Source: 汤头条
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CAGUIOA, J:
x x x [PRCI] appended the following documents, to wit: a) the Approved Survey Plan, Technical Description and Surveyor's Certification of [the Subject Property] showing its area and boundaries; b) Tax Declarations and Tax Receipts proving that since 1956, [the Subject Property] was already declared for tax purposes and the corresponding realty taxes were paid; c) Affidavit of Esperanza Gerona establishing the transfer of ownership and possession of the subject realty to [PRCI]; d) Certification of the Regional Technical Director of Forest Management Service of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) proving that the subject lot is within the alienable and disposable land of public domain, as verified under Project No. 21 of Pasig pursuant to [Land Classification] Map 639 which was approved on [March 11, 1927 and] per ocular inspection on the ground on [September 12, 2011]; and e) Affidavit of Bernarda Lu, a friend and neighbor of the Dee Ham family, attesting to [PRCI's] ownership of the [Subject Property] and its uninterrupted possession as well as the payment of land taxes thereon.[17]After trial, the RTC issued a Decision[18] dated December 1, 2011 (RTC Decision) "confirming and affirming" PRCI's title over the Subject Property.[19] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, affirming the Order of general default heretofore entered, judgment is hereby rendered CONFIRMING and AFFIRMING the title to [PRCI] under the coverage and operation of PD 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.The RTC found that the evidence on record convincingly established that PRCI and its predecessors in interest had been in open, actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the Subject Property in the concept of an owner for the period required by law for the acquisition of title.[21]
After this decision shall have become final and executory, the Order for the issuance of a Decree of Registration shall accordingly issue.
SO ORDERED.[20]
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the [RTC Decision] is AFFIRMED.The CA held that the evidence presented by PRCI sufficiently established that the Subject Property is alienable and disposable.[24]
SO ORDERED.[23]
x x x The 2011 and 2013 [certifications] from the DENR along with LC Map 639 are sufficient proof not only of the fact that the State has classified the [S]ubject [P]roperty as alienable and disposable for the last ninety-four years, but also that the same is not intended for public use.The Republic also filed its Memorandum[48] on September 13, 2021.
x x x While [PRCI] maintains that the statement in the 2011 and 2013 certifications "[h]ence not needed for forest purposes" satisfies the requirement in Malabanan that there should be an express declaration from x x x the State [that] the [S]ubject [P]roperty is no longer intended for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth, it is respectfully submitted that the very act of classifying the land as alienable and disposable should be deemed as the express State declaration that the particular land is no longer retained for public use, as the act of classifying it into alienable and disposable makes it no longer beyond the commerce of man and therefore susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
x x x The Honorable Court in Malabanan classified land as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Lands that are of public dominion are further classified between those held by the State in its public capacity for public use or intended for public service and patrimonial property, which are held by the State in its private capacity.
x x x Articles 421 and 422 of the Civil Code further classifies patrimonial properties of the State between those that are inherently patrimonial in nature and those that are of the public dominion but are no longer intended for public use or public service, respectively.
x x x From the foregoing, it may be interpreted that Article 422 pertains to those lands which were formerly part of the public dominion but were classified as alienable and disposable, thus converting them into patrimonial properties of the State. Since patrimonial property is held by the State in its private capacity, they are rid of their inalienability and cease to be beyond the commerce of man upon their classification as alienable and disposable. At the same time, the public land becomes susceptible to prescription.
x x x This is not without basis in jurisprudence. In Spouses Modesto v. Urbina,[46] the Honorable Court ruled that classification of public land as alienable and disposable renders it susceptible to the possessory rights of private persons, to wit:"Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain, and its occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. It is only after the property has been declared alienable and disposable that private persons can legally claim possessory rights over it."x x x Justice Edgardo L. Paras also had the same view on the effect of classifying public lands as alienable and disposable, thus:"Upon the other hand, public agricultural lands before being made available to the general public should also be properties of public dominion for the development of the national wealth (and as such may not be acquired by prescription); but after being made so available, they become patrimonial property of the state, and therefore subject to prescription. Moreover, once already acquired by private individuals, they become private property[.]"x x x It should also be noted that agricultural free patents operate on the same principle, i.e.[,] the classification of public land as alienable and disposable already amounts to the State's [express] declaration that a subject land is no longer intended for public use.
x x x From the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the act of classifying public lands as alienable and disposable operates as an express State declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth.
x x x As such, the mere act of classifying public lands as alienable and disposable should be deemed sufficient proof that the land is no longer intended for public use, especially in particular circumstances similar to the instant case, where the land has been classified as alienable and disposable for the last ninety-four (94) years and the occupants thereof have openly occupied the subject property and constructed structures thereon without any opposition from either public or private entities.
x x x At the very least, given its ramifications, the act of classifying public land as alienable and disposable must have the effect of shifting to the State the burden of proof that the public land so classified is intended for public service or the development of the national wealth.
x x x [PRCI] is mindful that the foregoing interpretation of what constitutes "express State declaration", if it is to be applied, may be tantamount to a relaxation of the requirements set forth in Malabanan. This "relaxation" of the requirements, however, does not mean that the process for original registration of title will be vulnerable to fraudulent and/or inaccurate claims as the proceedings will still be subject to the participation and scrutiny of the State.
x x x By applying the foregoing interpretation, the only difference is that the applicant will not be unduly burdened [with] proving the intentions (sic) of the State which is, most of the time, beyond the knowledge of ordinary citizens.[47] (Emphasis omitted)
x x x The classifications of land pertaining to the State under the Civil Code are mutually exclusive. Property under the Civil Code may belong to the public dominion (or property pertaining to the State for public use, for public service or for the development of the national wealth) or it may be of private ownership (which classification includes patrimonial property or property held in private ownership by the State). Significantly, the Civil Code expressly provides that "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."In this connection, the Republic asserts that lands of the public domain become patrimonial only when there is an express government manifestation that the property is no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth.[50] It explains:
x x x The classification of a land into a public dominion or public land automatically prevents it from being acquired by private individuals without complying with the process of converting it to patrimonial property. On the other hand, when a land is classified as a patrimonial property, it can be freely acquired by private individuals. The classification of a land to any of these two would prevent or allow its alienability.[49]
x x x In exploring the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain[,] [o]ne may [ask]: would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.With respect to proof of land classification status, the Republic echoes the requirements set forth in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.[52] (T.A.N. Properties) and Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation[53] (Hanover), as follows:
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those [properties] "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when (sic) it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."
