108 OG No. 31, 3780 (July 30, 2012)
This petition for review on
certiorari assails the decision
[1] and the resolution
[2] of the Court of Appeals (
CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105410. These assailed CA rulings reversed and set aside the ruling of the Civil Service Commission (
CSC)
in Resolution No. 080305
[3]
that denied respondent Richard G. Cruz's prayer for the award of back
salaries as a result of his reinstatement to his former position.
THE FACTS
The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (
CMWD), was charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General Manager (
GM) Nicasio Reyes. He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging statement (
Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at General Manager) against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors (
Board);
four of the respondent's subordinates allegedly witnessed the
utterance. The dishonesty charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondent's
act of claiming overtime pay despite his failure to log in and out in
the computerized daily time record for three working days.
The
respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave
misconduct, he stressed that three of the four witnesses already
retracted their statements against him. On the charge of dishonesty, he
asserted that he never failed to log in and log out. He reasoned that
the lack of record was caused by technical computer problems. The
respondent submitted documents showing that he rendered overtime work on
the three days that the CMWD questioned.
GM Reyes preventively
suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the expiration of his
preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD
Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty,
and dismissed him from the service.
[4]CSC RULING
The
respondent elevated the findings of the CMWD and his dismissal to the
CSC, which absolved him of the two charges and ordered his
reinstatement. In CSC Resolution No. 080305, the CSC found no factual
basis to support the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
In ruling that the respondent was not liable for grave misconduct, the CSC held:
Cruz was adjudged guilty of grave misconduct for his alleged utterance of such maligning statements, "MASASAMANG TAO ANG MGA BOD AT GENERAL MANAGER".
However, such utterance, even if it were true, does not constitute a
flagrant disregard of rule or was actuated by corrupt motive. To the
mind of the Commission, it was a mere expression of disgust over the
management style of the GM and the Board of Directors, especially when
due notice is taken of the fact that the latter officials were charged
with the Ombudsman for various anomalous transactions.[5]
In ruling that the charge of dishonesty had no factual basis, the CSC declared:
Based
on the records of the case, the Commission is not swayed that the
failure of Cruz to record his attendance on April 21 and 22, 2007 and
May 5, 2007, while claiming overtime pay therefor, amounts to
dishonesty. Cruz duly submitted evidence showing his actual rendition of
work on those days. The residents of the place where he worked attested
to his presence thereat on the days in question.[6]
The
CSC, however, found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable
office rules for his failure to log in and log out. It imposed on him
the penalty of reprimand but did not order the payment of back salaries.
The
CMWD and the respondent separately filed motions for reconsideration
against the CSC ruling. CMWD questioned the CSC's findings and the
respondent's reinstatement. The respondent, for his part, claimed that
he is entitled to back salaries in light of his exoneration from the
charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The CSC denied both motions.
Both the CMWD and the respondent elevated the CSC ruling to the CA
via
separate petitions for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The
CA dismissed the CMWD's petition and this ruling has lapsed to
finality.
[7] Hence, the issue
of reinstatement is now a settled matter. As outlined below, the CA
ruled in the respondent's favor on the issue of back salaries. This
ruling is the subject of the present petition with us.
CA RULING
Applying the ruling in
Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,
[8] the
CA found merit in the respondent's appeal and awarded him back salaries
from the time he was dismissed up to his actual reinstatement. The CA
reasoned out that CSC Resolution No. 080305 totally exonerated the
respondent from the charges laid against him. The CA considered the
charge of dishonesty successfully refuted as the respondent showed that
he performed overtime service. The CA thereby rejected the CSC's
contention that the charge of dishonesty had been merely downgraded to a
lesser offense; the CA saw the finding in CSC Resolution No. 080305 to
be for an offense (failing to properly record his attendance) entirely
different from the dishonesty charge because their factual bases are
different. Thus, to the CA, CSC Resolution No. 080305 did not wholly
restore the respondent's rights as an exonerated employee as it failed
to order the payment of his back salaries. The CA denied the CSC's
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
WHETHER
OR NOT [THE] RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BACK SALARIES AFTER THE CSC
ORDERED HIS REINSTATEMENT TO HIS FORMER POSITION, CONSONANT WITH THE CSC
RULING THAT HE WAS GUILTY ONLY OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES
AND REGULATIONS.[9]
CSC's positionThe CSC submits that the CA erred in applying the ruling in
Bangalisan, requiring as a condition for entitlement to back salaries that the government employee be found innocent of the charge
and
that the suspension be unjustified. CSC Resolution No. 080305 did not
fully exculpate the respondent but found him liable for a lesser
offense. Likewise, the respondent's preventive suspension pending appeal
was justified because he was not exonerated.
