汤头条 - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

1)	The instant petition is not an electoral protest seeking to unseat any elected public officer or to proclaim any winner 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, but is instead an election controversy cognizable by COMELEC that would vindicate Legaspi, et al.'s rights of suffrage, to information, and to petition the government for redress of grievances鈥攆undamental rights inherent in petitioners as part of the collective popular sovereign.

2)	Legaspi, et al. assert that COMELEC, in confusing Legaspi, et al.'s request for a recount of the provincial results in Pangasinan as either an electoral protest or as a petition for recall/initiative, failed to recognize that these remedies were not exclusive in vindicating Legaspi, et al.'s rights.

3)	Legaspi, et al. further assert that COMELEC had no compelling state interest in denying the requested recount (which Legaspi, et al. assert as incumbent upon COMELEC to prove), and consequently, said denial violated Legaspi, et al.'s rights here.

4)	The instant petition is in the nature of a class suit of transcendental importance relative to the rights invoked here, with Legaspi, et al. being representative of all the voters in the Province of Pangasinan who are too numerous to be joined at present.

5)	In essence, Legaspi, et al. doubt the manner in which their votes and ballots were counted by COMELEC's vote-counting machines (VCMs) after the close of polls on May 9, 2022, mainly due to the supposedly unusual speed by which the election results were picked up and broadcasted in the news, along with other "red flags" such as the supposedly high voter turn-out in Pangasinan, and how the actual election results supposedly differed from pre-election surveys conducted in Pangasinan.

6)	Legaspi, et al. were alarmed upon reading various opinions, observations, and postings online from a number of identified experts that all point to the statistical improbability (if not impossibility) of the election results, as summarized in the attached excerpts of an unsigned and unverified "Summary of Viral Social Media Postings."^[13]

7)	With their conclusion that the voting on May 9, 2022 was not transparent, the actual results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections need to be verified by a manual counting crosschecked with the actual results transmitted to the various canvassing boards. The random manual audit conducted by COMELEC is inconclusive for purposes of reassuring Legaspi, et al., since there is no indication of any polling precincts or VCMs from Pangasinan were subjected to said audit.

8)	Legaspi, et al.'s request for the manual recount in Pangasinan is ultimately grounded upon their sovereign right of suffrage, which to them, includes the right to know how their votes were counted, tallied, and reported, as well as the corresponding obligation of COMELEC to accommodate their request to present their testimonial, documentary, and video evidence of the supposed improbability (if not impossibility) of the May 9, 2022 election results. If their right to be sufficiently informed of how their votes were counted is denied, then ultimately their fundamental right of suffrage is negated.

9)	The declaration of policy for COMELEC's automated election system, as spelled out in Section 1^[14] of Republic Act No. 8436^[15] (as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9369^[16]), is enough to require and enable it to do all necessary and proper actions relative to the requested manual recount鈥攁ll in the interest of transparency, accuracy, and truthfulness of the electoral process.

10)	Crucially, Legaspi, et al. assert that the Court had already upheld COMELEC's authority to revert to manual recounts when the automated election system is shown to have failed to read ballots correctly (as discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections^[17] and to correct manifest errors in the certificates of canvass and election returns (as discussed in Sandoval v. Commission on Elections^[18]).

11)	Finally, Legaspi, et al. have no more plain, speedy, and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 COMELEC's inaction, which allegedly amounts to grave abuse of discretion.

In support of the instant petition, Legaspi, et al. attached their respective Judicial Affidavits^[19] that narrate the following common assertions:

1)

That each of them was aware of the existence of the APELA and had voluntarily signed the same;

2)

That each of them was aware that the COMELEC had either dismissed or denied the APELA, that each knew of the instant petition being prepared for filing before the Court;

3)

That each of them had read the instant petition and had signed its verification and certification against forum shopping portions with full understanding of, and agreement with, the instant petition's contents;

4)

That each of them doubts the results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections due to the highly suspicious, statistically improbably, and nearly impossible swiftness of the tallying, and that each were monitoring the election results on COMELEC's website, on social media and on various television news programs;

5)
That each of them was surprised at the supposedly high voter turnout in the Province of Pangasinan, and that the results for the province differed substantially from pre-election surveys; and

6)
That each of them came to know of the opinions of some election experts that doubted the speed, conduct, and overall transparency of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, which validated each of their concerns and worries.

In its Comment^[20] filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, COMELEC for its part submits the following arguments for the dismissal of the instant petition:

1)

The instant petition suffers from defective verifications, since it can be seen from a plain reading of the same that petitioners have no personal knowledge of facts recited therein, and that their action is based on their mere assertions that are based on their fears and speculations about how the automated election system was supposedly compromised 鈥� fears and speculations which are in turn only based on the hearsay opinions they came across on social media that had no specific mention of the election results in the Province of Pangasinan, the authors of which are not presently joined in the present proceedings, and the authenticity of which have not been sufficiently established.

2)

Mandamus cannot lie here, since Legaspi, et al. cannot point to any clear factual or even legal basis for their right to have the election results in Pangasinan subjected to a manual recount. Thus, respondent cannot be said to have reneged on its suffrage-related duties under the law.

3)

Legaspi, et al. have no locus standi to file the instant petition, since they have neither sustained any material injury (i.e., they were all able to cast their votes during the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections). Moreover, the instant petition cannot be considered a class suit since the 32 petitioners from just 9 cities and municipalities in the Province of Pangasinan cannot be said to be representative of the entire class of 2,096,936 registered voters (with 1,828,196 who actually voted on May 9, 2022) coming from all 48 cities and municipalities in the said province.^[21]

4)

Finally, the instant petition presents no actual case or controversy, since Legaspi, et al. intend to neither nullify the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections nor to unseat any incumbent elected official. Moreover, Legaspi, et al. have presented no concrete evidence of any alleged cheating or mass disenfranchisement during the said elections鈥攖hey only present their bare assertion of their lack of faith in the COMELEC's VCMs utilized on May 9, 2022, which they have based on conjectures and suspicions that they came across online.

In their Reply,^[22] Legaspi, et al. counter-assert the following:

1)

The social media postings they came across online are not hearsay but point to records that could be verified by electronic means, such as an inspection of COMELEC's transparency server for the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. Moreover, the opinions they cite are those of experts 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 automated elections.

2)

Legaspi, et al. now allege specific factual issues, such as the supposedly surreptitious change in the source code downloaded to all VCMs, and the alleged manipulation of COMELEC's transparency server to reflect results that would already condition the minds of the public during the first hour after the close of polls on May 9, 2022.

3)

COMELEC's non-transparent manner in failing to accommodate Legaspi, et al.'s requests are clearly instances of disregarding and ignoring their APELA, which violate their basic right of suffrage as explained above.

4)

The Court should adopt a more liberal policy here 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 locus standi, since the issues presented by the instant petition are of transcendental importance due to the fundamental rights involved.

5)
Finally, the instant petition constitutes a class suit since Legaspi, et al. represent the interests of fairly 72,000 voters^[23] in Pangasinan who signed the APELA demanding for the manual recount. Moreover, there is a case and controversy present here, since COMELEC (in Legaspi, et al.'s eyes) had effectively denied the said APELA.

Issues before the Court

1)   Whether the verifications 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 the instant petition are defective;

2)   Whether Legaspi, et al. have locus standi;

3)   Whether the instant petition can be classified as a class suit;

4)   Whether there is an actual case or controversy here;

5)   Whether Legaspi, et al. exhausted all administrative remedies before resorting to the instant petition; and

6)   Ultimately, whether certiorari or mandamus can lie.

Ruling of the Court
The instant petition must be dismissed.

In dealing with the six identified issues in seriatim, the Court now first discusses the sufficiency (or lack thereof) of the verifications made by Legaspi, et al.

Verification under the extant 2019 Rules of Court is defined under Rule 7, Section 4, viz.:

Section 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath or verified.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly authorized to sign said verification. The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary's certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading, and shall allege the following attestations:

(a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on [their] personal knowledge, or based on authentic documents;

(b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and

(c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the allegations in the pleading.

A pleading required to be verified that contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Indeed, petitions for certiorari and mandamus are required to be properly verified under Rule 65, Sections 1^[24] and 3.^[25] Poring over the verifications done and accomplished by Legaspi, et al., they all indeed contain phrases basically stating under oath that they individually attest that the instant petition contains true and correct statements based on their personal knowledge and existing authentic documents. However, the Court is at pains to determine how they were able to have personal knowledge of the following facts:

1) The alleged unusual speed of the transmission of the electoral results from the VCMs to COMELEC's transparency server on May 9, 2022, since they evidently were not present during the VCMs' transmission and had only monitored the election results on social media, on television, and on COMELEC's website (i.e., they were not present nearby any VCM or at respondent's headquarters housing the transparency server during the said transmission of results);

2) The observations of technical experts and international observers 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, which they only came to know of via social media or sources online that are unauthenticated for evidentiary purposes; and

3) Their actual participation in the signing of the APELA, since again, the signature pages were not submitted as part of the records of the instant petition.

