not served should Normel abandon his conscience and prudence to blame innocent persons. Thus, Panfilo and Reynaldo's denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution witness. These negative defenses are self-serving and undeserving of weight in law absent clear and convincing proof.[32] Panfilo and Reynaldo did not adduce evidence that they were somewhere else when the crimes were committed and that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incidents.[33]
Q: What were the three companions of the one who stabbed Julius doing at the time that he stabbed Julius?
A: One was holding the hands of my cousin and the two were punching me.
. . . .
PROS. GARCIA, JR.:
And touch the shoulders of those persons who punched you.
WITNESS: The one who punched me on my left eye was Reynaldo dela Torre, Jr. and the one who punched me below my right ear was YYY265481.
PROS. GARCIA, JR.:
Q: Did you fight back?
A: I was not able to fight back.
Q: Why?
A: When I was about to step down, I was hit on my left eye, and I was able to step back. And when I was about to step down again, I was hit at the lower portion of my right ear.[27]
. . . .
PROS. GARCIA, JR.:
Q: Please tell us who of the four [sic] who stabbed Julius? Touch his shoulder.
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness touched the shoulder of XXX265481.
PROS. GARCIA, JR.:
Q: Mr. Witness, where was Julius stabbed? Which part of his body?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness is touching his right chest.
PROS. GARCIA, JR.:
Q: When Julius was stabbed, where were you specifically?
A: I was inside the jeep. The jeep was not yet running, so I was able to see where Julius was stabbed.
Q: Why did you not help your cousin?
A: Because I was already inside the jeep. Julius was still outside the jeep when he was blocked by the two and was stabbed.
COURT:
Q: What were the three companions of the one who stabbed Julius doing at the time that he stabbed Julius?
A: One was holding the hands of my cousin and the two were punching me.
PROS. GARCIA, JR.:
Q: Tell us who was holding Julius while he was stabbed? Touch his shoulder.
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness touched the shoulder of Panfilo Lade, Jr.
. . . .
PROS. GARCIA, JR.:
Q: And what happened to your cousin Julius after he was stabbed?
A: He ran to the place where we were drinking, but he was not able to reach the place because he fell down.
Q: Where did he fall down, on the roadside, or where specifically?
A: He fell down on the roadside.
. . . .
PROS. GARCIA, JR.:
Q: While he was already fell [sic] on the roadside, what happened?
COURT:
Q: Do you know what happened?
A: He was stabbed on his neck.
Q: Again?
A: When he fell down, he was stabbed on his neck.
. . . .
PROS. GARCIA, JR.:
Q: Aside from hitting the neck, where else if you know?
A: I did [sic] not know anymore because the jeep was already far.
Q: You saw Julius already on the ground. How many persons did you see when Julius was stabbed again?
A: Four (4) persons.
Q: The same persons?
A: Yes, sir.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
Anent Panfilo and Reynaldo's criminal liability, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC's factual and legal findings that they conspired to commit slight physical injuries and murder. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[34] Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts.[35] To be a conspirator, one need not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did they have to know the exact part performed by their co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.[36] Here, the implied conspiracy between Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 is evident from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the crimes demonstrating that all of them have the same purpose and were united in their execution.[37]
Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 were shown to have acted in concert not only in going together at the crime scene but also in purposely following the victims along the national highway. Their presence at the crime scene while one of them is in possession of a deadly weapon is not a mere coincidence or a casual and unintended meeting.[38] Ostensibly, they were there for a common purpose. The simultaneous actions of the four accused likewise evinced that they had one objective in mind—to assault the victims. YYY265481 and Reynaldo blocked Julius as soon as Normel boarded the jeepney. Reynaldo and YYY265481 punched and knocked Normel back into the jeepney when he tried to help Julius. Panfilo restrained the hands of Julius enabling XXX265481 to thrust a knife on his right chest. XXX265481 fatally stabbed Julius on his neck after he fell on the ground. As the CA aptly observed, the four accused acted as one, with XXX265481 and Panfilo attacking Julius while Reynaldo and YYY265481 prevented Normel from coming to his aid. The four accused fled together after achieving their common purpose. They did nothing after the incidents. They did not alert the authorities about the crimes which behavior certainly does not speak of innocence. All these acts point to the conclusion that Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 are co-principals who conspired to commit the crimes. The act of one is the act of all. The four accused are liable for all the crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.[39]