The CSC also submits that the factual considerations in
Bangalisan are entirely different from the circumstances of the present case. In
Bangalisan,
the employee, Rodolfo Mariano, a public school teacher, was charged
with grave misconduct for allegedly participating, together with his
fellow teachers, in an illegal mass action. He was ordered exonerated
from the misconduct charge because of proof that he did not actually
participate in the mass action, but was absent from work for another
reason. Although the employee was found liable for violation of office
rules and regulations, he was considered totally exonerated because his
infraction stemmed from an act entirely different (his failure to file a
leave of absence) from the act that was the basis of the grave
misconduct charge (the unjustified abandonment of classes to the
prejudice of the students).
The CSC argues that in the present case, the charge of dishonesty and the infraction committed by the respondent
stemmed from a single act
- his failure to properly record his attendance. Thus, the respondent
cannot be considered totally exonerated; the charge of dishonesty was
merely downgraded to a violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations.
Accordingly, the CSC posits that the case should have been decided according to our rulings in
Jacinto v. CA[10] and
De la Cruz v. CA[11] where
we held the award of back salaries to be inappropriate because the
teachers involved were not fully exonerated from the charges laid
against them.
The respondent's positionThe
respondent maintains that he is entitled to reinstatement and back
salaries because CSC Resolution No. 080305 exonerated him from the
charges laid against him; for the purpose of entitlement to back
salaries, what should control is his exoneration from the charges
leveled against him by the CMWD. That the respondent was found liable
for a violation different from that originally charged is immaterial for
purposes of the back salary issue.
The respondent also asserts that the
Bangalisan ruling
squarely applies since the CSC formally admitted in its Comment to
CMWD's petition for review before the CA that the penalty of reprimand
is not a reduced penalty for the penalty of dismissal imposable for
grave misconduct and dishonesty.
[12]THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit. The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal,
[13]
of a government employee who had been dismissed but was subsequently
exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction. The Court's starting point
for this outcome is the "no work-no pay" principle - public officials
are only entitled to compensation if they render service. We have
excepted from this general principle and awarded back salaries even for
unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees
based on the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law";
[14] to deny
these employees their back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment
after they have been exonerated from the charge that led to their
dismissal or suspension.
[15]The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - x x x.
(4)
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case
the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal. (italics ours)
This
provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back
salaries since it does not expressly provide for back salaries during
this period; our established rulings hold that back salaries may not be
awarded for the period of
preventive suspension[16] as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond question.
To
resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before
an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be
found innocent of the charges
and b) his suspension must be unjustified.
[17]
The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an
employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency
of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive
suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed
period is unjustified and must be compensated.
The CSC's rigid
and mechanical application of these two conditions may have resulted
from a misreading of our rulings on the matter; hence, a look at our
jurisprudence appears in order.
Basis for award of back salariesThe Court had the occasion to rule on the issue of entitlement to back salaries as early as 1941,
[18] when Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (
RAC)
[19]
was the governing law. The Court held that a government employee, who
was suspended from work pending final action on his administrative case,
is not entitled to back salaries where he was ultimately removed due to
the valid appointment of his successor. No exoneration or
reinstatement, of course, was directly involved in this case; thus, the
question of back salaries after exoneration and reinstatement did not
directly arise. The Court, however, made the general statement that:
As
a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any
compensation if he has not rendered any service, and the justification
for the payment of salary during the period of suspension is that the
suspension was unjustified or that the official was innocent.
Hence, the requirement that, to entitle to payment of salary during
suspension, there must be either reinstatement of the suspended person
or exoneration if death should render reinstatement impossible.[20] (emphasis and underscoring ours)
In
Austria v. Auditor General,[21] a
high school principal, who was penalized with demotion, claimed payment
of back salaries from the time of his suspension until his appointment
to the lower position to which he was demoted. He argued that his later
appointment even if only to a lower position of classroom teacher
amounted to a reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC. The Court
denied his claim, explaining that the reinstatement under Section 260 of
the RAC refers to the same position from which the subordinate officer
or employee was suspended and, therefore, does not include demotional
appointments. The word "reinstatement" was apparently equated to
exoneration.