Florenz D. Regalado (Regalado), an eminent commentator and former member of the Court, wrote the following with regard to the rule on verification (i.e., Rule 7, Section 4):

The second paragraph of this section has been further amended so that the pleader's affirmation of the truth and correctness of the allegations in his pleading shall be based not only on his "knowledge and belief' but specifically on his "personal knowledge or based on authentic records." In the 1964 Rules of Court, Sec. 6 of Rule 7 required personal knowledge of the facts averred, which was considered too strict since a person can reasonably affirm a fact based on his belief in its truth when there is or has been no other fact or reason contrary thereto.

However, that liberalized version is better regulated by the present amended provisions that facts should be attested to on the basis of one's personal knowledge or, especially with regard to old or vintage facts or events, by the recitals thereof in authentic records. Verification is intended to forestall allegations which are perjured or hearsay, and this purpose is reasonably subserved by the requirement for authentic documents such as official records which are exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. For the same reason, a verification cannot be made on facts obtaining or arising in whole or in part from mere information and belief.^[26] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Regalado also emphasized that "[v]erification may be made by the party, his representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading."^[27] The crux of the instant petition's first issue, however, is if Legaspi, et al. did in fact have personal knowledge sufficient to establish their capacity to verify the instant petition in the first place, or failing that, if the instant petition is based on authenticated documents in conformity with Rule 7, Section 4. Put differently, the Court must resolve the question of what happens to a seemingly valid and compliant verification portion that is based on a pleading containing no reasonable indication that the party pleading his or her case has any personal knowledge of the facts, or has attached any authentic documents in support of the said pleading.

In this regard, the Court finds that Legaspi, et al. did not have sufficient personal knowledge that capacitated them to verify the instant petition. The third guideline on verification and certification against non-forum shopping, as laid down by the Court in Altres v. Empleo,^[28] is instructive:

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.^[29]

The Court cited its reasoning in Rombe Eximtrade (Phils.), Inc. v. Asiatrust Dev't., Bank^[30] for the aforementioned guideline, viz.:

On the matter of verification, the purpose of the verification requirement is to assure that the allegations in a petition were made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative. The verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition signed the verification attached to it, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. In this case, we find that the position, knowledge, and experience of Ferrer as Manager and head of the Acquired Assets Unit of Asiatrust, and his good faith, are sufficient compliance with the verification and certification requirements. This is in line with our ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada, where we said that it is deemed substantial compliance when one with sufficient knowledge swears to the truth of the allegations in the complaint.^[31] (Citations omitted)

Here, Legaspi, et al. clearly do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances that prompted their fears and speculations regarding the results on the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. There is no indication that any of them were intimately connected or concerned with the actual transmission of the tallies of the VCMs in their respective polling precincts all the way to COMELEC's servers, and it is clear from the records that their knowledge comes from mere information and belief based on news, social media, and opinionated sources found on the Internet that are unauthenticated in accordance with the Revised Rules on Evidence. Jurisprudence and the rules commonly state that mere information and belief as basis of a pleader's knowledge is clearly insufficient for purposes of verification. Thus, even if the verification portion of a pleading, just like Legaspi, et al. here, is compliant word-for-word with the requirements of Rule 7, Section 4, said compliance will not save the fact that a pleader's personal knowledge is actually not based on personal knowledge or even on any authenticated documents.

This is all the more so due to the fact that the instant petition is actually based on Legaspi, et al.'s collective belief that something (or many things) were amiss with regard to the conduct of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. In Negros Oriental Planters Assn., Inc. v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros OCC., Br. 52, Bacolod City,^[32] the Court held that the requirement verification implies that a "party cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records."^[33] Thus, "[a] pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied."^[34]

With no showing here of how Legaspi, et al. came to have personal knowledge of the ultimate facts alleged in the instant petition, and with no other authenticated documents that can be utilized as basis for their verification (i.e., not even the communications from COMELEC's Law Department [which are mere unauthenticated photocopies], Legaspi, et al.'s Judicial Affidavits [which are merely self-serving and without any other evidentiary attachments], and especially not the 'Summary of Viral Social Media Postings' [which is unsigned and merely an aggrupation of excerpts of another document] and the APELA [which is also merely an unauthenticated photocopy of the first page and without the critical signature pages indicating their actual participation therein]), the Court can already treat the instant petition as a dismissible unsigned pleading.

Going now to the second issue, the Court is reminded of its definition of locus standi in Integrated Bar of the Phils. v. Hon. Zamora,^[35] viz.:

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."^[36] (Citations omitted)

In the same case, the Court clarified that a mere general interest in a controversy that is actually shared by the whole citizenry is not specific enough to constitute locus standi, especially if the injury is not specified, viz.:

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by, the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" nor personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.^[37] (Emphasis supplied)

Here again, the Court is at pains to determine what gives Legaspi, et al. their legal standing to sue the COMELEC at present. They have specifically stated in the instant petition that they do not intend to unseat any elected official, and that they do not intend to have any winner proclaimed. They simply pray that they be given an opportunity to have some closure with regard to what they see as an automated election riddled with anomalies by a full manual audit of all VCMs utilized in the Province of Pangasinan on May 9, 2022.

While their collective status as members of the sovereign electorate is not in doubt, this is again similar to the situation in Zamora, which is merely a general interest shared by the entire voting population with regard to the outcome and conduct of the past national and local elections. There is no concrete injury that the Court can detect here, since Legaspi, et al. admitted to have participated in the electoral process by voting on May 9, 2022 without any governmental act barring them from the polls. Their fears and speculations relative to the automated election system being compromised are too vague and uncertain to constitute material interest here, since they did not substantiate the instant petition with specific allegations based on personal knowledge of the ultimate facts, or with authenticated documents and proof that would belie any counter-allegation of hearsay.

Instead, Legaspi, et al. have harped upon their insistence that the issues presented by the instant petition have overriding transcendental importance that necessitates the Court's intervention and adjudication. Indeed, even Zamora affirmed the Court's discretion in relaxing the requirements of locus standi in view of a suit's transcendental importance, viz.:

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.^[38] (Citations omitted)

While the Court is aware of instances in the past such as Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA),^[39] wherein direct resort to the Court's jurisdiction through a Rule 65 petition "brought by a citizen" and that "involves the enforcement of constitutional rights鈥攖o information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources" was recognized as having locus standi due to the transcendental importance^[40] of the issues presented, said precedents cannot be applicable here. This is because cases like Chavez v. PEA involved matters that required the Court's immediate resolution on issues having direct and immediate bearing on constitutional rights and issues鈥攅.g., when the renegotiations of the joint venture agreement between PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation were close to be concluded.

Here, Legaspi, et al. point to no immediate danger to their constitutional rights posed by COMELEC's failure to undertake the requested full manual recount鈥攐ther than their fear and speculation of enduring a number of years being led and governed by persons who may or may not be entitled to their elective positions. This goes into Legaspi, et al.'s very capacity to sue as citizens. In Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,^[41] the Court said as much:

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.^[42] (Citations omitted)

Verily, the Court held in Prof David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,^[43] that in suits brought forward by concerned citizens, "there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early."^[44] However, here, the Court fails to detect any immediate urgency that would merit the instant petition's elevation to a case impressed with transcendental importance-precisely because Legaspi, et al. have failed to show that any injury is either present or imminent to anyone. As the Court held in In the Matter of Save the SC Judicial Independence & Fiscal Autonomy Movement v. Abolition of JDF & Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy,^[45] "[a] mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for this Court to set aside procedural rules,"^[46] and that moreover, "it must be also shown that there is a clear and imminent threat to fundamental rights."^[47]

Thus, the Court remains unconvinced with regard to Legaspi, et al.'s plea for leniency as to their legal standing. The Court cannot recognize the same based on their mere supposition that something (or many things) had gone awry 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 the results and conduct of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections 鈥� even if they invoke the supposed transcendental importance of the requested full manual recount. Without anything to substantiate the supposed material injury to anyone caused by COMELEC's alleged denial of their request for the said recount (which will be discussed below as actually not constituting any denial at all of Legaspi, et al.'s rights), or even the urgent need for the same, the Court cannot see how Legaspi, et al. stand to gain or lose as a result of the resolution of the instant petition.