As intimated earlier, Panfilo and Reynaldo were charged with slight physical injuries and murder docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 62, 240-2007 and 62, 241-2007, respectively. Corollarily, the prosecution proved in Criminal Case No. 62, 240-2007 that Normel sustained contusions when YYY265481 and Reynaldo delivered blows to stop him from aiding Julius. YYY265481 and Reynaldo punched Normel twice revealing the malicious intent to inflict such injuries.[40] The contusions neither prevented Normel from engaging in his habitual work nor required medical assistance. As such, the slight physical injuries fall under Article 266, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Given that the crime happened before the enactment of Republic Act No. 10951,[41] the beneficial and original provisions of the RPC shall apply which prescribed the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding PHP 200.00 and censure. Considering the evil intent to inflict harm, the Court deems it proper to modify the punishment from fine to imprisonment. The prescribed penalty of arresto menor ranges from one day to 30 days imprisonment. As the penalty does not exceed one year, the Indeterminate Sentence Law becomes inapplicable. Absent any modifying circumstance, the imposable penalty must be within the medium period of arresto menor or 11 days to 20 days imprisonment. Thus, the Court imposes upon Panfilo and Reynaldo the straight penalty of 20 days imprisonment. As regards the civil liability, the Court awards Normel PHP 5,000.00 moral damages which shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid pursuant to prevailing case law.[42]
In Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007, the prosecution likewise established the crime of murder which requires the presence of the following elements, namely: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.[43] It is clear that XXX265481 stabbed Julius twice causing his death. The post-mortem examination of the body of Julius corroborated this fact. The killing was attended by the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength which demands the purposeful use of excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[44] The prosecution proved the relative disparity in strength or force between Panfilo, Reynaldo, XXX265481, and YYY265481 as assailants, and Julius as the lone unarmed victim. The collective conduct of the four accused, one of them armed with a deadly weapon, in blocking and restraining the victim before the fatal attack likewise indicate that they deliberately sought abuse of superior strength to ensure the commission of the crime.[45] Lastly, the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the crime of murder is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. Absent any other aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty must be reclusion perpetua. Hence, the CA erred in imposing reclusion perpetua in lieu of death penalty upon Panfilo and Reynaldo. The Court also finds it appropriate to reduce the civil liability of the accused. The awards of PHP 75,000.00 civil indemnity, PHP 75,000.00 moral damages, PHP 75,000.00 exemplary damages, and PHP 50,000.00 temperate damages are proper in accordance with prevailing law and jurisprudence.[46] The award of damages shall all earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated March 25, 2021 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02205 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
In Criminal Case No. 62, 240-2007, accused-appellants Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. and Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. are GUILTY of slight physical injuries a dare sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of 20 days imprisonment. The accused-appellants are solidarily liable to pay the victim Normel Lapinig of PHP 5,000.00 moral damages which shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment.
In Criminal Case No. 62, 241-2007, accused-appellants Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. and Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. are GUILTY of murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellants are solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the victim Julius Bacolod Caramonte of PHP 75,000.00 civil indemnity, PHP 75,000.00 moral damages, PHP 75,000.00 exemplary damages, and PHP 50,000.00 temperate damages which shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), I dissent. See separate opinion.
* Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. is also referred to as "Reynaldo Dela Torre" in some parts of the rollo.
** In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9344, Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1] People v. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú, 819 Phil. 406, 416 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[2] People v. Espera, 718 Phil. 680, 694 (2013) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
[3] Rollo, pp. 14-28. The Decision dated March 25, 2021 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02205 was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and concurred in by Associate Justices Loida S. Posadas-Kahulugan and Anisah B. Amanodin-Umpa of the Twenty-Second Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
[4] Id. at 16, 39-40.
[5] Id. at 17, 41-42.
[6] Id. at 14-15.
[7] Id. at 17-18, 42-48.
[8] Id. at 37-57.
[9] Id. at 51-57. The February 6, 2019 Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 62, 240-2007 and 62, 241-2007 was penned by Judge Lope L. Calio of Branch xxxxxxxxxxx, Regional Trial Court, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[10] Id. at 21- 27.
[11] Id. at 30-32.
[12] Id at 4-8.
[13] Id. at 60-61, 69-70.
[14] Id. at 74-108.
[15] See People v. Ansano, 891 Phil. 360 (2020) [Per .J. Caguioa, First Division]. Sea also J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in People v. Pepino, 777 Phil. 29 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[16] People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[17] People v. Gamer, 383 Phil. 557 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Divison].