In the 1961 case of
Gonzales v. Hon. Hernandez, etc. and Fojas[22] interpreting the same provision, the Court first laid down the requisites for entitlement to back salaries. Said the Court:
A perusal of the decisions of this Court[23] x x x show[s] that back salaries are ordered paid to an officer or an employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal.
In the case at bar, [the employee] was not completely exonerated,
because although the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service
[ordering separation from service] was modified and [the employee] was
allowed to be reinstated, the decision [imposed upon the employee the
penalty of two months suspension without pay]. [emphasis and
underscoring ours]
Obviously, no exoneration
actually resulted and no back salary was due; the liability for the
offense charged remained, but a lesser penalty was imposed.
In
Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson, et al.,[24]
the City Mayor ordered the dismissal from the service of city employees
after finding them guilty as charged. On appeal, however, the decision
was modified by considering "the suspension of over one year x x x,
already suffered x x x [to be] sufficient punishment"
[25]
and by ordering their immediate reinstatement to the service. The
employees thereupon claimed that under Section 695 of the RAC, the
punishment of suspension without pay cannot exceed two (2) months. Since
the period they were not allowed to work until their reinstatement
exceeded two months, they should be entitled to back salaries
corresponding to the period in excess of two months. In denying the
employees' claim for back salaries, the Court held:
The
fallacy of [the employees'] argument springs from their assumption that
the modified decision had converted the penalty to that of suspension.
The modified decision connotes that although dismissal or resignation
would be the proper penalty, the separation from work for the period
until their reinstatement, would be deemed sufficient. Said decision did
not, in the least, insinuate that suspension should have been the
penalty.
x x x [T]he modified decision did not exonerate the petitioners.
x x x And even if we consider the punishment as suspension, before a
public official or employee is entitled to payment of salaries withheld,
it should be shown that the suspension was unjustified or that the employee was innocent of the charges proffered against him.[26]
On
the whole, these rulings left the application of the conditions for the
award of back salaries far from clear. Jurisprudence did not strictly
observe the requirements earlier enunciated in
Gonzales as under subsequent rulings, the innocence of the employee alone served as basis for the award of back salaries.
The innocence of the employee as sole basis
for an award of back salariesIn
Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc.,[27]
we ruled that the payment of back salary to a government employee, who
was illegally removed from office because of his eventual exoneration on
appeal, is merely incidental to the ordered reinstatement.
Tan was subsequently reiterated in
°Õ²¹Ã±²¹±ô²¹ v. Legaspi,
et al.,[28]
a case involving an employee who was administratively dismissed from
the service following his conviction in the criminal case arising from
the same facts as in the administrative case. On appeal, however, he was
acquitted of the criminal charge and was ultimately ordered reinstated
by the Office of the President. Failing to secure his actual
reinstatement, he filed a
mandamus petition to compel his
superiors to reinstate him and to pay his back salaries from the date of
his suspension to the date of his actual reinstatement. We found merit
in his plea and held:
[The employee] had been
acquitted of the criminal charges x x x, and the President had reversed
the decision x x x in the administrative case which ordered his
separation from the service, and the President had ordered his
reinstatement to his position, it results that the suspension and the
separation from the service of the [employee] were thereby considered
illegal. x x x.
x x x [In this case,] by virtue of [the
President's order of reinstatement], [the employee's] suspension and
separation from the service x x x was thereby declared illegal, so that
for all intents and purposes he must be considered as not having been
separated from his office. The lower court has correctly held that the
[employee] is entitled to back salaries.[29]
The
°Õ²¹Ã±²¹±ô²¹ ruling
was reiterated in
Cristobal v. Melchor,[30] Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,[31] De Guzman v. CSC[32] and
Del Castillo v. CSC[33] - cases
involving government employees who were dismissed after being found
administratively liable, but who were subsequently exonerated on appeal.
In
Garcia v. Chairman Commission on Audit,
[34] the Court held that - where the employee, who was dismissed after being found administratively liable for dishonesty, was
acquitted on a finding of innocence
in the criminal case (for qualified theft) based on the same acts for
which he was dismissed - the executive pardon granted him in the
administrative case (
in light of his prior acquittal) entitled him to back salaries from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his actual reinstatement.