Put simply, whether the Court grants the instant petition or not, Legaspi, et al. remain unscathed and unperturbed in terms of their constitutional rights for now, as will be explained below. Their anxieties with regard to what they may have read and heard about the results and conduct of the last elections may indeed remain 鈥� as it is their constitutional right to harbor such anxieties as involved citizens who care about democracy and the rule of law 鈥� but for obvious reasons the Court is presently not the proper forum for the resolution of such concerns.

Anent the third issue, the unamended and intact Rule 3, Section 12 of the 2019 Rules of Court defines a class suit as follows:

Section 12. Class suit. 鈥� When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.

Here, Legaspi, et al. allege that they are representing more than 71,000 voters from the Province of Pangasinan who signed the APELA and had the same filed before COMELEC for appropriate action. The problem with this assertion is that Legaspi, et al. failed to attach the APELA's signature pages for the Court's verification. The Court, thus, cannot make an adequate determination as to whether the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all to the present proceedings, or even as to whether Legaspi, et al. are sufficiently numerous or representative of the supposed class they represent, or that they can fully protect the interests of all concerned. Moreover, participation in the APELA's signature campaign does not automatically equate to any signatory's participation in the present proceedings without sufficient authorization for their supposed representatives to do so. The Court cannot speculate as to how many of the supposed 71,000 or more voters from Pangasinan actually desire to have the instant petition litigated on their behalf. With no sufficient basis for the Court's consideration, the instant petition cannot be designated as a class suit 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 the signatories to the APELA.

Anent the fourth issue, the Court is reminded of its ruling in Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Hon. Aquino^[48] with regard to the requirement of an actual case or controversy for the exercise of the Court's power of judicial review, viz.:

Most important in this list of requisites is the existence of an actual case or controversy. In every exercise of judicial power, whether in the traditional or expanded sense, this is an absolute necessity.

There is an actual case or controversy if there is a "conflict of legal right, an opposite legal [claim] susceptible of judicial resolution." A petitioner bringing a case before this Court must establish that there is a legally demandable and enforceable right under the Constitution. There must be a real and substantial controversy, with definite and concrete issues involving the legal relations of the parties, and admitting of specific relief that courts can grant.

This requirement goes into the nature of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government. It is bound by the doctrine of separation of powers, and will not rule on any matter or cause the invalidation of any act, law, or regulation, if there is no actual or sufficiently imminent breach of or injury to a right. The courts interpret laws, but the ambiguities may only be clarified in the existence of an actual simation.^[49] (Citations omitted)

The Court had previously elucidated on the nature of an actual case or controversy in Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,^[50] viz.:

The controversy must be justiciable 鈥� definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.^[51]

Thus, for an actual case or controversy to exist, the aggrieved party's rights must be fully established to be extant, due, and demandable 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 the other party's actions, which either violate or deny the said rights.

This is the crux of the instant petition and the Court's discussion: whether Legaspi, et al's constitutional rights of suffrage, to petition the government for redress of grievances, and to have access to information on matters of public concern were affected in any way by COMELEC's supposed denial of the APELA and its imperative request for a full manual recount of the election results in the Province of Pangasinan.

Beginning with regard to Legaspi, et al.'s right of suffrage, the Court harkens back to the case of People v. San Juan,^[52] which outlined the conceptual core of the constitutional right of suffrage, viz.:

Indeed, each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process. As numerous as they are insidious are long-standing techniques of terror and intimidation that have been conceived by man鈥攊n derogation of the right of suffrage鈥攚hich we have repeatedly and unqualifiedly condemned. When he legislature provided in section 133 of the Revised Election Code an explicit and unequivocal guarantee of a voter's free access to the polling place, it could have intended no purpose other than to maintain inviolate the right to vote by safeguarding the voter against all manner of unauthorized interference and travesty that surveyors of fear can devise. Every unlawful obstacle, by whatever means or method, interposed to the free entry of a voter into the polling place to cast his vote, strikes at the very heart of the right of suffrage.^[53]

Indeed, the common understanding of violations to the right of suffrage would be any impediment erected by the State or private persons and entities that would prevent legal and physical access to the polling precincts. However, here, the Court fails to see any violation thereof. Legaspi, et al. have admitted to participating in the electoral process by casting their votes on May 9, 2022. It is their submission, however, that corollary to the constitutional right of suffrage is the right to be fully informed of all steps and aspects of the vote颅-counting process, lest the right of suffrage be ultimately frustrated and denied by the supposed manipulation of COMELEC's automated election system, and to have the results fully and manually recounted should there be any whiff of electoral anomalies.

However, it is too much of a stretch for the Court to hold that the constitutional right of suffrage encompasses the supposed right of the sovereign electorate in a locality to have an entire election conducted thereat fully and manually recounted based on unsubstantiated surmises and unfounded conjectures that supposedly shadow the said election's conduct and results. This supposed right exists neither in the statute books nor in jurisprudence, and for the Court to recognize such right here would be a dangerous tread into the forbidden waters of judicial legislation.

Not even the case of Loong, which Legaspi, et al. cite as the authoritative precedent for the Court's power to recognize the suspension of the automated counting of ballots and the reversion to manual counting in the event of supervening circumstances, can be properly invoked here. Said case involved the VCMs utilized in certain municipalities in the Province of Sulu during the May 11, 1998 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Elections, which could not read the printed ballots due to an error in printing. The Court indeed noted that Republic Act No. 8436 failed to anticipate such technical issues, but that respondent was not powerless to address the same, viz.:

. . . In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(l) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, the Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections...

. . . .

In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual recount was not only reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local votes in the six (6) municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine [count] does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.^[54]

Here, however, the situation is patently different. There is no allegation here that a great number of VCMs rejected or failed to read and count the ballots fed into them, or that an entire group of clustered polling precincts failed to transmit their results, or that an entire barangay, municipality, or city was not included in the provincial results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. There is not even an allegation here of a failure of elections in any part of Pangasinan. For COMELEC to exercise extraordinary powers here for a full manual count of the entire province would in turn require such extraordinary circumstances that would basically equate to an overall failure of the counting and transmission of the results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections in Pangasinan鈥攃ircumstances which are not present, alleged, or even proven in the instant petition. Also, therein lies the rub: the scenario in Loong would only work to be the jurisprudential basis for a manual count, NOT a recount.

On a minor note, the Court here also rejects Legaspi, et al.'s assertion that they can properly petition here for the correction of manifest errors in either the certificates of canvass or the election returns emanating from the Province of Pangasinan relative to the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. This old pre-proclamation procedure, as embodied in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, was only cognizable before the appropriate canvassing body or COMELEC, and the Court notes that this provision has been rendered defunct due to the advent of automated elections in the Philippines.

Properly speaking, then, without any proof of the manipulations and anomalies complained of that would have prevented their votes from being counted, Legaspi, et al. had no legal justification to present to the COMELEC in order for the requested full manual count in Pangasinan to happen鈥攖o say nothing of a recount. Again, there is also no statutory basis for said recount鈥攊ndeed, Legaspi, et al. could not even invoke the random manual audit provided for in Section 29 of Republic Act No. 8436 (as amended by Section 24^[55] of Republic Act No. 9369), which only has a limited scope (i.e., one polling precinct per congressional district).

Given the foregoing, the Court, thus, fails to see how the constitutional right of suffrage will suffer because of the COMELEC's supposed denial of the requested recount鈥攖he latter having no legal and factual basis. As things stand, Legaspi, et al.'s right of suffrage essentially and actually remains intact, unscathed, and unperturbed here.

Moreover, the Court fails to see how the COMELEC's communications amounted to a denial and violation of Legaspi, et al.'s constitutional right of suffrage. This is because of the sheer confusion caused by the language and terminologies employed in Atty. Fabia's Letters, especially the one dated June 15, 2022, which designates the APELA as a "people's initiative." While clearly the intended purpose of the APELA is nowhere near what is contemplated in the provisions Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as the "Initiative and Referendum Act," the COMELEC cannot be blamed for its puzzlement at the said designation.

Indeed, the COMELEC had no choice in the language of its last response, which had to directly address the explicit request for a people's initiative by merely calling Atty. Fabia's attention to the statutory and other formal requirements for a people's initiative. This is the same situation with the COMELEC's initial response to the APELA, because the COMELEC, well aware that no right to a recount of an entire province exists outside the realm of electoral protests filed by losing provincial or national candidates, could only respond with what is in the law for it to administer. Surely, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for its initial response after proverbially trying its best to squeeze water out of a stone.