[18] Mercado v. People, 615 Phil. 434, 445 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[19] People v. AAA, G.R. No. 247007, March 18, 2021 [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[20] People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[21] 473 Phil. 517 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
[22] Id. at 540-541.
[23] 586 Phil. 515 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[24] Id. at 536 -537.
[25] People v. Rivera, 458 Phil. 856 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
[26] Id. at 876-877.
[27] CA rollo, pp. 152-153.
[28] Id. at 157-158.
[29] People v. Matignas, 428 Phil. 834 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[30] People v. Orosco, 757 Phil. 299, 310 (2015) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division], citing People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 721 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[31] People v. Abierra, 833 Phil. 276 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
[32] People v. Togahan, 551 Phil. 997, 1014 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
[33] People v. Espina, 383 Phil. 656 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
[34] REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 8, par. 2.
[35] People v. Cabrera, 311 Phil. 33, 40-41 (1995) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
[36] People v. De Jesus, 473 Phil. 405, 429 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[37] People v. Licayan, 415 Phil. 459 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[38] People v. Landicho, 317 Phil. 599 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division].
[39] People v. Medice, 679 Phil. 338, 349 (2012) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
[40] Villareal v. People, 680 Phil. 527 (2014) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].
[41] Republic Act No. 10951 (2017), An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, Otherwise Known as "The Revised Penal Code", as Amended.
[42] Javarez v. People, 881 Phil. 546 (2020) [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].
[43] Ramos v. People, 803 Phil. 775, 783 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
[44] People v. Villanueva and Sayson, 807 Phil. 245, 252 (2017) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
[45] See Valenzuela v. People, 612 Phil. 907, 917 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[46] People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
Criminal prosecution built solely on eyewitness identification should be handled with great care, given the natural limitations of human memory.[1] An anomalous out-of-court identification taints any subsequent identification made in court. This becomes particularly relevant when prosecution witnesses provide conflicting accounts of the events that transpired during the out-of-court identification.
Here, the impermissibly suggestive procedure of the out-of-court identification violates the due process rights of accused-appellants Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. (Lade) and Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. (Dela Torre). They must, therefore, be acquitted.
This controversy centers on the out-of-court identification by Normel Lapinig (Lapinig) of the four men who had allegedly stabbed his cousin to death, resulting in charges of murder and slight physical Injuries.[2]
Lapinig testified that on the late night of October 20, 2007, he was out with his cousin Julius Bacolod Caramonte (Caramonte), drinking beer at a videoke bar along xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx, Davao City. They left around midnight and were waiting for a ride home when four men approached them. As Lapinig was boarding a passenger jeepney, two of the men blocked Caramonte's way. Lapinig tried to help, but the same men punched him twice. As the jeepney was slowly moving, Lapinig witnessed one of the men stab Caramonte while being restrained by another. Attempting to flee, Caramonte stumbled and fell by the roadside where he was stabbed once more, this time in the neck.[3]
Lapinig alighted the jeepney in xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx in search of police but failed to find one. He then took a motorcycle back to his boarding house. The next day, around 10:00 a.m., accompanied by his lessor, Lapinig went to xxxxxxxxxxx Police Station where he learned that his cousin had died.[4] Upon police inquiry, Lapinig confirmed that he could identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, a police officer showed him a single photograph, from which he identified the four people as the perpetrators.[5] These four men were Lade, Dela Torre, and their co-accused XXX265481 and YYY265481.[6]
Contrary to the testimony of Lapinig, Senior Police Officer IV Ernesto A. Ayop (SPO4 Ayop) testified that Lapinig had been presented with a photo gallery at the police station. According to him, Lapinig skimmed through the photo gallery before isolating the photographs of the four men.[7]
Meanwhile, the defense claimed that on the night of the incident, Lade, Dela Torre, XXX265481, and YYY265481 had been commissioned to post campaign materials for a barangay election, though XXX265481 and YYY265481 did not show up. Later that night, Lade and Dela Torre attended a meeting at the candidate's residence. They went home around 10:00 p.m. and stayed in their respective houses until 6:00 a.m. the next day. The relatives of Panfilo, Reynaldo, and YYY265481 supported their testimonies.[8]
Cristito Buta (Buta) testified to corroborate the alibi, saying he was the one who hired the three men. He added that around 7:00 a.m. the next day, Lade and Dela Torre arrived at his house and, together, they put up more campaign posters. By 10:00 a.m., two persons arrested Lade and Dela Torre.[9]
On arraignment, XXX265481 admitted to the crime while the other three denied any participation. The trial court convicted him while trial for the rest proceeded. Eventually, the trial court found the three others guilty of both the murder of Caramonte and slight physical injuries inflicted on Lapinig.[10] Pending the Court of Appeals decision, YYY265481 withdrew his appeal, prompting the issuance of a Partial Entry of Judgment as to him. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of Lade and Dela Torre, who in turn appealed to this Court.[11]
The majority, in sustaining the conviction of accused-appellants, ruled Lapinig's out-of-court identification satisfied the totality-of-Âcircumstances test.[12] It further ruled that, in any case, "a defective out-ofÂ-court identification may be cured by subsequent in-court identification[.]"[13]
I dissent.