The
above situation should be distinguished from the case of an employee
who was dismissed from the service after conviction of a crime and who
was ordered reinstated after being granted pardon. We held that he was
not entitled to back salaries since he was not illegally dismissed nor
acquitted of the charge against him.
[35]Incidentally, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
[36]
if the public official or employee is acquitted of the criminal
charge/s specified in the law, he is entitled to reinstatement and the
back salaries withheld during his suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In
Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,
[37]
the Court clarified that the silence of Section 42 (Lifting of
Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation) of the Civil
Service Decree
[38] on the payment of back salaries, unlike its predecessor,
[39] is no reason to deny back salaries to a dismissed civil servant who was ultimately exonerated.
Section
42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point x x x [as] it does
not cover dismissed civil servants who are ultimately exonerated and
ordered reinstated to their former or equivalent positions. The rule in
the latter instance, just as we have said starting with the case of Cristobal vs. Melchor
is that when "a government official or employee in the classified civil
service had been illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later
been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left
his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges
that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held."[40]
These cited cases illustrate that a black and white observance of the requisites in
Gonzales is not required at all times. The common thread in these cases is either the employee's
complete exoneration of the administrative charge against him (
i.e., the employee is not found guilty of
any other offense),
or the
employee's acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence. If
the case presented falls on either of these instances, the conditions
laid down in
Gonzales become the two sides of the same coin; the
requirement that the suspension must be unjustified is automatically
subsumed in the other requirement of exoneration.
Illegal suspension as sole basis for an award
of back salaries By requiring the concurrence of the two conditions,
Gonzales
apparently made a distinction between exoneration and unjustified
suspension/dismissal. This distinction runs counter to the notion that
if an employee is exonerated, the exoneration automatically makes an
employee's suspension unjustified. However, in
Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al.,
[41] the
Court had the occasion to illustrate the independent character of these
two conditions so that the mere illegality of an employee's suspension
could serve as basis for an award of back salaries.
Abellera, a
cashier in the Baguio City Treasurer's Office, was ordered dismissed
from the service after being found guilty of dishonesty and gross
negligence.
Even before the period to appeal expired, the City of
Baguio dismissed him from the service. On appeal, however, the penalty
imposed on him was reduced "to two months suspension, without pay"
although the appealed decision was affirmed "in all other respects."
When
the issue of Abellera's entitlement to back salaries reached the Court,
we considered the illegality of Abellera's suspension -
i.e.,
from the time he was dismissed up to the time of his actual
reinstatement - to be a sufficient ground to award him back salaries.
The
rule on payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a
member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, is
already settled in this jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries
corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may
be decreed not only if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension (Sec. 35, RA 2260), but also when the suspension is unjustified.
In
the present case, upon receipt of the [Civil Service Commissioner's]
decision x x x finding [Abellera] guilty, but even before the period to
appeal had expired, [the Baguio City officials] dismissed [Abellera]
from the service and another one was appointed to replace him. [Abellera's] separation x x x before the decision of the Civil Service Commissioner had become final was evidently premature.
[The Baguio City officials] should have realized that [Abellera] still
had the right to appeal the Commissioner's decision to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals within a specified period, and the possibility of that
decision being reversed or modified.[42]
As it did happen on such appeal x x x the penalty imposed by the
Commissioner was reduced x x x to only 2 months suspension. And yet, by
[the Baguio City officials'] action, [Abellera] was deprived of work for
more than 2 years. Clearly, Abellera's second suspension from office [i.e., from the time he was dismissed up to his actual reinstatement] was unjustified, and the payment of the salaries corresponding to said period is, consequently, proper.[43] (emphases and underscoring ours)
The import of the
Abellera ruling was explained by the Court in the subsequent case of
Yarcia v. City of Baguio[44] that involved substantially similar facts. The Court clarified that the award of back salaries in
Abellera
was based on the premature execution of the decision (ordering the
employee's dismissal from the service), resulting in the employee's
unjustified "second suspension." Under the then Civil Service Rules, the
Commissioner of Civil Service had the discretion to order the immediate
execution of his decision in administrative cases "in the interest of
public service." Unlike in
Abellera, this discretion was exercised in
Yarcia;
consequently, the employee's separation from the service pending his
appeal "remained valid and effective until it was set aside and modified
with the imposition of the lesser penalty."