x x x Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.[51]
x x x [PRCI] did not present as evidence a copy of the classification of the land approved by the DENR Secretary, and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records as required by Hanover. It is not enough for the DENR RED[-NCR] to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO, CENRO or the RED[-NCR] (for lands situated in the NCR). [PRCI] failed to do so because the certifications presented by it did not prove that the land is alienable and disposable.In sum, the Republic maintains that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC Decision granting PRCI's application for registration in the absence of proof that: (i) the government officials who issued the certifications on land classification status testified on their contents pursuant to the Court's ruling in T.A.N. Properties and Hanover; and (ii) the DENR RED-NCR attached a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, certified as true by the legal custodian of DENR records.[55]
x x x More importantly, the government officers who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. Hence, even if admitted in evidence, the certification is useless to prove the facts stated therein unless the proper government officers are presented before the court to testify on its contents.[54]
Land classification under the 1987 Constitution and the Civil Code |
Pursuant to the Regalian [d]octrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into five (5) categories 鈥� agricultural lands, forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks. The provision states:
To further understand the Regalian [d]octrine, a review of the previous Constitutions and laws is warranted. The Regalian [d]octrine was embodied as early as in the Philippine Bill of 1902. Under Section 12 thereof, it was stated that all properties of the Philippine Islands that were acquired by the United States through the treaty with Spain shall be under the control of the Government of the Philippine Islands, to wit:SECTION 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be designated by the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this Act.The only exception in the Regalian [d]octrine is native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown. In 颁补谤颈帽辞 v. Insular Government, the United States Supreme Court at that time held that:It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.As pointed out in the case of Republic v. Cosalan:Ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title that "refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." To reiterate, they are considered to have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way.
The CA has correctly relied on the case of Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, which institutionalized the concept of native title. Thus:Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.From the foregoing, it appears that lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an exception to the Regalian [d]octrine embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.[61] (Emphasis supplied; original emphasis omitted)
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. x x x (Emphasis supplied)In turn, Section 3 mandates that only lands classified as agricultural may be declared alienable and susceptible of private ownership. It bears noting, however, that private ownership contemplates not only ownership by private persons, but also ownership by the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities in their private capacity.[62]
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:In the 2013 Resolution[63] in the case of Malabanan, the Court attempted to harmonize the classification of land under the 1987 Constitution and the classification of property under the Civil Code, thus:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
ART. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.During the deliberations, Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan astutely raised that this classification of "alienable and disposable lands of the State" into patrimonial lands and lands of the public domain appears to be inconsistent with the intent of the framers. Indeed, the record of the Constitutional Commission deliberations on what was then Section 6, Article XII[65] is illuminating:
x x x x
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. x x x[64] (Italics in the original)
MR. SUAREZ. If it is reflective of the thinking of the Committee insofar as Section 4 is concerned, we propose that the words "lands of the public domain" appearing on line 26 of Section 6 be changed to "PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS"; but basically, it is "agricultural land."As the quoted exchange shows, it was initially suggested that the term "lands of the public domain" under then Section 6, Article XII[67] be qualified with the term "agricultural" in order to clarify that only private agricultural lands of the public domain may be acquired and/or held by individuals, corporations, or associations.
MR. MONSOD. Maybe to be consistent and to harmonize, we just use the same phrase as we used in Section 4: "AGRICULTURAL LANDS of the public domain."
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I call attention to the fact that the words "public domain" are the words used in the 1935 as well as in the 1973 Constitutions.
MR. VILLEGAS. We retained it that way.
MR. RODRIGO. So, they have already adopted a meaning and I suppose there is even a jurisprudence on this matter. Unless it is absolutely necessary, I do not think we should change that.
MR. SUAREZ. What we are suggesting, Madam President, is to retain the words "public domain" but qualify the word "lands" with "AGRICULTURAL lands of the public domain."
MR. VILLEGAS. We are retaining "public domain."
MR. CONCEPCION. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. If the Committee does not intend to change the original implication of this provision 鈥� and by original I mean the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 鈥� may I suggest the advisability of retaining the former phraseology. Otherwise, there might be a question as to whether the same meaning attached thereto by jurisprudence will apply or another meaning is sought to be imparted to this provision.
MR. VILLEGAS. As long as it is clear in our record that we really mean agricultural lands, can we ask Commissioner Suarez to just retain the existing phraseology?
MR. SUAREZ. I would have no objection to that. I just want to make it very clear, whether in the record or in the constitutional provisions, when we speak of "lands of the public domain" under Section 6 we are thinking in terms of agricultural lands.
THE PRESIDENT. So, there will be no need anymore to insert the word "AGRICULTURAL"?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. We will not press on our amendment, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. We already have that interpretation.
x x x x
MR. TINGSON. There are no more registered speakers for Section 6; so we may now vote on Section 6, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Will the honorable Chairman please read Section 6?
MR. VILLEGAS. Section 6 will read: "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."[66]
Prescription as a mode of acquisition of real property |
Section 14. Who may apply. 鈥� The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:Notably, PRCI did not specify the statutory provision invoked as basis for its application for registration. Nevertheless, PRCI hinged its application on the allegation that it and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the Subject Property for more than fifty (50) years,[79] particularly since the year 1956, and not 1945 as prescribed by what was then Section 14(1). Thus, the inevitable conclusion which may be drawn from this is that PRCI's application for registration could only fall within the rubric of what was then Section 14(2) of PD 1529 which covered the registration of land acquired through prescription under existing laws.
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
ART. 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.The provisions governing prescription only permit the acquisition of private unregistered lands.[84] As previously noted, lands of private ownership may either be lands owned by private persons, or, pursuant to Article 425 of the Civil Code, patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, or municipalities, owned by them in their private capacity.[85]
x x x x
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
x x x x
ART. 1129. For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
x x x Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2) x x xBased on the foregoing discussion in Malabanan, the requirements for original registration under then Section 14(2) were: (i) a declaration that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable; (ii) an express government manifestation that said land constitutes patrimonial property, or is "no longer retained" by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth; and (iii) proof of possession for the period and in the manner prescribed by the Civil Code for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from the moment the property subject of the application becomes patrimonial property of the State.