The frailty and malleability of human memory are scientifically proven. Contrary to the common belief that memory is like a video recorder, it may be distorted, contaminated, compromised, and even fabricated.[14]
The "belief that a confident memory is always highly accurate and resistant to distortion or loss"[15] may carry grave consequences. Eyewitness testimonies, heavily influenced by distorted memories, can result in wrongful convictions-allowing innocent individuals to lose their life and liberty, while the real perpetrators evade justice.
Several factors shape the level of a witness's attentiveness when observing an event, including the duration and frequency of exposure, the level of violence during the event, the witness's stress levels and expectations, and their actions during the incident.[16] These factors affect the encoding, storage, and retrieval process of memory construction:
Consider a distracted witness who only briefly views three strangers wearing dark glasses and hats under conditions of poor lighting at a substantial distance. Research supports common-sense assumptions that short crime duration, greater distance, poor illumination, offender disguises, and distractions from full attention will diminish the quality of eyewitness memory.Once law enforcement steps in, investigators further regulate and influence the witness's memory. Suggestive identification procedures cause witnesses to misrepresent, albeit unconsciously, their accounts of the observed events:
Research has also uncovered influences on memory that may not always be common knowledge. Three examples from the eyewitness literature illustrate this point. First, witness fear and stress are likely to diminish, rather than aid, the quality of memory, contrary to common wisdom. The human "fight or flight" physiological response to threat—that mobilizes energy for the physical action of fighting hard or running fast—is geared toward enhancing prospects of survival, not memory. While the gist of the frightening experience is not easily forgotten, details are often not encoded correctly, if at all.
A second well-documented phenomenon is the "weapon focus effect." Research shows that a weapon is likely to draw the attention of the witness, reducing time for attention directed to facial features. Lab studies indicate that presence (versus absence) of a weapon reduces accuracy of later lineup identifications.
A third example is that identification errors are significantly more likely when the event is "cross-race." Most people are much better at encoding facial details for members of their own race than other races. A meta-analysis of studies spanning thirty years and encompassing the laboratory experiences of nearly 5000 research participants found that witnesses were 1.40 times more likely to correctly identify a previouslyÂ-seen face of their own race compared to a face of another race, and 1.56 times more likely to falsely identify an other-race face never seen before.[17] (Citations omitted)
In practice, suggestion can enter the identification process in two ways. First, law enforcement officers or other observers can confirm a witness's identification, whether at the time of the identification procedure or at any point before in-court identification. This can be as subtle as an officer praising the witness for a "good job" in her identification or as overt as a detective thanking the witness "for confirming our suspicion." The problem with such suggestions is that they can give witnesses false confidence in their identifications, even if the witnesses are mistaken. Moreover, witnesses too rarely recognize that a reinforcing comment inflated their confidence.Moreover, "eyewitness memory . . . can err through commission, incorporating new information that may seemingly sharpen the experience or shape the narrative for the witness[,]"[19] which in turn no longer represents a truthful report of the initial experience. For example, an eyewitness may confuse, or worse, replace a perpetrator's face just by viewing an innocent person in a line-up, a show-up, a mugshot, or even in photographs.