[45]The unjustified "second suspension" mentioned in
Abellera actually
refers to the period when the employee was dismissed from the service
up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Under our present legal
landscape, this period refers to "suspension pending appeal."
[46]In
Miranda v. Commission on Audit,[47]
the Court again had the occasion to consider the illegality of the
suspension of the employee as a separate ground to award back salaries.
Following the filing of several administrative charges against him,
Engr. Lamberto Miranda was "preventively" suspended from June 2, 1978 to
May 7, 1986. He was reinstated on May 22, 1986. On October 7, 1986, the
administrative case against him was finally dismissed "for lack of
evidence." When his claim for back salaries (from the time he was
"preventively" suspended up to his actual reinstatement) was denied by
the Commission on Audit, he brought a
certiorari petition with this Court.
In granting the petition, the Court ruled that since the law
[48]
limits the duration of preventive suspension to a fixed period, Engr.
Miranda's suspension for almost eight (8) years is "unreasonable and
unjustified." Additionally, the Court observed that the dropping of the
administrative case against Engr. Miranda for lack of evidence "is even
an eloquent manifestation that the suspension is unjustified."
[49] The Court held:
This
being so, Engineer Miranda is entitled to backwages during the period
of his suspension as it is already settled in this jurisdiction that a
government official or employee is entitled to backwages not only if he is exonerated in the administrative case but also when the suspension is unjustified.[50] (emphases and underscoring ours)
Jurisprudential definition of exoneration The
mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government
employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against
him. This is the Court's teaching in
City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA.[51]
In this case, the employee was initially found guilty of disgraceful
and immoral conduct and was given the penalty of dismissal by the City
Mayor of Zamboanga. On appeal, however, the CA limited the employee's
guilt to improper conduct and correspondingly reduced the penalty to
"six-months suspension without pay with a stern warning that repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely."
[52] The CA also awarded him "full backwages."
[53]We
held that the CA erred in awarding back salaries by reiterating the
principle that back salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or
employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his
suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal.
[54]The Court had the occasion to explain what constitutes "exoneration" in
Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,[55]
the respondent's cited case. In this case, the Secretary of Education
found the public school teachers guilty as charged and imposed on them
the penalty of dismissal. On appeal, the CSC affirmed the Secretary's
ruling but reduced the penalty imposed to suspension without pay.
However, the CSC found one of the teachers (Mariano) guilty only of
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, and only penalized
her with reprimand. None of the petitioning public school teachers were
awarded back salaries.
On appeal to this Court, we awarded back
salaries to Mariano. We explained that since the factual premise of the
administrative charges against him -
i.e., his alleged
participation in the illegal mass actions, and his suspension - was
amply rebutted, then Mariano was in effect exonerated of the charges
against him and was, thus, entitled to back salaries for the period of
his suspension pending appeal.
With respect to
petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his back wages is in order. A
reading of the resolution of the [CSC] will show that he was exonerated
of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The Secretary
of the DECS charged him with and he was later found guilty of grave
misconduct x x x [and] conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service x x x for his participation in the mass actions x x x. It was
his alleged participation in the mass actions that was the basis of his
preventive suspension and, later, his dismissal from the service.
However,
the [CSC], in the questioned resolution, made [the] finding that
Mariano was not involved in the "mass actions" but was absent because he
was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother.
Although the CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was
for his violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because he
failed to inform the school or his intended absence and neither did he
file an application for leave covering such absences.
x x x x
However,
with regard to the other petitioners, the payment of their back wages
must be denied. Although the penalty imposed on them was only
suspension, they were not completely exonerated of the charges against
them. The CSC made specific findings that, unlike petitioner Mariano,
they indeed participated in the mass actions. It will be noted that it
was their participation in the mass actions that was the very basis of
the charges against them and their subsequent suspension.[56]
Bangalisan
clearly laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the employee
is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry
into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense
committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have
been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged,
the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for
the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. The employee
found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to back salaries
when the offense actually committed does not carry the penalty of more
than one month suspension or dismissal.