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The identification [of] what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:It is clear that property of public dominion x x x cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
x x x x
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion x x x when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.[87] (Emphasis omitted)
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:In other words, placing on the applicant the burden to prove the State's lack of intent to retain the property would be unreasonable, and totally beyond the text and purpose of PD 1529. Further, this renders illusory the legal provisions in the Civil Code for the acquisition of property. After all, it is the State which has the capacity to prove its own intent to use such property for some public purpose in the absence of any overt manifestation thereof through prior use, occupation, or express declaration.
x x x x
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.From these referenced cases, it becomes clear that the need for an express government manifestation confirming that the property in question is "no longer retained" by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth, stems from the principle that abandonment of property of public dominion under Article 420 cannot be inferred solely from non-use. In turn, the determination of whether property has in fact been abandoned by the State is necessary only in cases where there has been prior state-use. To repeat, there is no abandonment to speak of in the absence of prior state-use.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because the lot has been idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public [dominion], not available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such["] x x x.
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property x x x. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.[96] (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
SEC. 6. Section 14 of [PD 1529] is hereby amended to read as follows:Notably, Section 6 of RA 11573 shortens the period of possession required under the old Section 14(1). Instead of requiring applicants to establish their possession from "June 12, 1945, or earlier", the new Section 14(1) only requires proof of possession "at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.""SECTION 14. Who may apply. 鈥� The following persons may file at any time, in the proper Regional Trial Court in the province where the land is located, an application for registration of title to land, not exceeding twelve (12) hectares, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
"(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not covered by existing certificates of title or patents under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under this section.
"(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of accession or accretion under the provisions of existing laws.
"(3) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
"Where the land is owned in common, all the co颅-owners shall file the application jointly.
"Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land: Provided, however, That should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
"A trustee on behalf of the principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by the trustee, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust."
SEC. 7. Proof that the Land is Alienable and Disposable. 鈥� For purposes of judicial confirmation of imperfect titles filed under [PD 1529], a duly signed certification by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer that the land is part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain is sufficient proof that the land is alienable. Said certification shall be imprinted in the approved survey plan submitted by the applicant in the land registration court. The imprinted certification in the plan shall contain a sworn statement by the geodetic engineer that the land is within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and shall state the applicable Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, Proclamations and the Land Classification Project Map Number covering the subject land.In effect, Section 7 supersedes the requirements[99] in T.A.N. Properties and Hanover.
Should there be no available copy of the Forestry Administrative Order, Executive Order or Proclamation, it is sufficient that the Land Classification (LC) Map Number, Project Number, and date of release indicated in the land classification map be stated in the sworn statement declaring that said land classification map is existing in the inventory of LC Map records of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is being used by the DENR as land classification map.
In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that:Like certifications issued by the CENROs, Regional Technical Directors, and other authorized officials of the DENR with respect to land classification status, certifications of similar import issued by DENR geodetic engineers do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, their authentication in accordance with said rule is necessary.Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued respondent's documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. At best, they may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[101] (Emphasis supplied)(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.鈥擠ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. x x x
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[105] the Court shed light on the nature of statutes that may be deemed curative and may therefore be applied retroactively notwithstanding the absence of an express provision to this effect:"It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, '(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.' But there are settled exceptions to this general rule; such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.["][104] (Italics omitted)
According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive x x x (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."[106] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics omitted)In Nunga, Jr. v. Nunga III,[107] the Court further clarified that while a law creating new rights may be given retroactive effect, this can only be done if the new right does not prejudice or impair any vested rights.
ART. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively.[86] See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1113.
SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. [Emphasis supplied]This is consistent with the 1935[1] and 1973[2] Constitutions which also limited State dominion only over lands within the public domain.
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.The due process clause does not confine its coverage to properties covered by paper titles, "[v]erily, there could be land, considered as property, where ownership has vested as a result of either possession or prescription, but still, as yet, undocumented."[3]
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Philippine, 546; "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.[5]Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in 颁补谤颈帽辞 emphasized that land held under the concept of ownership prior to the Spanish invasion of our shores could not have been part of public land:
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the necessities of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.[6] (Emphasis supplied)Additionally, the regalian doctrine, a feudal theory introduced by the Spaniards, was not adopted during the American colonial period, and the respect of ownership by native custom was the rule in line with the American objective "to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain."[7] Again, in 颁补谤颈帽辞:
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.Hence, the State's "underlying title to all the lands in the country ... is burdened by the pre-existing legal rights of [indigenous people] who had occupied and used the land prior to [the] birth of the State."[9]
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, [it] had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized [the] land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
At the end of the Spanish era an estimated ten to twenty percent of the native population continued to live outside the colonial pale. Most either belonged to Islamicized communities in the southern parts of the colony or lived among the upland interiors of the major islands. The U.S. Regime generically labeled these peoples as "non-Christian tribes." An official Christian/non-Christian dichotomy ensued and was reified in the minds of the colonial elites. The dichotomy ignored the indigenous cultural traits that endured among the Hispanicized, the varied degrees of Hispanization among ostensible Christians, and the cultural variations among those labeled non-Christian.The Spanish Government made it clear that the distribution of land rights and interests to Spaniards and their loyal subjects should not be at the expense of the "rights and interests of the natives in their holdings."[15] Yet while both Spain and America promoted policies that respected the natives' rights over their land, the reality was that our colonizers eventually triggered their legal disenfranchisement through subsequent laws.