Law enforcement officers may also employ suggestive identification procedures that make the suspect stand out from others. For example, in the case of Marvin Anderson, Anderson's photograph appeared in color while the other photographs in the array were black-and-white. A further example is lineups, in which problems have arisen when the suspect is the only person presented of a particular height, hair color, or complexion among a group of six or more. These frailties may lead witnesses to make "relative judgments," subtly encouraging them to select the individual in an identification procedure who looks most like the offender rather than employing independent judgment to ensure that the individual identified is the actual perpetrator.[18] (Citations omitted)
After exposure to new information, the subsequent memory is often compelling to the eyewitness, increasing their confidence in its accuracy despite it being highly compromised. Yet, studies show limited to inverse correlations between one's confidence in the accuracy of a memory and the memory's actual accuracy.[20]
Law enforcers use several modes of out-of-court identification to aid their investigations. One mode is a police line-up, where the witness selects a "suspect from a group of persons lined up[.]"[21] Another mode is the showÂ-up, where "the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification."[22] Both are types of corporeal identification, where the suspect is physically present for the witness to identify.[23] Aside from these, law enforcers also use photographs or mugshots to facilitate witness identification of the perpetrator.[24]
Jurisprudence acknowledges that human errors and suggestive influences heavily influence out-of-court identifications. First adopted in People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[25] courts have since used the totality-of-Âcircumstances test to determine the reliability and admissibility of an out-of-Âcourt identification:
(1) the witness'[s] opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness'[s] degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.[26] (Citation omitted)In People v. Timon,[27] this Court went further and ruled:
Even assuming arguendo that the appellants' out-of-court identification was defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We emphasize that the "inadmissibility of a police line-up identification . . . should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification." We also stress that all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.[28] (Citation omitted)People v. Sabangan[29] involved the murder of a barangay captain. Three witnesses identified the accused from several pictures shown by the police, subsequently confirmed through a police show-up.[30] In applying the totality-of-circumstances test, this Court sustained the accused's conviction, emphasizing that the witnesses, during the shooting, "had the opportunity to clearly view [his] face."[31] Despite the irregularities in the out-of-court identifications, this Court ruled that the subsequent in-court identification "cured any flaw that may have attended it."[32]
On the other hand, this Court has considered prior or contemporaneous actions of law enforcers, prosecutors, the media, or even other witnesses to show the suggestive nature of identification procedures, ultimately resulting in an acquittal.[33]
In People v. Pineda,[34] six perpetrators were involved in a robbery with homicide on a passenger bus. The police admitted that they only showed two photos to the witness—that of Pineda and his co-accused.[35] This Court found the identification procedure unacceptable for being tainted with impermissible suggestion.[36] It provided two rules for out-of-court identifications done through photographs:
The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect. Thus:Pineda also identified 12 danger signals that operate independently from identification procedures used by investigators. These signals indicate that the identification may be inaccurate despite the appropriate method being used:[W]here a photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party, any subsequent corporeal identification of that person may be based not upon the witness's recollection of the features of the guilty party, but upon his recollection of the photograph. Thus, although a witness who is asked to attempt a corporeal identification of a person whose photograph he previously identified may say, "That's the man that did it," what he may actually mean is, "That's the man whose photograph I identified."
. . . .
A recognition of this psychological phenomenon leads logically to the conclusion that where a witness has made a photographic identification of a person, his subsequent corporeal identification of that same person is somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy must be evaluated in light of the fact that he first saw a photograph.[37] (Citations omitted)
Pineda also emphasized that the prosecution must prove the identity of the perpetrator apart from establishing the existence of the crime.[39]
People v. Rodrigo[40] similarly involved a case of robbery with homicide. The accused was identified through a lone photograph shown to the witness, and subsequently through a show-up where the witness and the accused had a personal confrontation in the police station.[41] This Court acquitted the accused and explained how a suggestive identification procedure violates the right of the accused to due process:
The initial photographic identification in this case carries serious constitutional law implications in terms of the possible violation of the due process rights of the accused as it may deny him his rights to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification proceeded from and was influenced by impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic identification. In the context of this case, the investigators might not have been fair to Rodrigo if they themselves, purposely or unwittingly, fixed in the mind of Rosita, or at least actively prepared her mind to, the thought that Rodrigo was one of the robbers. Effectively, this act is no different from coercing a witness in identifying an accused, varying only with respect to the means used. Either way, the police investigators are the real actors in the identification of the accused; evidence of identification is effectively created when none really exists.[42]People v. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú[43] involved yet another case of robbery with homicide. The first witness identified the accused after almost eight years, and the second witness after almost nine years, from the time the offense was committed.[44] Despite previously admitting that they could not remember any features of the robber, they contradicted themselves years later after undergoing a highly suggestive process.[45] This Court, in acquitting the accused, emphasized the inherent frailty of human memory:
To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive identification by a witness during trial due to the frailty of human memory. It must also show that the identified person matches the original description made by that witness when initially reporting the crime. The unbiased character of the process of identification by witnesses must likewise be shown.[46]Excessive reliance on testimonial evidence to prove the identity of the perpetrator, preceded by improper suggestions, violates the fundamental right of the accused to due process.[47] Moreso, an initial out-of-court identification done through a photograph without strictly following the rules laid down in Pineda undermines the credibility, reliability, and accuracy of any corporeal identification subsequently made in court.
