946 Phil. 88
LOPEZ, J., J.:
That on or about the 25th day of November. 2017, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of complainant ROBERTO AMADO HATAMOSA, by then and there mauling him, which caused a fractured right finger, a disfigurement to the complainant.Upon arraignment, Pastor pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him.[11] After pre-trial was conducted, trial on the merits then ensued.[12]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
Premises considered, the Court holds accused PASTOR CORPU[S], JR. y BELMORO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the commission of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES and is hereby sentenced him (sic) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ARRESTO MENOR or 30 days. He is likewise ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00) as moral damages.Later, Pastor filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, the RTC affirmed the conviction of Pastor in its Decision[15] dated March 20, 2019, to wit:
For failure of the prosecution to present evidence beyond reasonable doubt, accused RESURECION ZAMORA y ESPANOLA and FELIX CORPUS y BELMORO are ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.[14]
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Appeal of accused-appellant Pastor Corpu[s], Jr. y Belmoro is dismissed and the Decision of the court a quo is affirmed.Aggrieved, Pastor elevated the matter to the CA. Before the CA, Pastor argued that the Information charging him with slight physical injuries had prescribed since it was filed two months from the time of the alleged commission or discovery of the offense.[17] However, the CA affirmed Pastor's conviction, viz.:
SO ORDERED.[16]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal filed by Pastor Corpus, Jr. y Belmoro on 29 April 2019 is DENIED. The Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 257, Parañaque City on 20 March 2019 in Criminal Case No. 2019-0059 is AFFIRMED.Anent the issue of prescription, the CA reasoned that the Information filed against Pastor alluded to the crime of serious physical injuries, and not slight physical injuries as Pastor alleges.[19] Since the crime of serious physical injuries is punishable by prision mayor, prision correccional or arresto mayor, the said crime prescribes in fifteen (15), ten (10), or five (5) years, as the case may be.[20] Hence, the CA concluded that Pastor's criminal liability was not extinguished by reason of prescription since the Information was filed in court just less than half a year after the commission of the crime.[21]
SO ORDERED.[18]
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.At surface level, it appears that the lower courts validly affirmed the conviction of Pastor for committing the crime of slight physical injuries against Roberto. Although the Information charged Pastor with serious physical injuries, the lower courts may validly find him guilty of slight physical injuries in accordance with the variance doctrine.
Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense. The principle has the support of overwhelming authorities in American jurisprudence:To reiterate, the Information against Pastor charged him with unlawfully and feloniously attacking and employing personal violence upon Roberto, causing a fractured right finger, a disfigurement to the latter. This allegation constitutes the crime of serious physical injuries under Article 263 (3) of the RPC:"The general rule, as stated in 22 CJS, Criminal Law, sec. 225b, is 'as a general rule, one indicted for an offense not barred by limitation, but convicted of a lesser included offense which is so barred, is entitled to discharge', and in 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 343; 'It frequently happens that a change of felony includes an offense of a lower grade with a different period of limitation, so that, while the felony is not barred, the statute has run as to the lesser offense. In this situation, the rule is that if the statute has not run against the felony, while the lesser offense is barred, the bar cannot be evaded by indicting the defendant for the felony and convicting him of the lesser offense.[27]" (Citation omitted)
ARTICLE 263. Serious physical injuries. - Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:Since serious physical injuries is punishable by prisión correccional, a correctional penalty,[28] it prescribes in 10 years.[29] Meanwhile, what was ascertained from the evidence adduced during trial is the lesser crime of slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the RPC.[30]
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3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof; or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. (Emphasis supplied)We are not unmindful of the rulings of this Court in Perez v. Sandiganbayan[36] and People v. Pangilinan[37] when we declared that the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the prosecutor's office effectively interrupts the prescriptive period for the subject offense. In Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[38] (Panaguiton) this Court explained the rationale for the rule:
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)Nonetheless, this Court clarified in the more recent case of Republic v. Desierto[39] (Desierto) that for crimes falling under the Rules of Summary Procedure and within the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Manila, the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 of the RPC is that which is filed in the proper court and not the complaint lodged by the offended party before the prosecutor's office:
Patently, the phrase "without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation" found in Sec. 9 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure is now deleted in the above-quoted provision. Jadewell declared that "[a]s provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance." Notably, the offense involved in Jadewell is a violation of city ordinance which, as provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, is commenced only by information except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de offcio.As a crime punishable by arresto menor, slight physical injuries is clearly governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure which provides:
In other words, in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, prescriptive period is tolled only by the filing of an Information in court and not by the commencement of a preliminary investigation by the investigating body nor the institution of the complaint with the investigating body. Other than Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, the criminal action is commenced by filing a complaint or information before the court. In the same vein, the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted by either the complaint or information filed in court.
Hence, for special laws within the scope of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the principle laid down in Zaldivia and Jadewell is controlling, i.e., violations of municipal or city ordinance, and BP 22. Accordingly, the ruling in Panaguiton with respect to interruption of prescription of BP 22 shall govern only those acts committed when BP 22 is not yet covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, i.e., before the effectivity of A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC on April 15, 2003. Thus, for acts committed on April 15, 2003 onwards, the filing of complaint or information in court shall interrupt the running of the prescriptive period and not the institution of the preliminary investigation by investigating agencies or the filing of a complaint before such investigating agencies. However, in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, only the filing of Information in court shall toll the running of the prescriptive period.[40] (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
SECTION 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:Consequently, the ruling laid down in Desierto[41] is relevant and appropriate in the case at bar, in that the filing of the Complaint against Pastor did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. From the reckoning point of November 25, 2017 until May 21, 2018 when the prosecutor's office filed the Information against Pastor, 177 days have already lapsed. Clearly, the crime for which the petitioner was found guilty had already prescribed on the basis of the absence of Information filed before the trial court.
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B. Criminal Cases:
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(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.All told, the MeTC committed reversible error in convicting Pastor of slight physical injuries. It is plain that the case should have been dismissed as the light offense for which he was found guilty had already been extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed. Consequently, the RTC and the CA likewise committed reversible errors in affirming the conviction of Pastor.
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.[43] (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)