One of the greatest, and largely unrecognized, ironies of the Taft era was the tendency to overlook the wide spectrum of westernized acculturation among the Philippine masses, as well as the enduring indigenous influences in their lives. As a result, the much disdained Hispanicized peasantry was lumped together and indiscriminately labeled, along with Filipino elites, as 'civilized.' Worcester insisted that people from the three main Christian ethnic groups, i.e., the Tagalogs, Ilocanos, and Visayans, were culturally homogeneous and "to be treated as a class."[14]
The title to all agricultural lands which were capable of adjustment under the Royal Decree of 1880, but the adjustment of which has not been sought at the time of promulgation of this Decree . . . will revert to the State. Any claim to such lands by those who might have applied for adjustment of the same but have not done so at the time of the above-mentioned date, will not avail themselves in any way or at any time.[19] (Emphasis supplied)The Americans then used the failure to register under the Maura Law as a basis to deny recognition of ancestral property rights.[20]
"There is no running away from history. It shapes our reality, and as time goes by, we become a part of it ourselves..."[1] |
Section 2. All lands of the public domain x x x are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. x x xThe 1986 Constitutional Commission deliberately retained the term "public domain," which was also used in the 1935 and 1973 constitutions, to refer to lands which are owned by the government under the principle of state dominion.[6] Furthermore, Article XII, Section 3, in regulating the disposition of such lands, consistently uses the modifying phrase "of the public domain" in describing the "alienable and disposable" or "agricultural" lands being distributed under said provision.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
SECTION 1. There is hereby created, under the Department of the Interior, an Insular Bureau of Public Lands, which shall have charge of all of the public domain of the Government of the Philippine Islands, except so far as control thereof may be necessary to the functions of the Forestry and Mining Bureaus, which shall not be affected by this Act. Under the supervision of the Bureau of Public Lands shall be executed all instruments for the sale or conveyance of the public lands when authorized by law.The Philippine Bill of 1902, which served as the basic law of the Philippines at that time, then authorized the government to classify and dispose of鈥�i.e., render capable of being transferred to the ownership of another鈥攍ands of the public domain under terms and conditions embodied in a general law enacted for such purpose, viz.:
SECTION 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect or have the force of law until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.Pursuant to this grant of power, the Philippine Commission, on October 7, 1903, enacted the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926, hereinafter referred to as the PLA I), which allowed the disposition of lands of the public domain through homestead, sale, and lease. Sections 1, 10, and 22 thereof stated:
SECTION 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
SECTION 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents.
SECTION 16. That in granting or selling any part of the public domain under the provisions of the last preceding section, preference in all cases shall be given to actual occupants and settlers; and such public lands of the United States in the actual possession or occupancy of any native of the Philippine Islands shall not be sold by said Government to any other person without the consent thereto of said prior occupant or settler first had and obtained: Provided, That the prior right hereby secured to an occupant of land, who can show no other proof of title than possession, shall not apply to more than sixteen hectares in any one tract.
The PLA I, in setting forth the rules on lease, sale, and acquisition of "homesteads on" or "portions of the public domain," referred to unoccupied, unreserved, nonmineral agricultural public lands. Stated differently, the PLA I deliberately defined its area of application, i.e., the "public domain," to be "unoccupied, unreserved, nonmineral agricultural public lands."CHAPTER I
Homesteads on the Public Domain
SECTION 1. Any citizen of the Philippine Islands, or of the United States, or of any Insular possession thereof, over the age of twenty-one years or the head of a family may, as hereinafter provided, enter a homestead of not exceeding sixteen hectares of unoccupied, unreserved, unappropriated agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands, as defined by the Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled "An Act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," which shall be taken, if on surveyed lands, by legal subdivisions, but if on unsurveyed lands, shall be located in a body which shall be as nearly as practicable rectangular in shape and not more than eight hundred meters in length; but no person who is the owner of more than sixteen hectares of land in said Islands or who has had the benefits of any gratuitous allotment of sixteen hectares of land since the acquisition of the Islands by the United States, shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter.CHAPTER II
Sales of Portions of the Public Domain
SECTION 10. Any citizen of the Philippine Islands, or of the United States or of any insular possession therefor, or any corporation or like association of persons organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or any state, territory, or insular possession thereof, and authorized to transact business in the Philippine Islands, may purchase any tract of unoccupied, unappropriated and unreserved non-mineral agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands, as defined in the Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, not to exceed sixteen hectares for an individual or one thousand and twenty-four hectares for an individual or one thousand and twenty-four hectares for a corporation or like association, by proceeding as hereinafter provided in this chapter, provided, that no association of persons not organized as above and no more partnership shall be entitled to purchase a greater quantity than will equal sixteen hectares for each member thereof.CHAPTER III
Leases of Portions of the Public Domain
SECTION 22. Any citizen of the United States, or of the Philippine Islands, or of any insular possession of the United States, or any corporation or association of persons organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, or of any state, territory, or insular possession thereof, authorized by the laws of its creation and any by the laws of the Philippine Islands and the Acts of Congress applicable thereto to transact business in the Philippine Islands, may lease any tract of unoccupied, unreserved, nonmineral agricultural public lands, as defined by sections eighteen and twenty of the Act of Congress approved July first, nineteen hundred and two providing a temporary government for the Philippine Islands, and so forth, not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares, by proceeding as hereinafter in this chapter indicated; Provided, That no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or occupation until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had and obtained, or until such claim shall be legally extinguished; And provided, further, That no corporation or association of person shall be permitted to lease lands hereunder which are not reasonably necessary to enable it to carry one the business for which it was lawfully created and which it may lawfully pursue in the Philippine Islands.
SECTION 12. Any citizen of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, over the age of eighteen years, or the head of a family, who does not own more than twenty-four hectares of land in said Islands or has not had the benefit of any gratuitous allotment of more than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippine Islands by the United States, may enter a homestead or not exceeding twenty-four hectares of agricultural land of the public domain.
SECTION 23. Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, and any such citizen not of lawful age who is head of a family, and any corporation or association of which at least sixty-one per centum of the capital stock or of any interest in said capital stock belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, and which is organized and constituted under the laws of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or of any State thereof and authorized to transact business in the Philippine Islands, and corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands authorized under their charters to do so, may purchase any tract of public agricultural land disposable under this Act, not to exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares in the case of an individual and one thousand and twenty-four hectares in that of a corporation or association, by proceeding as prescribed in this chapter[.]