Verily, the Court here cannot rightly and fairly consider the COMELEC's supposed denial as such, since obviously, there was no explicit language of such a denial in COMELEC's communications, and crucially, Legaspi, et al. are at fault and mostly to blame for the miscommunication as to what they were really demanding from the COMELEC. Not only did they demand for a recount without any legal and factual basis; they also caused a legal bemusement at COMELEC's expense with their poor choice of words that far from clarified the situation, and which they used as a springboard for their direct resort to this Court. With no real and actual denial of anything related to Legaspi, et al.'s constitutional right of suffrage here, the Court consequently fails to detect any actual case or controversy relative to the same.

On a related note, the Court sees merit in affirming that the right of suffrage should indeed cover the accompanying right to have one's votes properly and rightly counted 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 an election. However, with no justiciable controversy here relative to Legaspi, et al.'s right of suffrage to begin with, such a ruling cannot be made at this time. The Court will, however, hold at present that for actual cases and controversies to be considered as extant and properly the basis for cases that invoke judicial review, concrete proof of an initiating party's rights and violations (existing or impending) thereof must be attendant. In other words, mere speculations and surmises relative to future and past violations of a party's rights are insufficient for purposes of determining whether a case constitutes a justiciable controversy.

As for Legaspi, et al.'s right to petition the government for redress of grievances, the Court simply and summarily notes that nothing here has prevented them from being heard before the COMELEC, and indeed before the Court. Their right to express their apprehensions and doubts with regard to the conduct and results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections is constitutionally guaranteed and recognized, and the Court sees no indication here at all of the said right being violated or stymied.

Going now to Legaspi, et al.'s right to be informed on matters of public concern, the Court must point out at this stage that this should have been the anchor and lodestar of the instant petition. This is because it is fittingly the most appropriate constitutional right that Legaspi, et al. can invoke in order for their minds to be put at ease relative to the truth behind the results and conduct of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections.

A cursory discussion of this critical constitutional right is in order. Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution guarantees that "[t]he right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." This has been accorded the designation in recent common parlance as the people's freedom of information (FOI), which was first mentioned in Philippine jurisprudence in the case of Subido v. Ozaeta^[56] albeit at the time as a corollary adjunct of the freedom of the press.

Subido has been subsequently cited numerous times relative to FOI cases before the Court. In Baldoza v. Judge Dimaano,^[57] the Court noted that the 1973 Constitution expressly recognized FOI^[58] as part of the State's overall recognition of the importance of such right to citizens in a democracy, viz.:

The access to public records predicated [is] on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. In an earlier case, this Court held that mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the latter office predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such power does not carry with its authority to prohibit. . .

. . . .

The New [1973] Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.^[59] (Citations omitted)

FOI was also invoked as basis for the Court's rulings in Ta帽ada v. Hon. Tuvera,^[60] where the printing of unpublished presidential issuances in the Official Gazette was ordered lest the said issuances be deemed to have no binding force and effect. The Court said as much about FOI鈥攚hich was adopted in toto from the 1973 Constitution for inclusion by reference in the 1986 Freedom Constitution鈥攊n relation to the requirement of publication for laws and issuances of general application, viz.:

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.^[61]

The first FOI case decided by the Court under the 1987 Constitution was the seminal and landmark decision in Legaspi v. Civil Service Cornmission,^[62] where the Court upheld a citizen's access to records pertaining to the civil service eligibility of certain persons employed in the Cebu City Health Department. The Court noted that "it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligible."^[63] In reasoning that such information was covered by FOI, and thus, petitioner therein was entitled to the Court's order for mandamus, the absence of any limitation in law that restricted access to said information was discussed, viz.:

In the instant case, while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligible. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligible, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligible for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus therefore lies.^[64]

Legaspi also made the following important pronouncements: (1) the constitutional provision recognizing FOI is "self-executing" and can be invoked "without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature;"^[65] (2) the "government agency having custody of the desired information" has the "burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee;"^[66] and (3) "[i]n determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern, there is no rigid test which can be applied."^[67] Relative to this last pronouncement, the Court explained thus:

"Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.^[68]

Verily, Legaspi has set the standard for the Court's subsequent rulings relating to FOI cases. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.^[69] the Court ruled that while information and documents on Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) loans granted to members of the former Batasang Pambansa were indeed matters of public interest and concern that were not covered by any exceptions to FOI, the GSIS could not be compelled to "prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in [Legaspi, et al.'s] desire to acquire information on public concem."^[70] Speaking through the late former Associate Justice Irene R. Cortes, who also penned the ruling in Legaspi, the Court granted the mandamus petition by only allowing access to the said information and documents "subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection"^[71] to be determined and deemed necessary by GSIS.

In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato,^[72] the Court granted access to the decisions and individual members' voting slips of the Movie & Television Review and Classification Board, since the said governmental actions and documents were made pursuant to official public functions and are public in character. In addition, the Court noted the following:

The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed-door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner['s] request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records[.]^[73]

In Chavez v. PCGG,^[74] the Court expressly recognized four limitations on the right to FOI: "(1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information."^[75] Said confidential information includes information relating to ongoing negotiations and/or proposals relative to the PCGG's discussions with putative owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth, viz.:

Considering the intent of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier颅鈥攕uch as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.^[76]

In Gonzales v. Hon. Narvasa,^[77] relative to a mandamus petition for the disclosure of the names of officials holding multiple positions in government and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles that had recently been seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President, the Court ordered the Executive Secretary to answer therein petitioner's letter requesting the said information. Said the Court:

Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioner's letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern鈥攖hat is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property. With regard to petitioner's request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business.^[78] (Citation omitted)

In Chavez v. PEA, the Court clarified that FOI could be invoked in order to gain access to official infonnation on on-going negotiations before the signing of a government contract, especially in light of the transparency requirements of public bidding, and subject to the general limitations as discussed above. In Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General of the National Economic & Development Authority,^[79] the Court made an offhand note that the people's right to FOI did not cover personal matters embodied in strictly confidential personal data collected by the government. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,^[80] the Court restated and affirmed the public's right to access court records, which include pleadings and papers filed by private parties, viz.:

In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. In the exercise of such discretion, the following issues may be relevant: "whether [the] parties have interest in privacy, whether [the] information is being sought for legitimate purpose or for improper purpose, whether there is threat of particularly serious embarrassment to [a] party, whether [the] information is important to public health and safety, whether sharing of [the] information among litigants would promote fairness and efficiency, whether [the] party benefitting from [the] confidentiality order is [a] public entity or official, and whether [the] case involves issues important to the public.^[81] (Citations omitted)

In Bantay Republic Act or Ba-Ra 7941 v. Commission on Elections,^[82] the Court affirmed the people's right to FOI when it compelled COMELEC to publicly disclose the names of nominees of party-list organizations that were participating in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. In Chavez v. National Housing Authority,^[83] the Court actually lamented the fact that there was "still no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on government transactions."^[84] There is still no law on the statute books to date. In the same case, the Court also made a distinction between a government agency's duty to disclose information from its duty to provide or permit access to information, viz.:

Thus, the duty to disclose infmmation should be differentiated from the duty to permit access to information. There is no need to demand from the government agency disclosure of information as this is mandatory under the Constitution; failing that, legal remedies are available. On the other hand, the interested party must first request or even demand that he be allowed access to documents and papers in the particular agency. A request or demand is required; otherwise, the government office or agency will not know of the desire of the interested party to gain access to such papers and what papers are needed. The duty to disclose covers only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency.^[85]

This requirement of a prior demand for access to information is of particular significance to the instant petition, which will be discussed later below.

In the historic case of Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain,^[86] the Court affirmed that the people's right to FOI covered therein Legaspi, et al.'s right to be consulted on the peace agenda 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 the Govermnent's negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, as well as information related to the negotiations for the proposed Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. The Government's invocation of executive privilege was crucially not recognized, since the executive order defining the authority of the Government's negotiating panel had already recognized the public's right to be consulted at various levels (both national and local) with regard to the said peace talks.^[87]

In the more relevant case of Guingona, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,^[88] the Court compelled the COMELEC to fully explain to the public its preparations for the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections鈥攖he first fully automated national elections in the Philippines鈥攐n the basis of a catena of statutory provisions that relate to its duties as the country's electoral administrator. Incidentally, one provision cited by the Court therein is Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8436 (as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9369), or the State's declared policy, among others, to adopt an automated election system with a transparent and credible process of ballot counting and tally transmission.