Here, the prosecution banks on the testimony of Lapinig, the sole eyewitness to the crime, to establish the identity of the assailants. In his Affidavit-Complaint taken by the investigating officer a day after the incident, he claimed that the police officers showed him a single picture for him to identify and that he was surprised that the four persons appearing in the picture were the same persons who attacked him and his cousin.[48]
During his cross-examination, Lapinig consistently said that he was only shown one picture. He testified:
In a later hearing, he testified:
The prosecution's second witness, SPO4 Ayop, presented a conflicting account. Seemingly deliberate, perhaps in an attempt to eliminate any suspicion of impermissible and suggestive tactics, SPO4 Ayop asserted that Lapini had been shown a photo gallery.[51] He emphasized that Lapinig himself had browsed through the photos before singling out the photograph of accused-appellants and their co-accused.[52]
However, a closer look at SPO4 Ayop's testimony reveals that he was incompetent to testify as to what transpired during the out-of-court identification. On cross-examination, he said that he was not the person who allegedly showed Lapinig the photo gallery, but one Raul Tonzo:
We can thus conclude that the officers did not show Lapinig a series of photographs, violating the Pineda rules for out-of-court identification through photographs. Thus, any subsequent corporeal identification of the accused may not be based on Lapinig's recollection of the features of the assailants, but on his memory of the single photograph shown to him, which coincidentally depicted all four accused together.
Oddly enough, SPO4 Ayop also failed to clarify why the police possessed only a single photograph showing all four accused together, which they claimed was part of their photo gallery:
The lack of explanation from the police conveniently implies the collective guilt of all four individuals in committing the crime. They prompted a signal for Lapinig to think that there were at least four accused and that those four in the photograph were the ones responsible to the exclusion of any other assailants. The single photograph shown to Lapinig during the out-of-court identification was egregiously tainted with impermissible suggestion, creating false evidence of identification.
All told, the prosecution did not offer any justifiable explanation for the crucial discrepancies between the testimonies of their witnesses. Therefore, they failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the identities of accused-appellants as the perpetrators.
The out-of-court identification also crumbles under the totality-of-circumstances test.
First, Lapinig himself admitted that he was intoxicated during the incident,[55] which diminished his degree of attention at the time of the incident. His opportunity to view the assailants at the time of the crime was also poorly established. The prosecution claimed that around 11:00 p.m. on October 20, 2007, the four accused were present at the videoke bar;[56] presumably to establish that Lapinig had become familiar with their faces prior to the incident. The majority emphasized:
Normel had become familiar to Panfilo, Reynaldo, [XXX265481], and [YYY265481] before the incidents. Normel saw the four accused at the videoke bar and could recall their time of arrival, clothing, and distance when they sat near their table.[57]However, during Lapinig's direct examination, he never mentioned seeing the four accused in the videoke bar before the altercation that occurred outside. Furthermore, his Affidavit-Complaint failed to provide any detail regarding a prior confrontation between Lapinig and Caramonte and the four accused inside the videoke bar.
Only during his cross-examination did Lapinig suddenly mention that he saw the four accused arrive at the videoke bar.[58] Yet, right before saying this, upon the court's inquiry, he claimed that he was not aware of the other people that were inside the videoke bar:
Second, during his cross-examination, Lapinig also admitted that he could not recall what the four accused wore during the incident, including the exact time he saw them:
Prior descriptions from eyewitnesses are crucial because they assist the police in verifying the accuracy of the identification made by such eyewitnesses. However, the case records fail to show that Lapinig provided any prior descriptions of the assailants, either to the police or to his lessor. Without such descriptions, the police could not have verified the accuracy of Lapinig's identification.