SECTION 34. All citizen of lawful age of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and any corporation or association of which at least sixty-one per centum of the capital stock or of any interest in said capital stock belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, and which is organized and constituted under the laws of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or of any State thereof and authorized to transact business in the Philippine Islands, may lease any tract of agricultural public land available for lease under the provisions of this Act, not exceeding a total of one thousand and twenty-four hectares: x x x
Corporations or associations not having all and each of the requirements established in the preceding paragraph of this section may, with the express authorization of the Legislature, lease agricultural public lands available for lease the total area of which shall not exceed one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
SECTION 41. Any native of the Philippine Islands who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares, and who since July fourth, nineteen hundred and seven, or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors in interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, shall be entitled under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for a tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares in all.
SECTION 45. The following described citizens of the Philippine Islands and the United States, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted had prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have, with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have complied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
SECTION 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-颅five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.Barely a year after the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, the Philippine Legislature passed Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the PLA III, which repealed the PLA II. The PLA III, which continues to be the prevailing law on public land disposition, essentially retains the modes of acquisition of public land first introduced in the PLA II.[9] It also retains the terms "public" and "public domain" as the key thematic descriptors for lands within its coverage.
SECTION 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty-four hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association.[8]
The public domain embraces the area of the lands now owned or heretofore disposed of by the United States in nineteen States and eleven Territories and parts of Territories, and known as the land States and Territories x x x, the United States being the sole owner of the soil, with entire and complete jurisdiction over the same. x x x[12]In 1886, a Japanese scholar who was sent to the United States by the Japanese government "to investigate certain questions of agrarian and economic interest"[13] described the development of the public domain of the United States as follows:
The public domain of the United States was acquired through cession, purchase, and conquest. Its acquisition had been precipitated by a combination of varied political and economical [sic] considerations. The desire of firm union and the safety of the whole confederacy peacefully terminated the disputed claims of the larger States to the western lands. The prospect of fishery and the development of natural resources must have prompted the action of President Johnson's administration in the purchase of Alaska. The first acquisition of public land took place on March 1, 1781, and the last acquisition on March 30, 1867. x x x[14]This gradual accumulation of land by the United States federal government, which started with the cession of western lands by the thirteen founding states from 1785 to 1802,[15] then later followed by the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, the Florida Purchase of 1820, the annexation of Texas in 1845, the acquisition of Mexican lands through the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase of 1853, and concluded by the acquisition of Alaska (through an 1867 treaty with Russia) and Hawaii (through annexation in 1898),[16] had far-reaching effects. A senior official in the United States Department of the Interior pointed out that:
Cession of the western lands probably did more to build a solid base of unity for the Nation than was realized at the time. The significance of this action was not so much the material gain to the Nation of the real estate itself, but the intangible contribution it made by giving the Nation something which was now held in common and could be used for the common good. A property right had been created in an entity which was more than a single state.This mass distribution of lands of the public domain has become one of the hallmark sagas of American history. It involved protracted political and legal struggles among the federal government, the state governments, private companies, land speculators, farmers, settler associations, military veterans,[18] indigenous inhabitants of the North American continent, among other parties.[19] This massive program for the distribution of the lands acquired by the federal government, which was regulated through legislation,[20] became the matrix which engendered the second definition of the term public domain, thus:
The estimated 222 million acres which were involved in this transaction was small in comparison with what would later become part of the public domain. At one time or another, the federal government has held title to 1.8 billion acres of land, or nearly ninety-five per cent of the acreage of the Nation exclusive of Alaska and Hawaii. Today, the federal government holds title to nearly 21.8 per cent of the land in the oldest forty-eight States and to about 99.7 per cent of the land in Alaska.[17]
The lands owned by the federal government are generally classified as either "public domain" or "reserved" lands. The public domain includes lands open to settlement, public sale, or other disposition under the federal public land laws, and which are not exclusively dedicated to any specific governmental or public purpose. See, e.g., Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 75 S.Ct. 832, 99 L.Ed. 1215 (1955); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 46 S.Ct. 298, 70 L.Ed. 539 (1926). Public domain lands are, for the most part, managed by the United States Department of the Interior through its Bureau of Land Management. Reserved lands are those that have been expressly withdrawn from the public domain by statute, executive order, or treaty, and are dedicated to a specific federal purpose. Pursuant to the authority vested in the United States by Article IV, Section 3 of the United States Constitution, Congress has frequently acted to reserve or withdraw lands from the public domain or to empower the President or his delegate to do so. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed. 2d 1052 (1978); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 35 S.Ct. 309, 59 L.Ed. 673 (1915). Among these reservations are national forests, national parks, national monuments, public springs and waterholes, and public mineral hot springs. x x x[21] (Emphasis and underlining supplied, citations omitted)The constitution of the United States, like ours, vests in the legislature the power to control lands of the public domain.[23] Thus:
The terms "public lands" and "public domain," which are regarded as synonymous, do not include all the land owned by the United States or the states. Such terms are habitually used in the United States to designate such lands of the United States or of the states as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws, and are not held back or reserved for any special governmental or public purpose, and do not include lands to which rights have attached and become vested through full compliance with an applicable land law.[22] (Emphasis and underlining supplied, citations omitted)
No appropriation of public lands may be made for any purpose except by authority of Congress. However, Congress was held to have acquiesced in the long-continued practice of withdrawing land from the public domain by Executive Orders. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation that established procedures for withdrawals and that explicitly disclaimed continued acquiescence in any implicit executive withdrawal authority. The comprehensive authority of Congress over public lands includes the power to prescribe the times, conditions, and mode of transfer thereof and to designate the persons to whom the transfer shall be made, to declare the dignity and effect of titles emanating from the United States, to determine the validity of grants which antedate the government's acquisition of the property, to exempt lands acquired under the homestead laws from previously contracted debts, to withdraw land from settlement and to prohibit grazing thereon, to prevent unlawful occupation of public property and to declare what are nuisances, as affecting such property, and provide for their abatement, and to prohibit the introduction of liquor on lands purchased and used for an Indian colony. Congress may limit the disposition of the public domain to a manner consistent with its views of public policy. x x x[24] (Citations omitted)During this "frontier era" in the history of the United States, the United States federal government enacted numerous statutes and executive issuances regulating the public domain,[25] the most significant of which are: 1) the donation and land grant acts, through which portions of the public domain were distributed gratis for settlement, irrigation, road-building, school and railroad construction, among others;[26] 2) the Pre-emption Acts, which gave settlers in lands of the public domain a pre-emptive right to the lands they were occupying;[27] and 3) the Homestead Acts, which allowed American citizens to enter into and acquire title to government lands, subject to the requirement that the applicant shall personally occupy and cultivate the land.[28] At this point in time, clearly, the American land law regime favored distribution of the public domain as the general rule, and conservation thereof as the exception.