The Court here notes that in Guingona, it had indeed granted therein petitioners' plea for mandamus even if the petition was anchored on mere news reports of supposed technical and logistical preparations relative to the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. However, in that case, the Court recognized the urgency of the petition, since it was filed on April 23, 2010鈥攊.e., a little over two weeks before polling day. Indeed, the Court's Resolution was promulgated on May 6, 2010, or four days before polling day. The Court deemed it wise to brush aside technicalities and immediately order the COMELEC to inform the public of all election-related preparations even if there was no prior demand by any party due to the fact that time was already of the essence. Indeed, the time factor made that case one of transcendental importance.

In Antolin v. Domondon,^[89] which is a case that will be crucial to the ultimate resolution of the instant petition, the Court balanced interests relating to an FOI demand for access to licensure examination papers, viz.:

We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.

On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings, they have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for further proceedings.^[90]

In Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary,^[91] the Court effectively promulgated strict guidelines for access to copies of the statements of assets, liabilities, and net worth (or SALNs), personal data sheets, and curricula vitae of members, officials and employees of the judiciary, despite the concerns of some magistrates regarding the motives behind such requests for access, viz.:

The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor's responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject to the consequences of the law. While public officers [having] custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of records. After all, public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.^[92]

In Initiatives for Dialogue & Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets & Liabilities Management Corp. (PSALM),^[93] the Court bemoaned PSALM's refusal to accede to a request for detailed information regarding the winning bidder in the asset purchase agreement that covered the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant, which was a simple request covered by the transparency policy of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001." In Sereno v. Committee on Trade & Related Matters (CTRM) of the National Economic and Dev't. Authority (NEDA),^[94] the Court restated the rule on government agencies bearing the burden of proving that information requested from them are excluded from the coverage of FOI, viz.:

Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted to the people, is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for the exemption. In case of denial of access to the information, it is the government agency concerned that has the burden of showing that the information sought to be obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from the coverage of the constitutional guarantee.^[95]

Most recently in Colmenares v. Duterte,^[96] the Court pronounced the confidentiality clauses of certain loan agreements concluded between the Government and Chinese financial institutions as unduly restrictive and would not bar public availability of the contents of the entirety of the loan agreements in question. Here, the people's right to FOI is seen to have been complemented by Article XII, Section 21 of the Constitution, which explicitly states that "[i]nformation on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public.''

Verily, the constancy of jurisprudence relating to FOI, as elucidated above and which is a point of pride for Philippine constitutional law, shows how the Court accords primacy to such a fundamental right of an ordinary citizen to inquire into the dealings and functions of governance and administration that occur behind the scenes, so to speak. Subject to certain exceptions and limitations, a citizen whose right to FOI has either been denied or violated by a government agency may bring forth a suit for mandamus for the vindication of said right and the judicial compulsion of disclosure and/or grant of access to the State's troves and inventories that hold information crucial to the public discourse and welfare.

Said access may be subject to practical considerations for the orderly and sensible retrieval and examination of records, but generally speaking, no government agency may keep the proverbial door to such records shut in the absence of any compelling justification that must be judicially approved. This bias in favor of transparency and accountability is in keeping with democratic traditions and the sacred principle of popular sovereignty. It is thus both constitutional and commonsensical policy for every organ of the State to operate under a default open-door policy when it comes to the people's right to FOI.

However, the ultimate question here remains: was Legaspi, et al.'s right to FOI here either violated or denied by respondent to begin with?

Based on the records of the case, the Court answers the aforementioned question in the negative. To explain this, it is necessary to discuss the fifth issue of whether Legaspi, et al. exhausted all administrative remedies before resorting to the instant petition.

To recapitulate, the language of the APELA mentioned nothing about any request for the grant of access to any documents, electronic or otherwise, relative to the operation and transmission of the VCMs utilized in Pangasinan for the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. Nothing in Atty. Fabia's Letter dated June 15, 2022 to COMELEC's Law Department indicates any request for access to any specific information in COMELEC's custody. In actuality, said Letter bears only a vague invocation of Legaspi, et al.'s right to FOI without any particulars other than their desire to know how their votes were counted, tallied, and reported. Even the language of the Addendum dated June 20, 2022 is vague, since it requests for the "opening of the ballot boxes to be witnessed by the people, count the ballots manually, allow the SD cards to be audited by independent I.T. professionals and the tambiolo system be employed in the selection of precincts to be subjected to Random Manual Audit all at the expense of Legaspi, et al."^[97]

While this may almost be considered as a positive request for access to information, the Court must note that what Legaspi, et al. (through Atty. Fabia) are asking for here are all still in relation to the full manual recount of the provincial results, which has already been established to have no basis in law and fact. To consider this as an FOI request independent of the overarching context of the requested full manual recount would be pushing the envelope further than bearable, and would put an undue burden on both the Court and COMELEC to decipher and anticipate what exact information Legaspi, et al. are actually requesting. Are they, for instance, only interested in examining the ballots and secure digital (SD) cards? Are they not also interested in the transmission logs and other electronic records of the entire automated election system? What about COMELEC's transparency and other servers used on May 9, 2022? And what of the actual printouts of the VCMs that were generated immediately after the polls closed鈥攊ncluding the voter-verified paper audit trail receipts that were generated for each voter and kept in COMELEC's custody?

Verily, such a generally worded, overly broad, and vague reference to ballot boxes and SD cards in an addendum to an already confusing request cannot rightly be considered to have been a proper demand for FOI here. Also, even if Legaspi, et al. mentioned in their prayer that they are indeed interested in gaining access to the transmission logs,^[98] they are not actually requesting that they personally or by proxy be granted access to the same; they ask that the same be submitted to the Court with no reference to any purpose therefor. This is no longer an FOI request but virtually a motion to compel discovery filed before a tribunal that is not a trier of facts.^[99]

Moreover, the Court takes judicial notice of COMELEC's Resolution No. 10685,^[100] which outlines its FOI Manual that it adopted specifically for the recognition and enforcement of the people's constitutional right to FOI with regard to election-related matters. Its comprehensive contents provide for a veritable and well-defined procedure by which a citizen may request for access to information in the custody of COMELEC's offices and officials, and even has a commendable provision relating to a presumption in favor of disclosure and transparency, viz.:

Section 8. Application and Interpretation. 鈥� There shall be a legal presumption in favor of access to information, public records and official records. No request for information shall be denied unless it clearly falls under any of the exceptions listed in the inventory or updated Inventory of Exceptions circularized by the Office of the President provided in the succeeding section.

The determination of the applicability of any of the exceptions to the request shall be the responsibility of the Head of the Office which is in custody or control of the information, public record or official record, or the responsible central or field officer duly designated by him in writing.

In making such determination, the Head of the Office or his designated officer shall exercise reasonable diligence to ensure that no exception shall be used or availed of to deny any request for information or access to public records, or official records if the denial is intended primarily and purposely to cover up a crime, wrongdoing, graft or corruption.

The Court, thus, wonders why Legaspi, et al. did not first resort to this available process, which is complete with a procedure for the administrative appeal of denials of FOI requests and an express recognition in Section 37 of the said Resolution that "[u]pon exhaustion of all administrative remedies, the requesting party may file the appropriate judicial action in accordance with the Rules of Court." In effect, there was no denial of Legaspi, et al.'s right to FOI, since there was no proper FOI request here to begin with鈥攄espite an exhaustive FOI policy and manual in place since 2020.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies stands as a pillar of the judicial system in this country by which disputes and controversies are decided and settled. Its essence was eloquently laid out in Dimson (Manila), Inc. v. Local Water Utilities Administration,^[101] viz.:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before judicial intervention may be availed of. No recourse can be had until all such remedies have been exhausted, and the special civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if there are superior administrative officers who could grant relief. Carale v. Abarintos explains the reason for this rule, thus:

Observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound practice and policy. It ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary sifting process, particularly with respect to matters within the competence of the administrative agency, avoidance of interference with the functions of the administrative agency by withholding judicial action until the administrative process had run its course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a resort to them in the first instance. The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for this principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and [speedier] solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain the case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.

Accordingly, the party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

One final note. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a judicial recognition of certain matters that are peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency to address. It operates as a srueld that prevents the overarching use of judicial power and thus hinders courts from intervening in matters of policy infused with administrative character. The Court has always adhered to this precept, and it has no reason to depart from it now.^[102]

There are indeed, exceptions to the doctrine, as the Court enumerated in Maglalang v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp.,^[103] viz.:

(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.^[104]

The court sees none of the foregoing exceptions present here. Even if the Court had previously noted in the Valmonte case^[105] that issues requiring the interpretation of the scope of the people's right to FOI were purely legal questions that would be an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court must note now that such reasoning is outdated due to the present competence of government agencies with FOI policies and manuals (such as COMELEC) to rule in the first instance relative to FOI requests filed before them. As such, rulings on FOI requests are no longer pure questions of law, but now involve factual issues properly cognizable before government agencies with FOI adjudication processes, especially if they are highly technical in nature.

