DIMAAMPAO, J.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent] Immaculada Trinidad and against [petitioners] Noe R. Pagarao, Jr. and Rebecca Cabella, who are ordered to:On appeal before the RTC, Pagarao and Caballa argued that the MTC erred in failing to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action, considering that the complaint did not allege that their initial possession of the contested property was lawful.[14] Ruling against them, the RTC affirmed in toto the judgment of the MTC and decreed that Trinidad had the right to evict Pagarao and Caballa.[15] The RTC held further that while Trinidad had no knowledge as to when and how they began occupying the same, it was immaterial in view of the parties' subsequent agreement to execute a contract to sell.[16]
a) VACATE the property at Block 34, Lot 8, Audi St., Village East, Brgy. Sto Domingo, Cainta, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 616372; b) PAY the sum of: i. [PHP] 10,000[.]00 every month representing reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property from the time of demand to vacate on February 21, 2019 which shall be deducted by the amount of [PHP] 300,000.00 representing the earnest money; ii. [PHP] 20,000.00 as attorney's fees; iii. [PHP] 5,949[.]00 as costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis in the original)
There have been many cases discussing the distinction between actions for unlawful detainer and those for forcible entry. However, the common thread has always been the Court's consistent adoption of the following precept—the border between forcible entry and unlawful detainer is defined by the nature of the defendant's entry into or initial possession of the property. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.[27] This robust principle is so well established that it remains true even if the owner later decides to tolerate the intruder's possession. As has been repeatedly avowed, such subsequent tolerance cannot convert an action for forcible entry into one for unlawful detainer.[28]
- Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
- Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
- Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
- Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[26]
[T]olerance or permission must have been present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.The above jurisprudential discourse was elaborated further in Galacgac v. Bautista,[31] wherein this Court held:
. . . .
As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely establish its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry[.][30] (Emphasis in the original; citation omitted)
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one-year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.[32] (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)In the case at bench, Trinidad herself disavowed any knowledge of the incidents surrounding Pagarao and Caballa's initial entry to the subject realty.[33] In her complaint, she admitted that she "does not know exactly when and by what manner or reason [Pagarao and Caballa] had occupied her lot."[34] Short of an explicit declaration to that effect, Pagarao and Caballa's entry was neither permitted nor tolerated by Trinidad. Needless to say, such admission runs counter to the requirement in an unlawful detainer case that tolerance should have been present from the very start of possession.
Nonetheless, in this case, the contract to sell does not by itself give respondent the right to possess the property. Unlike in a contract of sale, here in a contract to sell, there is yet no actual sale nor any transfer of title, until and unless, full payment is made. The payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. Respondent must have fully paid the price to acquire title over the property and the right to retain possession thereof. In cases of non-payment, the unpaid seller can avail of the remedy of ejectment since he retains ownership of the property.In Union Bank of the Phils. v. Maunlad Homes, Inc.,[38] the Court similarly stated that the buyer's right to possess the property is extinguished when the contract to sell fails to materialize.[39] The failure of the buyer to make installment payments rendered the contract ineffective and without force and effect, consequently depriving them of the right to continue possession of the subject realty.[40]
Considering that respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving payment, he cannot claim ownership of the property and his possession thereof was by mere tolerance. His continued possession became unlawful upon the owner's demand to vacate the property. We stress, however, that this adjudication, is only a provisional determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.[37] (Emphasis supplied)