Likewise, the PLA I incorporates in its chapter on "Free Patents"[31] another variation on the homestead principle which allows for the recognition of time immemorial occupation of lands by natives of the Philippines, still subject to the basic requirement of an application filed before the pertinent land administration office and subject to investigation of the claim.[32]
The point decided was that such land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was agricultural, the reasoning leading up to that conclusion being that Congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands into three classes it must be included in one of the three, and being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall into the division of agricultural land. In the concurring opinion, in order to avoid misapprehension on the part of those not familiar with United States land legislation and a misunderstanding of the reach of the doctrine, it was pointed out that under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States the phrase "public lands" is held to be equivalent to "public domain," and does not by any means include all lands of Government ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement by homestead and other like general laws. Accordingly, "government land" and "public land" are not synonymous terms; the first includes not only the second, but also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private right. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the "public lands" and other real estate which is not a part thereof.A mere three months after Montano, this Court, deciding a case involving the applicability of Section 54, No. 6 of the PLA I, reiterated the ruling therein, viz.:
This meaning attached to the phrase "public lands" by Congress in its land legislation is settled by usage and adjudication beyond a doubt, and without variation. It is therefore doing the utmost violence to all rules of construction to contend that in this law, dealing with the same subject颅-matter in connection with these Islands, a different meaning had, without indication or motive, been imported into the words. They can not have one meaning in every other statute and a different and conflicting meaning in this statute. Where property in general is referred to therein, other and apt phrases are used in order to include it; for instance, section 12 [of the Philippine Bill of 1902] provides "that all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States . . . are hereby placed under the control of the Government of the said Islands." Therefore, there is much real property belonging to the Government which is not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or other governmental uses.[35] (Emphasis, underlining and italics supplied)
Given the above legal provisions and the data contained in the record, it is seen that the land, the registration of which is claimed, was of the class of vacant crown or public land which the State could alienate to private persons, and being susceptible of cultivation, since at any time the person in possession desired to convert it into agricultural land he might do so in the same manner that he had made a building lot of it, it undoubtedly falls within the terms of the said Act of Congress, as well as the provisions of the above-cited section 54 and paragraph 6 thereof of Act No. 926, for the reason that the said land is neither mining nor timber land.[36] (Emphasis and underlining supplied)As earlier demonstrated, the PLA II and the still-prevailing PLA III retain the use of the term public domain. Both iterations likewise retain the provisions on homesteads and free patents as legacy implementations of the homestead principle.[37]
While the Civil Code adopts the term "public dominion" instead of "public domain" as employed in the Constitution, both these terms refer to property subjected to the control of the State. The distinction appears to lie in usage, for while dominion is understood to pertain to "perfect control in right of ownership", domain may be alternatively understood as the subject of such right, as in "the real estate so owned". (Corollary to this, it has also been observed that "property of public domain" is not used [in the Civil Code] in the sense of ownership by the State, but a right of property which carries with it juridical prereogatives [sic] in favor of the State.) To be sure, the term "public dominion" presently adopted in the Civil Code originates from the term "dominio publico" which also refers to "public domain" under the pertinent Articles of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 x x x.Public domain, as used in the Constitution, can either mean all State-颅owned lands as a whole; or the subset of these lands which have been set aside for disposition. Meanwhile, public dominion, as used in the Civil Code provisions on property, has a distinct signification. In his commentaries on Articles 338 and 339 of the 1889 Civil Code of Spain,[45] Justice Jose Maria Manresa wrote:
There is no doubt that forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks which are lands of the public domain under the Constitution fall under property of public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, as do agricultural lands. Clearly, public land that is classified as agricultural (and subject to the State's current or intended use) is property of public dominion. x x x[44]
Pero 驴qu茅 clase de relaci贸n jur铆dica mantiene el Estado con estos bienes de dominio p煤blico? Por de pronto, se ve que no es una relaci贸n de propiedad, sino de pertenencia, que trae como consecuencia ciertas prerrogativas jur铆dicas en favor del Estado como soberano territorial. La propiedad de estos bienes, con los caracteres especiales de una propiedad colectiva y de un uso y disfrute general, en virtud de la aplicaci贸n de agu茅llos 谩 la satisfacci贸n de necesidades colectivas, corresponde, mientras est谩n en tal posici贸n, 谩 la sociedad nacional (贸 provincial 贸 municipal, seg煤n los casos). 芦Su destino禄, dice Ihering, 禄no es servir al Estado como persona jur铆dica, sino 谩 los ciudadanos禄. Est谩n adscritos 谩 un servicio com煤n y p煤blico, que les impide, advierte Laurent, 芦ser objeto de verdadera apropiaci贸n por el Estado 贸 por los particulares禄.It is clear that the civil law concept of public dominion is somewhat related to the concept of the public domain, as both pertain to the principle of state dominion. However, the scope of public dominion, as used in the Civil Code, is limited to state properties for public use, for public service, or the development of national wealth.[47] Unlike public domain, which connotes full ownership,[48] public dominion "is not a relationship of ownership, but of belonging, which brings as a consequence certain legal prerogatives in favor of the State as territorial sovereign."[49] These "legal prerogatives" over public dominion properties are vested by law in the State either because of: 1) the utility of these properties to the State in the discharge of its functions; or 2) their potential contribution to the national wealth. Moreover, these justifications correspond to the constitutional principles of police power and natural resource control.[50] Justice Manresa goes on further to state that the public use properties of public dominion under Article 420(1) comprise property that belongs to the nation, to the social community; with respect to it the State has only "the aforementioned legal prerogatives";[51] while the public dominion properties intended for public service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2) are given to the State because these properties are either: 1) "attached to a necessary service"; 2) "held by the State awaiting an opportune use"; or 3) "a special source of wealth, a source of income or a means available to meet the satisfaction of its needs."[52] Verily, lands of public use under Article 420(2) roughly correspond to the concept of reserved lands under American federal law.