Thus, for failing to avail of an extant remedy properly within the province and primary competence of COMELEC, Legaspi, et al.'s assertion that they no longer had any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law falls apart. As a requirement for both petitions for the prerogative writs of certiorari and mandamus, this constitutes a fatal lacuna in the instant Petition.

As for the sixth and final issue, the Court will first discuss the propriety (or more properly, the lack thereof) of certiorari to the case at bar. Another requisite for a petition for certiorari is the allegation of the existence of grave abuse of discretion, which was explained by the late Dean Willard B. Riano (Riano) in one of his last commentaries, viz.:

1. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231771, July 4, 2017). Certiorari will not lie when there is a mere abuse of discretion by the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Such kind of abuse does not amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For certiorari to lie, the abuse must be "grave" (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court).

Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave, as when it is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility (Basmala v. COMELEC, 567 SCRA 664, 668). In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public respondent for his issuance of the impugned order (Gravides v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199433, November 13, 2012; See also JM Agronomic Company, Inc. v. Liclican, G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015).

2. The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by the tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions as to amount to lack of power (Jardin v. NLRC, 326 SCRA 299, 304; See also Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. v. Riel, G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015; JM Agronomic Company, Inc. v. Liclican, G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015; Arnado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015).

To be considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law (Tua v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014, Dacles v. Millennium Erectors Corporation, G.R. No. 209822, July 8, 2015).^[106]

Even if one considers that COMELEC's communications in response to the requests for the full manual recount in Pangasinan were constitutive of acts done in its quasi-judicial functions, the Court fails to see what amounted to grave abuse of discretion here. Not only has it been established that COMELEC actually did not deny Legaspi, et al.'s request; it had also not been given any opportunity to accede to any FOI-related request, since Legaspi, et al. failed to avail of the remedies available in COMELEC's FOI Manual. Moreover, and as discussed above, it cannot be faulted for being confused with Legaspi, et al.'s requests, since their own wording muddled matters to a regrettably absurd degree. Clearly, COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not actually understand what proper relief they were seeking. Ultimately, according to Riano, "[t]he burden is on petitioner to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not merely a reversible error but also a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."^[107] Here, Legaspi, et al. have obviously not sufficiently discharged said burden.

As for mandamus, the Court here reiterates that no statutory basis exists for Legaspi, et al.'s plea for a full manual recount of the provincial results of a national/local election. This right only pertains to losing candidates who have filed election protests for the revision of ballots they have identified as objectionable. Not even the generally worded declaration of policy in Republic Act No. 9369 can properly be the basis for such action by respondent. The proper fomm for the grant of such a right to the public lies in Congress, and not the courts. As Riano commented, the issuance of a writ of mandamus is conditioned on the existence of a clear legal right, viz.:

1. For a writ of mandamus to be issued, it is essential that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required (Philippine Coconut Authority v. Primex Coco Products, 495 SCRA 763, 777; Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017).

2. The writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioner's legal right to the performance of the particular act, which is sought to be compelled, is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical issues will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, mandamus cannot issue (Angeles v. Secretary of Justice, 614 SCRA 478, 494).

3. For mandamus to issue, it is essential that the person petitioning for it has a clear legal right to the claim sought. It will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Thus, unless the right to relief sought is unclouded, it will be denied (Araos v. Regala, 613 SCRA 207, 215).^[108] (Emphases and underscoring supplied; italics in the original).

With regard to Legaspi, et al.'s constitutional right to FOI, the Court recognizes that in theory, they are indeed entitled to the same. However, due to the vagueness and breadth of the information mentioned in their pleadings and communications to COMELEC, and also due to the fact that they failed to exhaust the administrative process (and accompanying internal appellate procedure) established by COMELEC in its FOI Manual, mandamus will still not lie here in their favor. Their right exists in fact, but it is in the way they asked for the information desired that has compromised the instant petition. They indeed have a constitutional right to FOI, but without properly requesting for the information they so desire, the said right cannot be embodied and manifested for proper and appropriate identification and action. In other words, without a concrete demonstration as to what information is being accessed鈥攊n order for the proper authorities to make proper determinations as to their inclusion or exception under the umbrella of FOI鈥攖he said right cannot ultimately be given its due.

Moreover, and crucially, the Court here must reexamine the notion that mandamus is still the appropriate remedy to enforce and recognize the people's constitutional right to FOI in light of government agencies such as COMELEC having crafted and promulgated FOI procedures that now appear to be quasi颅 judicial in nature. This is critical to the determination of whether a government agency's action on an FOI request constitutes either a ministerial or a discretionary act. As Riano commented,

1. Mandamus is a writ that commands the performance of a purely ministerial duty imposed by law (Black's Law Dictionary, 5^th Ed., 866). A duty is ministerial when it demands no special judgment, discretion or skill. It is one in which nothing is left to discretion and is a simple and definite duty imposed by law (Black's Law Dictionary, 5^th Ed., 899). Hence, mandamus will not be available to compel the performance of a discretionary act.

Mandamus, for example, will not lie to control the discretion of a judge or compel him to decide a motion pending before him in a particular way (Morada v. Caluag, 5 SCRA 1128, 1130). In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised (Cuarto v. Ombudsman, 658 SCRA 580, 594). Hence, a judge may be compelled to act and rule on the motion. (Bar 1991)

2. For the writ of mandamus to issue, the petitioner must show that the act sought to be performed or compelled is ministerial on the part of the respondent. An act is ministerial when it does not require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed pursuant to a legal mandate. The burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that he is entitled to the performance of a legal right, and that the respondent has a corresponding duty to perform the act. The writ may not issue to compel an official to do anything that is not his duty to do so, or that is his duty not to do, or to obtain for the petitioner anything to which he is not entitled by law (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018).^[109]

Clearly, the fact that COMELEC's FOI Manual provides for the constitution of an appeals and review committee to decide appeals from initial denials of FOI requests means that the administrative process as spelled out in the FOI manuals and procedures of government agencies like COMELEC have actually and already become discretionary in nature, and no longer purely ministerial. Government officials following their respective office's FOI manuals (which obviously vary in terms of scope and exceptions depending on the nature of the mandate of the government agency involved) must actually decide on the facts and law relative to FOI requests, unlike before when exceptions to FOI were few and far between and the disclosure or granting of access to information were basically ministerial functions. This, however, is not a regrettable development in the growth of FOI regulation, but a growing recognition of the importance of FOI in administrative law and practice. As such, actions on FOI requests under the auspices of the concerned agency's FOI manual or similar established procedures that involve the determination of the factual and legal aspects of the said requests鈥攅specially if an internal appellate process is provided for鈥攁re deemed to he discretionary actions properly reviewable by either appeal or certiorari, depending on the attendant circumstances.

To conclude, the Court must state that this ruling should not be seen or taken to be, on balance, an ultimate denial of Legaspi, et al.'s constitutional right to FOI 鈥� far from it. The Court here has actually recognized that they can still avail of the remedies contained in the COMELEC's FOI manual for the information they desire 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 the truth of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. This ruling in fact affirms the people's constitutional right to FOI by its recognition and strengthening of FOI procedures duly crafted and promulgated by government agencies such as COMELEC. This is also in keeping with the Court's deference and respect accorded to it as the sole constitutionally empowered electoral body and watchdog having primary competence and specialized expertise over all things election-related.

On a final note, Legaspi, et al. should actually be commended for their courageous stance when they signed and filed the APELA, and ultimately when they came before this Court to seek relief. They must understand, however, that democracy and the rule of law presupposes the faithful adherence to established procedures for the assertion, recognition, and enforcement of their rights. Again, they still have the option of coming before the COMELEC in the proper manner by filing the appropriate FOI request, and they are totally within their constitutional right to do so, this after all being a free country still. This will also give the COMELEC the opportunity to have its first pass to adjudicate 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 the said requests, especially if it finds any exceptions to the general rule under FOI of disclosure and transparency, and to ensure that proper safeguards are in place should access be granted. However, to speculate further would be for the Court to preempt its decision on a future case that may be filed in relation to such adjudication. For now, the Court's judgment here suffices as its latest pronouncement relative to the people's constitutional right to FOI.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur
Leonen, SAJ. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., see separate opinion.