Most important, Lapinig's level of certainty during the out-of-court identification was preceded by a suggestive procedure. Again, the single photograph shown to Lapinig was contrary to the Pineda rules, which require a series of photographs, not merely that of the suspect, to be shown to the witness. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú teaches that not complying with the rules "suggests that any subsequent corporeal identification made by a witness may not actually be the result of a reliable recollection of the criminal incident. Instead, it will simply confirm false confidence induced by the suggestive presentation of photographs to a witness."[61]
Notably, the first, third, and eleventh danger signals discussed in Pineda were present in the out-of-court identification. Lapinig admitted that he could not remember any of the faces of the people present in the videoke bar at the time of the incident.[62] He failed to describe any of the four accused prior to his exposure to the photograph shown by the police. Last, several persons committed the crime, and they were unknown or unfamiliar to Lapinig beforehand.[63]
Given the highly suggestive and problematic out-of-court identification in this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants' identities as the perpetrators of the crime. They must, therefore, be acquitted.
For these reasons, I dissent.
On the other hand, Lapinig's medical certificate documenting his injury, along with Caramonte's death certificate confirming his demise, effectively establishes the occurrence of the crimes.[64] XXX265481's admission of guilt and YYY265481's withdrawal of appeal render it unnecessary for this Court to pass upon their culpability. Their individual admissions alone are ample evidence to uphold their convictions.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the appeal and ACQUIT accused-appellants Panfilo Delgado Lade, Jr. and Reynaldo Logronio Dela Torre, Jr. of the crimes charged against each of them.
[1] People v. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú, 819 Phil. 406, 408 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[2] Rollo, p. 31.
[3] Id. at 16.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 16, 23.
[6] Id. at 16.
[7] Id. at 16, 23.
[8] Id. at 17. See also ponencia, p. 3.
[9] Id. at 87-88.
[10] Ponencia, p. 3.
[11] Rollo, p. 20.
[12] Id. at 8.
[13] Id. at 10. (Citation omitted)
[14] Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and Juror Needs to Know about Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1331, 1345 (2015).
[15] Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E. L. Stark, The Neuroscience of Memory: Implications for the Courtroom, 14 NAT REV NEUROSCI, 649 (2013).
[16] See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in People v. Pepino, 777 Phil. 29, 73 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[17] Nancy K. Steblay, Scientific Advances in Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1090, 1104-1105 (2015).
[18] Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After A Century Of Research, 100 THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 825, 842-843 (1973).
[19] Nancy K. Steblay, Scientific Advances in Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1090, 1107 (2015).
[20] Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and Juror Needs to Know about Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1331, 1345 (2015).
[21] People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 180 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[22] Id.
[23] See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in People v. Pepino, 777 Phil. 29, 69 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[24] People v. Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 180 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[25] 319 Phil. 128 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[26] Id. at 180.
[27] 346 Phil. 572 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[28] Id. at 588-589.
[29] 723 Phil. 591 (2013) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
[30] Id. at 614.
[31] Id.
[32] Id. (Citation omitted)
[33] People v. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú, 819 Phil. 406, 429 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[34] 473 Phil. 517 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
[35] Id. at 539.
[36] Id. at 540.
[37] Id.
[38] Id. at 547-548.
[39] Id. at 548.
[40] 586 Phil. 515 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[41] Id. at 529.
[42] Id. at 529-530.
[43] 819 Phil. 406 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[44] Id. at 415.
[45] Id.
[46] Id. at 408.
[47] People v. Rodrigo, 586 Phil. 515, 529 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
[48] See Record of Documentary Evidence (Regional Trial Court), p. 4.
[49] TSN Normel Lapinig, March 4, 2008, pp. 43-44. Atty. Leopoldo L. Cagatin is a defense counsel.
[50] TSN, Normel Lapinig, April 17, 2008, pp. 22-23. Atty. Lorenzo B. Ta-asan is a defense counsel.
[51] Rollo, 23.
[52] Id.
[53] TSN, SPO4 Ernesto Ayop, September 26, 2011, p. 22. Atty. Rogelio G. Largo is a defense counsel.
[54] Id. at 23-24, 26-28.
[55] Rollo, p 16.
[56] Id.
[57] Ponencia, p. 8.
[58] TSN, Normel Lapinig, March 4, 2008, p. 12.
[59] Id.
[60] TSN, Normerl Lapinig, April 17, 2008, p. 11.
[61] People v. ±·³Üñ±ð³ú, 819 Phil. 406, 432 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[62] TSN, Normel Lapinig, March 4, 2008, p. 12.
[63] TSN, Normel Lapinig, April 17, 2008, p. 11.
[64] Rollo, pp. 15-16.