[57]Bangalisan
reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of
suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered
reinstated, may be decreed only if the employee is found innocent of the
charges which caused the suspension
and when the suspension is unjustified. This pronouncement
was re-echoed in
Jacinto v. CA,[58] De la Cruz v. CA,[59] and
Hon. Gloria v. CA.
[60] Taking off from
Bangalisan, the Court in
De la Cruz categorically stated:
The
issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered
reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders x x x were commuted
by the CSC to six (6) months suspension is already settled.
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, we resolved the issue in the negative on the ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of back wages in administrative disciplinary cases.[61]
In
Hon. Gloria, involving the same factual situation as
Bangalisan,
the
CA awarded the public school teachers back salaries - for the period
beyond the allowable period of preventive suspension - since they were
ultimately exonerated. In affirming the CA, the Court distinguished
preventive suspension from
suspension pending appeal
for the purpose of determining the extent of an employee's entitlement
to back salaries. The Court ruled that under Executive Order (
E.O.) No.
292,
there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees
who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i)
preventive suspension pending investigation
[62] and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal;
[63] compensation is due only for the period of preventive suspension
pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.
[64] Citing Floyd R. Mechem's
A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers,
[65] Hon. Gloria ruled:
Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that "payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified."[66] (emphases and underscoring ours)
A
careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict observance of
the second condition for an award of back salaries becomes important
only if the employee is not totally innocent of
any
administrative infraction. As previously discussed, where the employee
is completely exonerated of the administrative charge or acquitted in
the criminal case arising from the same facts based on a finding of
innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the first.
Otherwise, a determination of the act/s and offense/s actually committed
and of the corresponding penalty imposed has to be made.
Unjustified suspensionOn
the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met upon a
showing that the separation from office is not warranted under the
circumstances because the government employee gave no cause for
suspension or dismissal. This squarely applies in cases where the
government employee did not commit the offense charged, punishable by
suspension or dismissal (total exoneration); or the government employee
is found guilty of another offense for an act different from that for
which he was charged.
Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz illustratethe application of the two conditions Both the CA and the respondent applied
Bangalisan to justify the award of back salaries. The CSC argues against this position with the claim that the rulings in
Jacinto and
De la Cruz, not
Bangalisan,
should apply. After due consideration, we see no reason why the cited
rulings and their application should be pitted against one another; they
essentially espouse the same conclusions after applying the two
conditions for the payment of back salaries.
Bangalisan, Jacinto and
De la Cruz
all stemmed from the illegal mass actions of public school teachers in
Metro Manila in 1990. The teachers were charged with grave misconduct,
gross neglect of duty, and gross violation of civil service law, rules
and regulations, among others. The then Secretary of Education found
them guilty and dismissed them from the service. The CSC, on appeal,
ordered the teachers reinstated, but withheld the grant of their back
salaries. The CSC found the teachers liable for conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and imposed on them the penalty of
suspension. The CSC reasoned that since the teachers were not totally
exculpated from the charge (but were found guilty of a lesser offense),
they could not be awarded back salaries.
When these cases reached
the Court, the issue of the teachers' entitlement to back salaries was
raised. The teachers claimed that they were entitled to back salaries
from the time of their dismissal or suspension until their
reinstatement, arguing that they were totally exonerated from the
charges since they were found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
Under this factual backdrop, we
applied the two conditions and distinguished between the teachers who
were absent from their respective classes because
they participated in the illegal mass action, on one hand, and the teachers who were
absent for some other reason, on the other hand.
With
respect to the teachers who participated in the illegal mass actions,
we ruled that they were not entitled to back salaries since they were
not exonerated. We explained that liability for a lesser offense,
carrying a penalty less than dismissal, is not equivalent to
exoneration. On the second condition, we ruled that their suspension is
not unjustified since they have given a ground for their suspension -
i.e.,
the unjustified abandonment of their classes to the prejudice of their
students, the very factual premise of the administrative charges against
them - for which they were suspended.
With respect to the
teachers who were away from their classes but did not participate in the
illegal strike, the Court awarded them back salaries, considering
that:
first, they did not commit the act for which they were dismissed and suspended; and
second, they were found guilty of another offense,
i.e.,
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations which is not
penalized with suspension or dismissal. The Court ruled that these
teachers were totally exonerated of the charge, and found their
dismissal and suspension likewise unjustified since the offense they
were found to have committed only merited the imposition of the penalty
of reprimand.