^[5] Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 252 Phil. 264, 270-271 (1989) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc], where this Court said:

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. I) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

. . . .

. . . [T]he right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

^[6] Ponencia, p. 24.

^[7] 365 Phil. 386 (1999) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

^[8] Ponencia, pp. 3-4.

^[9] Republic Act No. 6735 (1989), sec. 3(a).

SEPARATE OPINION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The facts are straightforward. After the culmination of the May 2022 National and Local Elections, respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), through its Executive Director, received a document denominated as "APELA PARA SA MANO-MANONG PAGBILANG MULI NG MGA BOTO SA PROBINSYA NG PANGASINAN" (APELA) from a certain Albert O. Quintinita (Quintinita) on May 27, 2022. The APELA was a signature campaign demanding a recount of votes cast in the province of Pangasinan because of alleged anomalies in the conduct of the May 2022 National and Local Elections.^[1]

Through its Letter dated May 31, 2022, respondent's Law Department informed Quintinita of the proper procedure in filing an election contest. Thereafter, petitioner Atty. Laudemer I. Fabia, as spokesperson of the affected voters, sought reconsideration of the supposed denial of the APELA and averred that the APELA was not an election protest "but a people's initiative in the exercise of their sovereign rights as provided for under the Constitution," and invoked their right to information on matters of public concern. Per its Letter dated July 7, 2022, respondent's Law Department advised Quintinita that it has no jurisdiction over the APELA.^[2]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. Essentially, they claimed that respondent's lack of action on the APELA amounted to grave abuse of discretion.^[3] Too, they invoked here their rights of suffrage, to information, and to petition the government for redress of grievances.

The ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, accurately synthesized why the elements for the exercise of the Court's power of judicial review have not been established, and, ultimately, why the Petition is fatally defective. Too, it thoroughly discussed the important right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern enshrined under Article III, Section 7^[4] of the 1987 Constitution, and how such right of petitioners had not been violated here as they claim.

I agree.

In addition, it is my view that the dismissal of the Petition is proper primarily because of the sheer absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC.

It is well-settled that grave abuse of discretion arises when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. It occurs when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence.^[5]

Here, respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent clearly acted in accordance with the Constitution, the law, and existing jurisprudence. Respondent's Law Department aptly refrained from taking cognizance of petitioners' APELA, which they claimed to be a people's initiative in the exercise of their rights under the Constitution.

The power of initiative pertains to the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose enactment of legislations through an election called for the purpose.^[6]

As may be gleaned from the first page of the APELA,^[7] it was neither a petition to propose amendments to the Constitution nor a proposition to enact national or local legislations. Unfortunately for petitioners, they simply chose the wrong remedy to pursue their cause.

But even assuming that the APELA was in fact a people's initiative, petitioners failed to follow the requisites and procedure for the exercise thereof, specifically Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10650 or the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of: 1) Initiative on the Constitution; and 2) Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Legislations, viz.:

Section 12. Filing of the Petition. - (a) The Proponent/s shall secure a certification as to the total number of registered voters in each legislative district from the ERSD based on the data used in the immediately preceding elections, and shall append the same to the Petition under oath (see ANNEX "A"). On the other hand, the ERSD shall transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Commission a certified copy of the certification issued to the Proponent/s.

The Petition under oath, and the thereto attached certifications from the ERSD and EO mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph and in Section 15 (a), respectively, must be filed with the Office of the Clerk of the Commission after payment ofrequired filing fee.

It must be alleged in the said Petition under oath, among others, that the required number of signatures was already collected and gathered by the Proponent/s, the signature sheets therefor were already submitted to the concerned Offices of the EO, and a certification therefor was duly issued by the EO.

(b) The Clerk of the Commission shall docket the Petition as P.I.R., evaluate the same, and immediately thereafter, submit a recommendation to the Commission En Banc as to whether or not (1) the Proposition is an appropriate subject of the Petition and conforms with Section 8 hereof; and (2) the Petition under oath has:

(a)
The full text of the proposed amendment, which may either be:

i.
Written on the face of the Petition; or

ii.
Attached to the Petition, in which case, the Petition must state the fact of such attachment;

(b)
The Reason/s therefor;

(c)
An abstract or summary of the Proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the Petition. The abstract shall include a clear description of the Proposition's essential content;

(d)
The required attachments mentioned in Section 12 (a) hereof; and

(e)
A statement affirming that before the signatures are affixed, the Proponent/s ensured that Petitioners have read and understood the Petition and the proposed amendment/s to the Constitution, and have known that the signatures constitute approval of the proposed constitutional amendment/s and consent to the filing of the Petition.

The foregoing COMELEC Resolution was brought to petitioners' attention through the Letter dated July 7, 2022 of respondent's Law Department. Verily, respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it declined to act on the APELA. In any event, it is quite apparent that what petitioners really wanted was a manual recount of all the votes cast during the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, albeit they loosely referred to it as a people's initiative. In either case, however, the Petition is defective in form and substance, hence, dismissible outright.

ALL TOLD, I vote to dismiss the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.

^[1] Decision, pp. 2-3.

^[2] Id. at 3-6.

^[3] Id. at 3.

^[4]Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

^[5] Sevilla v. COMELEC, 843 Phil. 142, 156 (2018) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], citing Albania v. Commission on Elections, 810 Phil. 470, 477 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

^[6] ARTICLE XVII, SECTION 2, 1987 CONSTITUTION; SECTION 3(a) of REPUBLIC ACT No. 6735, otherwise known as The Initiative and Referendum Act, approved August 4, 1989.

^[7] Decision, pp. 2-3.

CONCURRING OPINION
SINGH, J.:

The present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus seeks support from this Court to enforce the petitioners' request for a manual recount of votes in the province of Pangasinan during the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. The ponencia found that the crux of the issue in this case is that petitioners are in fact pursuing the exercise of their right to information, albeit through the wrong remedy or medium.

I fully concur with the ponencia in finding that the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus should be dismissed based on the rationale expounded in the Decision.

However, I wish to make of record my position in regard to the following statement in the ponencia:

Subject to certain exceptions and limitations, a citizen whose right to FOI has either been denied or violated by a government agency may bring forth a suit for mandamus for the vindication of said right and the judicial compulsion of disclosure and/or grant of access to the State's troves and inventories that hold information crucial to the public discourse and welfare.^[1]

Relatedly, I would also like to cite the ponencia's proposition that mandamus should be reexamined as an "appropriate remedy to enforce and recognize the people's constitutional right to FOI in light of government agencies such as COMELEC having crafted and promulgated FOI procedures that now appear to be quasi-judicial in nature."^[2]

The FOI pertained to in the ponencia is the Freedom of Information (FOI) which is grounded on Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The ponencia found, and I fully agree, that the ultimate right petitioners wish to enforce in this case is their right to information regarding the true results of the May 9, 2022 elections, as they doubt the manner and accuracy in which their votes and ballots were counted by the vote-counting machines. As such, they filed their Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus hoping that the Court would grant their prayer for a manual recount of the said votes.

Jurisprudence has provided that a petition for mandamus will lie in cases involving the right to information. In one of the earlier FOI cases decided upon by the Court, Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (Legaspi),^[3] the Court held that the Constitutional provision on the right to information is self-executing and that there is no need for any ancillary act of the Legislature, though the Legislature may impose conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded. "However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec[tion] 7 have become operative and enforceable x x x. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding such as this one."^[4]

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court covers petitions for mandamus:

Section 3. Petition for mandamus. 鈥� When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.^[5]

Jurisprudence explains that "[m]andamus is of two (2) types: first, in order to compel the performance of a clear legal duty; and second, to rectify the unlawful exclusion from a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled."^[6] In either case, the requisites for mandamus to lie are:

(a)
the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded;
(b)
it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law;
(c)

the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law;
(d)

the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and
(e)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.^[7] (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the mandamus sought by the petitioners is of the first type, as it seeks to compel the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to manually recount the votes in the province of Pangasinan during the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. I opine that such demand, while an exercise of their right to information, is not one that can be granted by a petition for mandamus as the COMELEC does not have the ministerial duty to simply order a recount of the votes during the May 9, 2022 elections.

In fact, I do not agree that the exercise of the right to information is compellable by mandamus to begin with. I believe it is discretionary because it involves an assessment on the part of the requested agency of the propriety of the release of information. It is not ministerial such that every request must be granted. At best, I submit that the remedy of mandamus is only to compel government agencies to examine the request for information or to act upon such, but it cannot lie as an absolute remedy to compel the disclosure of information.