La funci贸n que en definitiva ejerce el Estado respecto de estos bienes 谩 consecuencia de la relaci贸n jur铆dica especial que implican, nace de ser el Estado el representante 箩耻谤铆诲颈肠辞 de la sociedad. Es una verdadera funci贸n de 辫辞濒颈肠铆补 social y administrativa, ya de seguridad, ya de servicio general. El Estado tiene bajo su acci贸n soberana todos esos bienes; para que respondan 谩 un fin de inter茅s general, los cuida, los conserva y regula cuando es preciso el uso de los mismos. Son, en suma, tales bienes un patrimonio nacional, provincial 贸 municipal, que est谩 bajo la salvaguardia del Estado respectivo.
x x x x
x x x En rigor, concibiendo al Estado como debe concebirse, cabe entre 茅l y los bienes que el C贸digo enumera tres relaciones diferentes, en vez de dos, 谩 pesar de lo que por otra parte opinan algunos comentaristas. La relaci贸n jur铆dica de dominio p煤blico, seg煤n el concepto m谩s racional de 茅ste, comprende los bienes que son de la naci贸n, de la comunidad social; respecto de ellos el Estado no tiene m谩s que la funci贸n representativa ya indicada. El C贸digo italiano dice que no son enajenables. En nuestro C贸digo son los que se enumeran en el n煤m. 1.掳 del presente art铆culo. Pero hay otra relaci贸n jur铆dica en la que se encuentran bienes (n煤m. 2.掳 del art. 339), que no son, en rigor, de dominio p煤blico, al menos en el concepto y forma que los anteriores; son del dominio del Estado, como representante social que realiza el derecho, y para poder prestar aquellos servicios p煤blicos que le est谩n encomendados, as铆 como para que contribuya al fomento de la riqueza nacional que est谩 bajo su custodia. No son estos bienes patrimoniales, porque est谩n como adscritos 谩 un servicio necesario, 贸 bien las tiene el Estado en espera de un empleo oportuno (las minas mientras no se otorgue su concesi贸n), ni constituyen una fuente especial de riqueza, fuente de ingresos 贸 medio en disponibilidad para atender la satisfacci贸n de sus necesidades.[46]
As to the first contention, it is not stated in defendant's brief in what sense the words "public lands" are used. It seems, however, that the defendant refers to lands of the public domain. He testified at the trial that the lands of the San Lazaro Hospital belonged to the Government of the United States. If such were the case his interpretation of these words would be erroneous. That property belongs to the public domain which is destined to public use or which belongs exclusively to the State without being devoted to common use or which is destined to some public service or to the development of the national resources and of mines until transferred to private persons. (Art. 339[53] of the Civil Code.) The land in question does not pertain to any of these classes. The best proof of it is that the defendant himself had been using it for his own personal and exclusive benefit. So that, assuming without deciding that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, it would be nevertheless private property under the provisions of articles 340 and 345 of the Civil Code,[54] and as such, unless provided for by special legislation, is subject to the provisions of those articles. The defendant has not called our attention to any special law providing a method different from that contained in the Civil Code for the leasing of the lands belonging to the San Lazaro Hospital, and we do not know of the existence of any such law.[55] (Emphasis. Underlining and footnote supplied)As is implied in the foregoing excerpt, this Court has already recognized, as early as 1906, that the constitutional concept of public domain is broader than the civil law concept of public dominion, for public domain embraces both state properties of the public dominion under Article 420 and state patrimonial (i.e., private) properties under Article 421 of the Civil Code. Thus, properties of the public dominion can become patrimonial property; but in becoming such, they remain within the public domain, unless and until they are transferred to parties other than the State.
Section 2. All lands of the public domain x x x are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. x x xIn formulating the provisions of Article XII, the 1986 Constitutional Commission deliberately retained the term public domain, including the legal history and signification of the concept, viz.:
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I think the intent of line 13, Section 4 is that there are now four classifications in the generic sense of agricultural lands: agriculture, forest, mineral and national parks.It is therefore clear that when the Constitution speaks of lands of the public domain, such term can only have two meanings: 1) all lands owned or held by the state; or 2) unreserved state-owned lands which have been opened for disposition. However, Article XII, Section 3 further qualifies that "[l]ands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Likewise, Article XII, Section 2 provides that "[w]ith the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources, [including forest lands, mineral lands, and national parks], shall not be alienated." Given these textual parameters, the inescapable conclusion is that the term "lands of the public domain," as used in the Constitution, pertains to all state-owned lands, regardless of their classification. It should also follow that when the Constitution speaks of alienable lands of the public domain, the basic law refers essentially to the subset of the larger set of all state-owned lands regardless of their classification that share the common attribute of alienability, subject to further qualification in Section 2 that this subset shall only include agricultural lands, thereby excluding forest lands, mineral lands, and national parks.
So, we would be willing to entertain an amendment that will insert the word "AGRICULTURE" before "lands" on line 13.
MR. SUAREZ: That is in Section 4.
MR. MONSOD: Yes.
MR. SUAREZ: And does the Commissioner think that this will be consistent with the provision of Section 6?
MR. MONSOD: Yes, and also with line 2 of the same section.
MR. SUAREZ: Yes. And would the Commissioner not think of changing the phrase "lands of the public domain" to "PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS" or something in order to jibe and harmonize with Section 4?
MR. MONSOD: Does the Commissioner mean line 26?
MR. SUAREZ: I am referring to line 26, Madam President.
MR. MONSOD: That is also agricultural land, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, that is it. Is the Commissioner not thinking of changing the term "lands of the public domain" to "AGRICULTURAL LANDS"?
MR. MONSOD: We are also willing to entertain an amendment to that effect in order to clarify the intent of the article.
MR. SUAREZ: May I suggest that to the members of the Committee, Madam President?
MR. VILLEGAS: All right.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Commissioner Suarez proposing an amendment?
MR. SUAREZ: With respect to Section 6.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Section 6.
MR. SUAREZ: If it is reflective of the thinking of the Committee insofar as Section 4 is concerned, we propose that the words "lands of the public domain" appearing on line 26 of Section 6 be changed to "PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS"; but basically, it is "agricultural land."