These cases show the Court's consistent stand in
determining the propriety of the award of back salaries. The government
employees must not only be found innocent of the charges; their
suspension must likewise be shown to be unjustified.
The Present CaseWe
find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back
salaries during the period he was suspended from work, following his
dismissal until his reinstatement to his former position. The records
show that the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty against him
were not substantiated. As the CSC found, there was no corrupt motive
showing malice on the part of the respondent in making the complained
utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of dishonesty was
well refuted by the respondent's evidence showing that he rendered
overtime work on the days in question.
We fully respect the
factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA affirmed these
factual findings. However, on the legal issue of the respondent's
entitlement to back salaries, we are fully in accord with the CA's
conclusion that the two conditions to justify the award of back salaries
exist in the present case.
The first condition was met since the
offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of
reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in
and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (
claiming overtime pay despite his
failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with.
The
second condition was met as the respondent's committed offense merits
neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one
month), but only reprimand.
In sum, the respondent is entitled to
back salaries from the time he was dismissed by the CMWD until his
reinstatement to his former position -
i.e., for the period of
his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his
preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not
entitled to any back salaries per our ruling in
Hon. Gloria.
[67]WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, and
Sereno, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., no part.
Abad and Mendoza, JJ., on official leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice)
Mariano C. del Castillo, and concurred in by Associate Justices Monina
Arevalo-Zenarosa (ret.) and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.; dated February
20, 2009.
Rollo, pp. 32-43.
[2] Dated May 8, 2009;
id. at 44-45.
[3] Penned by Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza;
id. at 250-258.
[4] CMWD Memorandum No. 31-07 dated June 6, 2007;
id. at 60.
[5] Id. at 72-73.
[6] Id. at 73.
[7] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 104704, entitled "
The City of Malolos Water District v. Civil Service Commission and Richard G. Cruz."
The CA Decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 became final and executory
on July 29, 2010, per Entry of Judgment dated January 10, 2011.
[8] 342 Phil. 586 (1997).
[9] Rollo, p. 21.
[10] 346 Phil. 656 (1997).
[11] 364 Phil. 786 (1999).
[12] Rollo, p. 282.
[13] Hon. Gloria v. CA, 365 Phil. 744 (1999).
[14] This provision uniformly exists in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
[15] Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc., 107 Phil. 17 (1960).
[16] Hon. Gloria v. CA,
supra note 13.
[17] Bangalisan v. CA,
supra note 8.
[18] Reyes v. Hernandez, 71 Phil. 397 (1941).
[19] Section 260 of the RAC reads:
Payment of salary accruing pending suspension.
- When the chief of a Bureau or Office suspends a subordinate officer
or employee from duty, the person suspended shall not receive pay during
suspension unless the Department Head shall so order; but upon
subsequent reinstatement of the suspended person or upon his
exoneration, if death should render reinstatement impossible, any salary
so withheld shall be paid, but without prejudice to the application of
the disciplinary provisions of section six hundred and ninety-five
hereof.
[20] Reyes v. Hernandez,
supra note 18, at 398.
[21] No. L-21918, January 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 79.
[22] 112 Phil. 160, 166 (1961).
[23] Gonzales v. Hernandez,
ibid.,
did not specify the cases it relied upon for its pronouncement. A
survey of prior jurisprudence, however, reveals the following as bases:
Reyes v. Hernandez,
supra note 18
; Batungbakal v. National Development Company, 93 Phil. 182 (1953)
; National Rice and Corn Corp. v. NARIC Workers' Union, 98 Phil. 563 (1956);
Tabora v. Montelibano,
et al., 98
Phil. 800 (1956); and
Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc., supra note 15.
[24] 120 Phil. 1213 (1964).
[25] Id. at 1215.
[26] Id. at 1218-1219.
[27] Supra note 15.
[28] 121 Phil. 541 (1965).
[29] Id. at 551-553.
[30] 189 Phil. 658 (1980).
[31] G.R. No. 110936, February 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 677.
[32]
G.R. No. 101105, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 169. The illegality of the
dismissal in this case resulted from the invalidity of the
reorganization that authorized the employee's dismissal.
[33] 343 Phil. 734 (1997).
[34] G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 356, 362-363.