Jurisprudence defines "ministerial duty" as one which is "so clear and specific that it leaves no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance."^[8] On the other, a "discretionary duty" is one which "by its nature requires the exercise of judgment."^[9] Thus, as explained in Symaco v. Aquino:^[10]

A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.^[11]

As mentioned in the ponencia, the COMELEC has promulgated its FOI Manual under Resolution No. 10685.^[12] This FOI Manual provides for the proper procedure in accessing needed information. Among its provisions is that there shall be a COMELEC FOI Decision Maker, who shall be responsible for granting or denying an FOI request after a thorough evaluation,^[13] and a COMELEC Appeals and Review Committee, which shall review the denial of an FOI request when so appealed by the requesting party.^[14] Upon exhaustion of these administrative remedies, the requesting party may the file the appropriate judicial action in accordance with the Rules of Court.^[15]

These FOI provisions are only some of the provisions echoed in other government agencies in their own FOI Manuals. Key to the review of the request for information, is a thorough review of the information requested and whether it falls among the Inventory of Exceptions to Executive Order No. 2 (Series of 2016),^[16] which is periodically updated to reflect changes in existing law and jurisprudence.^[17]

The rules created by the Executive Department require a thorough review of requests for information. This implies that the act of granting or denying said requests is not purely ministerial in character as the requests are first evaluated before they can be granted. While true, it is the right of every citizen to have their requests for information entertained, the grant thereof, however, is not an automatic outcome. A government official's discretion is still needed before a request may be properly processed and the information released to the public. As such, the fourth requisite in petitions for mandamus is not met.

Thus, although in Legaspi, it was stated that access to public records cannot simply be discretionary to government agencies, the pronouncements therein cannot be taken to mean that the grant of the request for information is ministerial in nature. The right to information is not absolute.

I opine that with the developments in our laws and rules and regulations, it is an opportune time for the Court to clarify that the right to information, while inherent in every citizen of the Philippines, is still subject to regulations imposed by the government agency or authority from whom petitioners seek information. As such, where a petition for mandamus does not lie, a petition for certiorari may still be availing where grave abuse of discretion is a ground to overturn any decision made by government officials on a request for information.

In the present case, the petitioner failed to prove that the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to automatically grant the call of the petitioner for the manual recount of votes in the Province of Pangasinan considering that, to reiterate, the remedy of mandamus is only to compel government agencies to examine the request for information or to act upon such request. Further, petitioners failed to prove any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC on its request. As such, in this instance, the remedy of certiorari must also fail.

As a final note of emphasis, the State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest and is further subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.^[18] Without showing how the manual recount of votes in the Province of Pangasinan is protected by these constitutional guarantees, and not covered by the limitations provided by law, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus must fail.

^[1] Ponencia, p. 35.

^[2] Ponencia, p. 41-42.

^[3] 234 Phil. 521 (1987) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].

^[4] Id. at 529.

^[5] Rules of Court, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended (April 8, 1997).

^[6] Municipality of Payao, Zamboanga Sibugay v. Municipality of Imelda, Zamboanga Sibugay, 905 Phil. 1046 (2021) [Per J. Lopez, J., Third Division].

^[7] Del Rosario v. Shaikh, 867 Phil. 731, 740 (2019) [Per J. Reyes, J. Jr., First Division].

^[8] Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 273 Phil. 507, 513 (1991) [Per J. Sarmiento, Second Division].

^[9] Id. at 1135.

^[10] 106 Phil. 1130 (1960) [Per J. Barrera, First Division].

^[11] Id. at 1135.

^[12] Promulgated on December 16, 2020.

^[13] Section 27 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10685 promulgated on December 16, 2020.

^[14] Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10685, promulgated on December 16, 2020.

^[15] Section 37 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10685, promulgated on December 16, 2020.

^[16] Operationalizing in the Executive Branch the People's Constitutional Right to Infonnation and the State Policies to Full Public Disclosure and Transparency in the Public Service and Providing Guidelines Therefor.

^[17] Memorandum Circular No. 49, Creating an Inter-Agency Freedom of Information Exceptions Policy Committee, promulgated on October 10, 2018.

^[18] Belgica v. Pulido-Tan, G.R. No. 212576, January 5, 2021.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 264661, July 30, 2024 ]

1)	That each of them was aware of the existence of the APELA and had voluntarily signed the same;

2)	That each of them was aware that the COMELEC had either dismissed or denied the APELA, that each knew of the instant petition being prepared for filing before the Court;

3)	That each of them had read the instant petition and had signed its verification and certification against forum shopping portions with full understanding of, and agreement with, the instant petition's contents;

4)	That each of them doubts the results of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections due to the highly suspicious, statistically improbably, and nearly impossible swiftness of the tallying, and that each were monitoring the election results on COMELEC's website, on social media and on various television news programs;

5)	That each of them was surprised at the supposedly high voter turnout in the Province of Pangasinan, and that the results for the province differed substantially from pre-election surveys; and

6)	That each of them came to know of the opinions of some election experts that doubted the speed, conduct, and overall transparency of the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections, which validated each of their concerns and worries.

1)	The instant petition suffers from defective verifications, since it can be seen from a plain reading of the same that petitioners have no personal knowledge of facts recited therein, and that their action is based on their mere assertions that are based on their fears and speculations about how the automated election system was supposedly compromised 鈥� fears and speculations which are in turn only based on the hearsay opinions they came across on social media that had no specific mention of the election results in the Province of Pangasinan, the authors of which are not presently joined in the present proceedings, and the authenticity of which have not been sufficiently established.

2)	Mandamus cannot lie here, since Legaspi, et al. cannot point to any clear factual or even legal basis for their right to have the election results in Pangasinan subjected to a manual recount. Thus, respondent cannot be said to have reneged on its suffrage-related duties under the law.

3)	Legaspi, et al. have no locus standi to file the instant petition, since they have neither sustained any material injury (i.e., they were all able to cast their votes during the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections). Moreover, the instant petition cannot be considered a class suit since the 32 petitioners from just 9 cities and municipalities in the Province of Pangasinan cannot be said to be representative of the entire class of 2,096,936 registered voters (with 1,828,196 who actually voted on May 9, 2022) coming from all 48 cities and municipalities in the said province.^[21]

4)	Finally, the instant petition presents no actual case or controversy, since Legaspi, et al. intend to neither nullify the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections nor to unseat any incumbent elected official. Moreover, Legaspi, et al. have presented no concrete evidence of any alleged cheating or mass disenfranchisement during the said elections鈥攖hey only present their bare assertion of their lack of faith in the COMELEC's VCMs utilized on May 9, 2022, which they have based on conjectures and suspicions that they came across online.

1)	The social media postings they came across online are not hearsay but point to records that could be verified by electronic means, such as an inspection of COMELEC's transparency server for the May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections. Moreover, the opinions they cite are those of experts 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 automated elections.

2)	Legaspi, et al. now allege specific factual issues, such as the supposedly surreptitious change in the source code downloaded to all VCMs, and the alleged manipulation of COMELEC's transparency server to reflect results that would already condition the minds of the public during the first hour after the close of polls on May 9, 2022.

3)	COMELEC's non-transparent manner in failing to accommodate Legaspi, et al.'s requests are clearly instances of disregarding and ignoring their APELA, which violate their basic right of suffrage as explained above.

4)	The Court should adopt a more liberal policy here 惫颈蝉-脿-惫颈蝉 locus standi, since the issues presented by the instant petition are of transcendental importance due to the fundamental rights involved.

5)	Finally, the instant petition constitutes a class suit since Legaspi, et al. represent the interests of fairly 72,000 voters^[23] in Pangasinan who signed the APELA demanding for the manual recount. Moreover, there is a case and controversy present here, since COMELEC (in Legaspi, et al.'s eyes) had effectively denied the said APELA.

(a)	The full text of the proposed amendment, which may either be:

	i.	Written on the face of the Petition; or
	ii.	Attached to the Petition, in which case, the Petition must state the fact of such attachment;

(b)	The Reason/s therefor;

(c)	An abstract or summary of the Proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the Petition. The abstract shall include a clear description of the Proposition's essential content;

(d)	The required attachments mentioned in Section 12 (a) hereof; and

(e)	A statement affirming that before the signatures are affixed, the Proponent/s ensured that Petitioners have read and understood the Petition and the proposed amendment/s to the Constitution, and have known that the signatures constitute approval of the proposed constitutional amendment/s and consent to the filing of the Petition.

(a)	the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded;
(b)	it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law;
(c)	the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law;
(d)	the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and
(e)	there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.^[7] (Emphasis supplied)