MR. MONSOD: Maybe to be consistent and to harmonize, we just use the same phrase as we used in Section 4: "AGRICULTURAL LANDS of the public domain."
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you.
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, may I call attention to the fact that the words "public domain" are the words used in the 1935 as well as in the 1973 Constitutions.
MR. VILLEGAS: We retained it that way.
MR. RODRIGO: So, they have already adopted a meaning and I suppose there is even a jurisprudence on this matter. Unless it is absolutely necessary, I do not think we should change that.
MR. SUAREZ: What we are suggesting, Madam President, is to retain the words "public domain" but qualify the word "lands" with "AGRICULTURAL lands of the public domain."
MR. VILLEGAS: We are retaining "public domain."
MR. CONCEPCION: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION: If the Committee does not intend to change the original implication of this provision 鈥� and by original I mean the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 鈥� may I suggest the advisability of retaining the former phraseology. Otherwise, there might be a question as to whether the same meaning attached thereto by jurisprudence will apply or another meaning is sought to be imparted to this provision.
MR. VILLEGAS: As long as it is clear in our record that we really mean agricultural lands, can we ask Commissioner Suarez to just retain the existing phraseology?
MR. SUAREZ: I would have no objection to that. I just want to make it very clear, whether in the record or in the constitutional provisions, when we speak of "lands of the public domain" under Section 6 we are thinking in terms of agricultural lands.
THE PRESIDENT: So, there will be no need anymore to insert the word "AGRICULTURAL"?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. We will not press on our amendment, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: We already have that interpretation.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.[56] (Underlining and emphasis supplied)
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural x x x.[72]is not quite accurate. First, the Constitution does not use the phrase "alienable and disposable lands of the State," but rather "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." While the two phrases are practically synonymous, the Constitutional intent to use the modifier "of the public domain" must be respected, and the historical-legal signification of the phrase must be taken into account in interpreting the provisions of the basic law. Second, "lands of the public domain" are the universal set to which both patrimonial and public dominion lands of the State belong; and since public dominion lands of the State are inalienable, the set of "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" is limited to patrimonial lands of the State. As pointed out by an eminent Filipino legal scholar:
Public lands of the Philippines are designated as "Lands of the public domain" in Commonwealth Act No. 141, and formerly in Act No. 2874. Are they property of public dominion as understood in article 420 of the Civil Code?
The Supreme Court has already called attention to the difference in meaning in the Spanish law and in American-patterned legislation of apparently the same terms. "It is to be noted, however," it said, "that in the two languages terms ordinarily equivalent are not in this relation employed in the same sense, and that lands de dominio publico signify quite a different thing from the arbitrary English phrases 'public lands' or 'public domain'." x x x
From this conclusion of the Supreme Court, it seems that "public lands" [i.e., lands of the public domain] may, under the criterion of the Civil Code, be classified as private property of the State, as soon as they are available for alienation or disposition. Before they have been declared so available for disposition, they would partake of property of public dominion, under article 420, paragraph 2, "for the development of the national wealth," just like "mines before their concessions have been granted."[73]
As discussed earlier, the PLA III, its predecessor statutes, and the related laws that were enacted during the American occupation were all enacted during the "frontier" phase of American history, when the United States government was still actively distributing the lands of the public domain, and the contemporary land laws were enacted to facilitate this process. These statutes were therefore crafted to: 1) embody distribution of the public domain as the general rule; and 2) to operationalize the concept of public domain as state-owned lands that have been opened to disposition. Thus, the legislature, in using the phrase "agricultural lands of the public domain" in Section 48(b) of the PLA III, could only have referred to state颅-owned patrimonial lands which have been opened to disposition, which at the time of the enactment thereof, comprised an overwhelming majority of the public domain as a whole.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by PD 1073).
"[P]ublic lands" (i.e., lands of the public domain) may, under the criterion of the Civil Code, be classified as private property of the State, as soon as they are available for alienation or disposition. Before they have been declared so available for disposition, they would partake of property of public dominion, under article 420, paragraph 2, "for the development of the national wealth," just like "mines before their concessions have been granted."In the recent case of Republic v. Bautista,[80] this Court distinguished Section 14(1) from Section 14(2) in this manner:
According to Lomonaco and Ricci, the State disposes of private property like any private person, but "naturally in accordance with special laws." This special law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 (formerly Act No. 2874) with respect to alienable or disposable public lands destined for agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial, or other similar productive purposes; for educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and for reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses. The friar lands, not classified as "public lands" under Commonwealth Act No. 141, are disposed of under the provisions of Act No. 1120; and the San Lazaro Estate, under Act No. 2360, as amended by Act No. 2478. These lands are private property of the State in the same manner that islands formed in navigable and floatable rivers are private property of the State.[79]
From their respective requisites, it is clear that the bases for registration under these two provisions of law differ from one another. Registration under Section 14(1) is based on possession; whereas registration under Section 14(2) is based on prescription. Thus, under Section 14(1), it is not necessary for the land applied for to be alienable and disposable at the beginning of the possession on or before June 12, 1945 鈥� Section 14(1) only requires that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for registration. However, in Section 14(2), the alienable and disposable character of the land, as well as its declaration as patrimonial property of the State, must exist at the beginning of the relevant period of possession.[81]In keeping with its American statutory ancestors, Section 48(b) of PLA III, as implemented by Section 14(1) of the PRD, is essentially a grant of patrimonial land of the public domain which is based on possession; in effect, it is a special kind of donation with conditions imposed by special law for the effectivity thereof.[82] Among these conditions is that the land must have been classified as agricultural under the provisions of the PLA III. As held in the second Heirs of Mario Malabanan[83] ruling, the conversion of the claimed land into alienable-and-disposable/patrimonial status, as well as the classification thereof into agricultural land under the PLA III, can be made even after the commencement of the statutory period, as long as it is made before the application is filed. On the other hand, Section 14(2) of the PRD implements the general provisions of the Civil Code on prescription with respect to patrimonial lands of the public domain. Unlike in Section 15(1), lands sought to be registered under Section 15(2) need not be classified as agricultural under the PLA III, as long as such lands have been declared alienable-and-disposable/patrimonial prior to or at the commencement of the prescriptive period.