[35] Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports, 259 Phil. 1109, 1114 (1989).
[36] Section 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 reads:
Suspension and loss of benefits. -- Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under
any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
[37] Supra note 31.
[38] Section 42 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 reads:
Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.
When the administrative case against the officer of employee under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining
authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided,
That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not
be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
[39] R.A. No. 2260 or Civil Service Act of 1959. Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260 reads:
Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.
When the administrative case against the officer or employee under
preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of
Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the
service.
If the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he
shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of
suspension. (italics ours)
[40] Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,
supra note 31, at 679.
[41] No. L-23957, March 18, 1967, 19 SCRA 600.
[42]
Under Section 28 of the Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260
(Civil Service Act of 1959), the Commissioner of Civil Service has the
discretion to order the immediate execution of his decision in
administrative cases (J. Barredo's Dissent in
Yarcia v. City of Baguio,
etc., 144 Phil. 351
[1970]).
[43] See
Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1316, August 31, 2001, 364 SCRA 204, 217, where the Court awarded back salaries to a Clerk of Court and
Ex-officio Provincial
Sheriff, whom the Court ordered dismissed from the service for gross
misconduct. The resolution of dismissal was immediately implemented. On
reconsideration, however, the Court found him guilty of simple neglect
of duty and imposed on him only the penalty of fine. In granting his
subsequent request for back salaries from the time of his dismissal
until his reinstatement, the Court considered, among others, the
prematurity of the immediate execution of the resolution of dismissal as
basis for the award.
[44] Supra note 42
.[45] Citing
Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson,
et al., supra note 24, which was also cited in
Sales v. Mathay,
Sr., etc., et al., 214 Phil. 153 (1984).
[46] See
Bautista v. Peralta, No. L-21967, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 223, where the Court considered the "second suspension" mentioned in
Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al., supra note 41
, as
a "preventive suspension." At the time, R.A. No. 2260 allows the
payment of back salaries for the entire period of suspension in the
event of exoneration. At present, there is a clear legal distinction
between preventive suspension (
i.e., suspension pending investigation) and suspension pending appeal.
[47] G.R. No. 84613, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 657.
[48] Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260 and Section 42 of P.D. No. 807.
[49] Miranda v. Commission on Audit, supra note 47, at 662.
[50] Ibid.[51] G.R. No. 80270, February 27, 1990, 182 SCRA 785.
[52] Id. at 788.
[53] Ibid.[54] The Court also relied on Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 which required that an employee must be exonerated of the charges in order that he may be paid his back salaries. See also
Yarcia v. City of Baguio,
supra note
42, where the Court held that the mere reduction, on appeal, of the
penalty imposed (from dismissal to a fine of six months pay), without
however exonerating the employee from the charge (of dishonesty) against
him, does not entitle him to back salaries.
[55] Supra note 8.
[56] Id. at 598-599.
[57]
If the proper penalty imposable for the offense actually committed does
not exceed one month, then there would have been no occasion for a
suspension pending appeal since a decision imposing the penalty of
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary is final and not subject to appeal. (
See Book V,
Section 47, par. 2 of Executive Order No. 292;
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, dated April 10, 1990,
as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003 which took effect on November 19, 2003.)
[58] Supra note 10.
[59] Supra note 11.
[60] Supra note 13.
[61] De la Cruz v. CA, supra note 11, at 797.
[62] Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 51 of E.O. No. 292.
[63] Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 47(4) of E.O. No. 292.
[64]
The Court ruled that the absence of a provision in P.D. No. 807 and
later in E.O. No. 292 allowing the payment of back salaries during the
period of preventive suspension, unlike in Act No. 2711 and R.A. No.
2260, evidences a legislative intent to disallow payment of back
salaries for the period of preventive suspension regardless of the
employee's exoneration. But the payment of back salaries per se, that
is, without regard to the duration of the payment, has been consistently
recognized.
[65] §864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office. - An officer
who has been lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he was so suspended,
even though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient.
The reason given is "that salary and perquisites are the reward of
express or implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who
could not lawfully perform such services.
[66] Hon. Gloria v. CA, supra note 13, at 762.
[67]
The preventive suspension pending the investigation of the charges is
not imposed as a penalty but only to enable the disciplining authority
to conduct an unhampered investigation; the preventive suspension in
this regard is a necessary sacrifice, which holding a public office
requires.